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Abstract 
This study focused on the economic efficiency of Kansas farms. The goal was to 
investigate factors and how they might affect farms and their economic and production 
performance. Kansas was selected as the region of study for its large agricultural production and 
distinctive type of multiple-operation farms. Farms in the sample could produce three outputs, 
crops, livestock and custom work. Inputs for the farms included measures of capital, labor, land 
and purchased inputs. Production outputs were measured in bushels and tons; input quantities 
were computed from input expenditures applying an input price index taken from the US 
Department of Agriculture in real US dollars. The dataset consisted of a 10-year (1998-2007) 
panel of 456 multi-output farms belonging to the Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques were used to construct a non-
parametric efficiency frontier and calculate technical efficiency (TE), allocative efficiency (AE), 
scale efficiency (SE), and overall or economic efficiency (OE) for each farm and each year. A 
discretionary input oriented DEA technique was used to assess the effect of capital availability as 
a farm input and its impact on farms’ efficiencies. Efficiency scores in this problem were 
compared to the farms’ scores when the level of debt was accounted for as a farm input. 
Panel data Tobit analysis was applied to the farms’ inefficiency scores to investigate the 
causality of selected farm characteristics on technical, allocative, scale and overall inefficiencies. 
For the sampled farms and period, results confirmed that larger farms were more efficient than 
smaller ones. Farms specializing in livestock products, such as dairy and beef, were reported to 
be slightly more overall efficient than crop or mixed farms. Some economies of scope were 
found between custom work operations and crops. Financial structure of the farms was measured 
using the ratio of total debt to total assets for each farm. According to the results, larger leverage 
ratios increased all farm efficiencies. The positive effect of debt or capital availability in Kansas 
farms efficiencies was confirmed. The results of the technical efficiency discretionary DEA 
model agreed with this finding.  
  
 
STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF KANSAS FARMS 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
MONICA LOPEZ ANDREU 
 
 
 
B.A. University of Murcia, Spain, 1996 
M.S. Kansas State University, 2003 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
College of Agriculture 
 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2008 
 
Approved by: 
 
Major Professor 
Jeffrey M. Peterson 
 
Copyright 
MONICA LOPEZ ANDREU 
2008 
 
 
  
 
 Abstract 
This study focused on the economic efficiency of Kansas farms. The goal was to 
investigate factors and how they might affect farms and their economic and production 
performance. Kansas was selected as the region of study for its large agricultural production and 
distinctive type of multiple-operation farms. Farms in the sample could produce three outputs, 
crops, livestock and custom work. Inputs for the farms included measures of capital, labor, land 
and purchased inputs. Production outputs were measured in bushels and tons; input quantities 
were computed from input expenditures applying an input price index taken from the US 
Department of Agriculture in real US dollars. The dataset consisted of a 10-year (1998-2007) 
panel of 456 multi-output farms belonging to the Kansas Farm Management Association 
(KFMA). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques were used to construct a non-
parametric efficiency frontier and calculate technical efficiency (TE), allocative efficiency (AE), 
scale efficiency (SE), and overall or economic efficiency (OE) for each farm and each year. A 
discretionary input oriented DEA technique was used to assess the effect of capital availability as 
a farm input and its impact on farms’ efficiencies. Efficiency scores in this problem were 
compared to the farms’ scores when the level of debt was accounted for as a farm input. 
Panel data Tobit analysis was applied to the farms’ inefficiency scores to investigate the 
causality of selected farm characteristics on technical, allocative, scale and overall inefficiencies. 
For the sampled farms and period, results confirmed that larger farms were more efficient than 
smaller ones. Farms specializing in livestock products, such as dairy and beef, were reported to 
be slightly more overall efficient than crop or mixed farms. Some economies of scope were 
found between custom work operations and crops. Financial structure of the farms was measured 
using the ratio of total debt to total assets for each farm. According to the results, larger leverage 
ratios increased all farm efficiencies. The positive effect of debt or capital availability in Kansas 
farms efficiencies was confirmed. The results of the technical efficiency discretionary DEA 
model agreed with this finding.  
 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xiii 
Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xiv 
Preface ........................................................................................................................................... xv 
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction and Objectives ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 General Overview ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Introduction and Specific Objectives .................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1 Sources of Inefficiency in Kansas Farms ....................................................................... 2 
1.2.2 Impact of Debt on Efficiencies in Kansas Farms ........................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review ................................................................................................. 10 
2.1 Production Economics ........................................................................................................ 10 
2.2 The Cost Function ............................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Measures of Efficiency ....................................................................................................... 15 
2.4 Methods of Measuring Efficiency ...................................................................................... 16 
2.5 Studies on Causes of Efficiencies in Agricultural Production ............................................ 20 
2.6 Studies on Financial Farm Structure and Farm Efficiencies .............................................. 24 
CHAPTER 3 - Methods ................................................................................................................ 30 
3.1 Model Overview ................................................................................................................. 30 
3.2 Basic DEA Model ............................................................................................................... 30 
3.3 Non-Discretionary Empirical Model: Constrained DEA .................................................... 33 
3.4 Panel Tobit Regression Analysis of Farm Efficiency and Inefficiency Scores .................. 38 
CHAPTER 4 - Data ...................................................................................................................... 42 
4.1 Data Source and Sampling Procedures ............................................................................... 42 
4.2 Input and Output Categories and Data Aggregation ........................................................... 47 
4.3 Production and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Farms ................................................ 48 
CHAPTER 5 - Results .................................................................................................................. 60 
5.1 Efficiency Scores from Basic DEA Model by Year ........................................................... 60 
 vi
5.2 Efficiency Scores in Debt-Constrained Model ................................................................... 67 
5.3 Causes of Farm Inefficiencies and Efficiencies .................................................................. 73 
CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions and Implications .............................................................................. 95 
6.1 Implications of Sources of Inefficiency in Kansas Farms .................................................. 95 
6.2 Implications from the Impact of Debt on Efficiencies in Kansas Farms ............................ 97 
6.3 Future Research .................................................................................................................. 99 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 101 
Appendix A - Kansas Farm Management Association Databank .............................................. 107 
Appendix B - Codes .................................................................................................................... 110 
B.1 SAS Code to Retrieve Farms from the KFMA Databank ................................................ 110 
B.2 GAMS Codes ................................................................................................................... 160 
B.2.1 GAMS Code for Input-Oriented DEA Model ........................................................... 160 
B.2.2 GAMS Code for Non-Discretionary DEA Model ..................................................... 167 
B.3 STATA Code to Conduct Tobit Regression Analysis ..................................................... 175 
Appendix C - Marginal Effects and Elasticities Corresponding to the Inefficiency Basic DEA 
Models (Section 5.3) ............................................................................................................ 180 
C.1 Stata Description of Marginal Effects and Elasticity Calculations .............................. 180 
C.2 Tables of Marginal Effects and Elasticities .................................................................. 181 
Appendix D - Effects of Total Debt on Technical Inefficiency .................................................. 193 
Appendix E - Definition of Variables and Results of DEA Models and Summary Statistics for 
Debt-Constrained Samples .................................................................................................. 217 
  
 vii
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1  Cost Function with Respect to One Input Price ......................................................... 14 
Figure 2.2 Measures of Efficiency ................................................................................................ 17 
Figure 3.1 DEA and Non-Discretionary Inputs ............................................................................ 34 
Figure 4.1 Kansas Farm Management Associations ..................................................................... 44 
Figure 5.1 Number of Fully Efficient Farms (of 456 Farms) from 1988 to 2007 ........................ 64 
  
 viii
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Relationship between Technical Efficiency and Level of Farm Debt ............................ 8 
Table 3.1 Input-Oriented DEA Model- Basic Model ................................................................... 32 
Table 3.2 Non-Discretionary DEA with Added Debt Constraint ................................................. 36 
Table 3.3 Comparisons of DEA Models ....................................................................................... 37 
Table 4.1 Economic Depreciation Methods .................................................................................. 46 
Table 4.2 Variable Definition by Category ................................................................................... 52 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 2007 .................................... 54 
Table 4.4 Summary Statistics Categorized by Gross Farm Income for 456 Kansas Farms from 
1988 to 2007 ......................................................................................................................... 56 
Table 4.5 Summary Statistics Categorized by Farm Specialization for 456 Kansas Farms from 
1988 to 2007 ......................................................................................................................... 57 
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics Categorized by Total Debt for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 
2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table 5.1 Summary of Estimates for Technical (TE), Allocative (AE), Scale (SE) and Overall 
(OE) Efficiency from 1988 to 2007 ...................................................................................... 62 
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Debt-Constrained Models for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 
2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 68 
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics of the Impact of Level of Debt on Efficiencies for 456 Kansas 
Farms from 1988 to 2007 ...................................................................................................... 70 
Table 5.4 Definition of Variables used in Basic DEA and Panel Tobit Models .......................... 74 
Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Basic DEA and Panel Tobit Models .... 75 
Table 5.6 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 79 
Table 5.7 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 80 
Table 5.8 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 81 
Table 5.9 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 82 
 ix
Table 5.10 Relationship between Technical Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis . 89 
Table 5.11 Relationship between Allocative Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis 90 
Table 5.12 Relationship between Scale Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis ........ 91 
Table 5.13 Relationship between Overall Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis .... 92 
Table C.1 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being Uncensored . 181 
Table C.2 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional on 
being Uncensored ................................................................................................................ 182 
Table C.3 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent Variable 183 
Table C.4 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being Uncensored . 184 
Table C.5 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional on 
being Uncensored ................................................................................................................ 185 
Table C.6 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent Variable 186 
Table C.7 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being Uncensored . 187 
Table C.8 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional on 
being Uncensored ................................................................................................................ 188 
Table C.9 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent Variable 189 
Table C.10 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being Uncensored 190 
Table C.11 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional on 
being Uncensored ................................................................................................................ 191 
Table C.12 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent Variable
 ............................................................................................................................................. 192 
Table D.1 Definitions for Variables used in Debt-Constrained and Panel Tobit Models .......... 195 
Table D.2 Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Debt-Constrained and Panel Tobit 
Models ................................................................................................................................. 196 
Table D.3 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 198 
Table D.4 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 199 
Table D.5 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Basic Model, Panel Tobit Model . 200 
Table D.6 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 201 
 x
Table D.7 Definition of Variables used in Essay Two Tobit Models ......................................... 204 
Table D.8 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Model ........................................................................................................................ 205 
Table D.9 Relationship Between Allocative Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Model ........................................................................................................................ 206 
Table D.10 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis 207 
Table D.11 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 208 
Table D.12 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 209 
Table D.13 Relationship between Farms Scale Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 210 
Table D.14 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis ........ 211 
Table D.15 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 212 
Table D.16 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 213 
Table D.17 Relationship between Overall Efficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 214 
Table D.18 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis ..... 215 
Table D.19 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel Tobit 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 216 
Table E.1 Definition of Variables used for Summary Statistics of DEA Results ....................... 217 
Table E.2 Summary Statistic for Farms with No Change in Technical Efficiency Score .......... 220 
Table E.3 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Technical Efficiency ........... 222 
Table E.4 Summary Statistics for Farms with No Change in Allocative Efficiency Scores ...... 224 
Table E.5 Summary Statistics for Farms with Negative Change in Allocative Efficiency ........ 226 
Table E.6 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Allocative Efficiency .......... 228 
Table E.7 Summary Statistics for Farms for No Change in Scale Efficiency ............................ 230 
Table E.8 Summary Statistics for Farms with a Positive Change in Scale Efficiency ............... 232 
Table E.9 Summary Statistics for Farms with Negative Change in Scale Efficiency ................ 234 
 xi
Table E.10 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Overall Efficiency ............ 236 
Table E.11 Summary Statistics for Farms with No Change in Overall Efficiency .................... 238 
  
 xii
 Acknowledgements 
 I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. J. Fox for offering me the means to begin 
these studies; and Dr. B. Schurle for his support in difficult times. I am thankful to all my 
professors; I was honored to learn with them. I am very thankful to Dr. J. Crespi, and Dr. O. 
Grunewald for their academic support and help, as well as their encouragements.  
 
I offer my gratitude to my major professor, Dr. J. Peterson. Dr. Peterson was an excellent 
guide in this lengthy project; Dr. Peterson is a brilliant academician. To Dr. Featherstone, who 
pushed me to the limit, I owe him gratitude for his help, despite his numerous commitments and 
our different languages. I am grateful to Dr. M. Langemeier, for working to provide all data and 
offering good advice on this project. I am grateful for the support and help I have received from 
the administrative staff at the Department of Agricultural Economics; and I would like to 
especially mention Carla Kay, who helped me most when needed and her good heart.  
 
My special thanks to Dr. L. Moeller MD at Lafene Health Center; and Donna Davis in 
The International Students’ Office. 
 
Especially, my deepest thanks go to my friends, new and old ones, whom I consider like 
my family. Thanks to Vladimir Hlasny, Svetla D. Ben-Itzhak, Shahram Shafie, Michael Cuba, 
Will Kilian, Josh Bayless, and Martha and Rahim Borhani. Thanks to my colleagues; this 
learning experience was joyful thanks to their help, support and encouragement. Thanks to you, 
Mario Villatoro and Adriana, Alex Gregory, Percy Manzo, Zhifeng Gao, Kelly Chen, Yapo 
N’Guessan, Paul Clark, Shreedar, Amin, and many more I thank from my heart …..  
 
 
  
 xiii
Dedication 
 I dedicate this piece of work to my grandma, my “Abuelititca Maria”, my spiritual pillar 
in this life and the next one. Grandma, finally! 
 
To my sister, my Mariucha the most loving and generous person, without her emotional 
support and hard work I would not have been able to accomplish this task. To my parents, Trinity 
and Paco, for their endless encouragement. To my grandparents, uncles and cousins and all, 
because they were always encouraging and felt very close though they were miles away.  
 
To my Lord; 
 
Rejoice in the Lord always.  I will say it again: Rejoice!  Let your gentleness be 
evident to all.  The Lord is near. Do not be anxious about anything, but in 
everything, by prayer and petition, with thanksgiving, present your request to God. 
Philippians 4:4-6 
 
Many are the plans in a man’s heart, but it is the Lord’s purpose that prevails. 
Proverbs19:21 
 
  
 xiv
 xv
Preface 
This dissertation considered explicitly the role of capital structure and other individual 
factors in determining the performance of a sample of 456 Kansas farms from 1998 to 2007. To 
meet these objectives, I relied on previous research on cost frontiers and performance 
measurement to establish the link between productive efficiency and farm and financial structure 
(Fried, Lovell and Schmidt 2005; Färe, Grosskopf and Margaritis 2005). Using this theoretical 
construct and a cost function, the distance from the best practice frontier and optimal behavior 
was calculated. Total debt was used to test the role of capital access and its relation to production 
efficiency, based on different theories including free cash flow, credit evaluation, embodied 
capital and agency costs. Total debt indicates capital availability to the farm. Financial variables, 
especially debt incurred to purchase inputs and the availability of capital, may affect the structure 
and organization of farm production. This dissertation contributes to the literature by assessing 
the effect of capital structure on a farm’s distance from the best practice frontier. 
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction and Objectives 
1.1 General Overview 
The level of technical efficiency of a particular farm is characterized by the relationship 
between observed production and some ideal or potential production. The measurement of farm 
specific technical efficiency is based upon deviation of observed output (or input) from the best 
production or efficient production frontier. A farm is perfectly efficient if its actual production 
lies on the minimum cost frontier. If the farm’s production is above the frontier that farm is 
technically inefficient. 
Measuring technical efficiency has been a focus of research since Farrell’s (1957) 
definition of technical efficiency led to the development of methods for estimating the relative 
technical efficiency of firms. The common features of these estimation techniques are that 
information is extracted from a body of data to determine the best practice production frontier 
(Lewin and Lovell 1990). From this the relative measure of technical efficiency for the 
individual farm can be measured.  
Production efficiency has been measured using parametric and nonparametric 
approaches. Parametric approaches involve the estimation of a stochastic production frontier, 
where the output of a farm is a function of a set of inputs, inefficiency, and random error. A 
disadvantage of this technique is the imposition of an explicit functional form and a 
distributional assumption on the error. In contrast, the nonparametric approach of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) does not impose parametric restrictions on the underlying 
technology and therefore is less prone to misspecification (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994).  
There are around sixty thousand farms in Kansas who benefit from all advances in 
technology. An interesting and important question is: What are the main factors indirectly 
driving farms’ efficiencies and inefficiencies in Kansas? Are these factors influencing different 
production efficiency measures in the same way? Further, is it possible to improve farming 
efficiency by knowing which factors most influence an economically successful farm?  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the overall efficiency of Kansas farms, 
given their production and other measures of performance. This study has two major goals. The 
first is to investigate the evolution of Kansas farm efficiencies and the factors affecting them in 
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light of some important concerns regarding farming issues, specifically the effect of debt as the 
possible means to purchase inputs and long-term assets. The second goal is to quantify the effect 
of total farm debt on efficiencies. The next section specifies the purpose and supporting 
objectives for each of these goals.  
In this dissertation, annual production efficiencies were estimated and analyzed for a 
sample of 456 multi-output, multi-input Kansas farms from 1998 to 2007. The dataset was 
provided by the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA). The data included farm-
specific accounting information over the ten-year period of analysis. Information on production 
levels, inputs, financial and socio-economic factors were part of the information provided by 
each farm each year. Outputs were aggregated in seven categories reflecting the main crops 
produced in the area and the most common livestock operations. Inputs were aggregated into 
seven categories: land, labor, short-term and intermediate-term capital, and purchased inputs for 
livestock operations and crops operations. It is important to realize that these farms may produce 
all outputs together, a subset of the possible outputs, or any one of them. This implies that not all 
farms produce or use all outputs and/or inputs. 
1.2 Introduction and Specific Objectives 
1.2.1 Sources of Inefficiency in Kansas Farms 
The production and cost frontier approaches have been widely used to measure efficiency 
in agricultural economics at the farm level. Efficiency analysis (and the identification of changes 
in efficiency) is conceptually different from identifying technical change. The first subject is the 
topic of this study. Efficiency studies are a useful way to diagnose problems and make 
recommendations based on empirical work and the economic theory of farm production. Many 
stakeholders are interested in the results of efficiency studies, including policy makers, farmers, 
and agribusinesses such as lenders or input suppliers. Efficiency analysis is important in the 
current era of rapidly changing technology and increasing input costs. Efficiency analysis makes 
it possible to assess farmers’ relative performance, to enhance agricultural production to 
minimize costs through optimal input combinations, and to analyze the effect of farm 
characteristics on overall performance.  
The majority of farm efficiency studies in agricultural economics focus on technical 
efficiency (Coelli, Rahman and Thirtle 2002). Technical efficiency is just one component of 
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overall economic efficiency. However, in order to be economically efficient, a farm must first be 
technically efficient. Profit maximization requires a farm to produce the right mix and optimal 
output given the level of inputs employed (i.e. be technically efficient), to use the right mix of 
inputs in light of the relative price of each input (i.e. be allocatively efficient), and finally to 
produce the right level of output given the set of prices (i.e. be scale efficient) (Kumbhjaker and 
Lovell 2000).  
This dissertation seeks to measure farm performance with more than one measure of 
efficiency to have a more comprehensive view of farm performance. Of particular interest is 
overall or economic efficiency, which accounts for relative market input prices and combines 
measures of technical, scale and allocative efficiency. These four measures provide a 
comprehensive look at the farm’s performance from the input side and will be explained in detail 
in the next chapter. 
As noted above, DEA is one technique to measure efficiency. DEA is a non-parametic 
linear programming method that constructs a “best practice” or “benchmark performance” 
frontier, to which each harm in a sample is compared. In this dissertation, farm-level technical 
efficiency will be estimated using DEA. The method compares the units of analysis1 in terms of 
their use of inputs and their level of output “enveloping” all the data points to construct a relative 
best practice frontier. All the farms are compared in terms of the quantity of inputs used and the 
quantity of outputs produced. The best performers are those producing the most output with the 
least amount of inputs. These best performers in the sample lie on the best practice frontier and 
are given a score of one. Farms that lie above the frontier are technically inefficient, as they use 
more inputs than necessary to produce a given amount of output. The efficiency score for these 
farms is calculated as the radial reduction in inputs (i.e., reduction of all inputs by the same 
proportion) to the input levels needed for an efficient farm to produce the same output. Thus, 
farms whose scores are below one are assigned ratios based on the best performers’ relevant 
production characteristics.  
DEA does not impose any assumptions about the functional form of the production 
frontier and hence is less prone to mis-specification than econometric methods. With DEA, 
measures of efficiency are relative, as they refer to the sample from which they are calculated. 
                                                 
1 This term is used interchangeably with “decision making units” (DMUs). Both terms refer to any group of firms, 
farms, or homogenous units whose performance can be analyzed among peers and who have a common production 
process that transforms inputs into outputs. 
 3
This is an advantage because accurate and detailed information on a large and representative 
sample of Kansas farms is available for this study from the Kansas Farm Management 
Association (KFMA) database. Various input and output characteristics of the farms were 
selected from the database to answer the research questions. Four measures of efficiency were 
calculated using DEA models. I am interested in the multi-output firm since Kansas farms often 
have two or more complementary operations, most commonly livestock and crops. I want to 
account for this factor in the calculation of efficiencies. A major advantage of the DEA method 
is that it accommodates multiple outputs and inputs. These four measures of efficiency offer a 
sharp view of farm’s relative performance. The DEA method is explained more fully in Chapters 
2 and 3.  
In this dissertation, I used an input-oriented DEA analysis, where farms had seven 
outputs corresponding to the most common crops and livestock operations in Kansas. The 
specific outputs were wheat production, feed grain production, soybean production, hay and 
forage production, beef production, milk production, and custom work. I included seven inputs 
that represented the most important variable and operating farm costs. Inputs for both crop and 
livestock operations included in the cost function were expenses for labor, capital, land, livestock 
and dairy expenses, seed, fertilizer, and chemicals. Not all farms produced or used all outputs 
and/or inputs.  
Much of the whole-farm data used in previous research came from accounting records of 
expenditures because most farmers kept information for income tax reporting and not necessarily 
for production decision making. Nevertheless, expenditure data allows researchers to 
consistently measure the farms’ production records and management characteristics over time. 
Prices are easy to calculate with expenditure data and represent prices in a competitive market. 
Additionally, computers provide the processing power and the ability to measure efficiency more 
accurately by allowing researchers to use more complex linear programming algorithms on 
larger databases. For this study, the KFMA provided expenditure data from a sample of 456 
Kansas farms for the ten consecutive years from 1998 to 2007 on farms inputs and outputs.   
 Once efficiencies were estimated using DEA methods annually for the 10-year sample 
from 1998 to 2007, a two-step procedure was used to determine and examine the determinants of 
inefficiencies in Kansas farms. The two-step procedure investigates the determinants of farm 
inefficiency by regressing a transformation of the efficiency scores against a vector of farm-
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specific characteristics. The following factors were specified as farm characteristics: size of 
operation (measured by gross income and/or net income), amount of unpaid labor, off farm 
income, percent of output income, percent of input expenditures, percent of owned acres, debt-
to-asset ratio, operator’s age, and operator’s age. Because most farms in the sample were mostly 
cattle or crop farms, I also included the percentage of crop income, acres devoted to pasture grass 
and the percentage of labor devoted to crops to control for differences across operation types. 
The variable list is very comprehensive and it contains the socio-economic factors likely to 
influence farm production inefficiencies.   
This sample of Kansas farms provided a very interesting and useful case study, as Kansas 
is a major agricultural producer. Kansas farms also can be small or large, and farms can operate 
multiple operations. In this dissertation the dataset not only contained production information but 
a range of socio-economic characteristics of the farm. I have the advantage of using detailed, 
farm-level panel data from Kansas farms in a Tobit model in order to measure the impact of the 
variables just mentioned and their effect on farm efficiencies. In econometric analysis, panel data 
helps identify better estimates of inefficiency because the approach accounts for individual farm 
factors that affect inefficiency which are otherwise difficult to account for, such as soil quality, 
and the type of farm management. Importantly, I can exploit the robustness of the data set to 
measure inefficiency scores and investigate their source in multi-product farms such as those 
found in Kansas. Previous studies have been conducted on efficiency of farms in Kansas 
(Featherstone, Langemeier and Ismet 1997; Langemeier and DeLano, 1999; Coffey and 
Featherstone, 2004). Although this dissertation is related to these previous studies on Kansas 
farms, its main contribution is the use of recent data on farms to calculate all efficiencies and 
their causes for multiple-output farms in Kansas for a 10-year period. In addition, the efficiencies 
were evaluated in light of financial, production and social factors. Specific objectives included: 
• Calculate standard measures of efficiency, i.e. cost, technical, scale and allocative 
efficiency, using four input oriented multi-output/multi-input DEA approaches for a 
sample of 456 farms in Kansas for 10 consecutive years, from 1998 to 2007. 
• Analyze distribution and trends of the four efficiency measures for the 10-year study 
period.  
• Compare farms’ efficiency scores across farms and years and identify the most efficient 
farms. 
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• Use a two-step procedure, i.e. a Tobit regression, to investigate the effect of important 
farm characteristics or factors on the efficiency of the multi-output farms in Kansas. 
• Use results of the empirical estimation to shed light on and develop strategies that can 
improve Kansas farms’ efficiency levels regarding the operational and social structure of 
the farming operation. 
1.2.2 Impact of Debt on Efficiencies in Kansas Farms 
Agriculture in Kansas is highly mechanized and according to Perry (2006) most irrigated 
Kansas crop farms use quite efficient irrigation methods such as center pivot systems. Fertilizer, 
herbicide and seeds are part of farm input variable expenses. Financial variables can represent 
the level of debt, especially debt incurred to purchase inputs, and the availability of capital to run 
a farming operation. Inputs are of better quality and higher priced due to technological advances, 
and new technology is a challenge for farmers today in a rapidly changing global marketplace 
where farmers have to be competitive. Stakeholders, who are increasingly concerned about the 
relationship between financial structure and production efficiency, are interested in determining 
the role that debt plays in farm efficiency. 
This dissertation focused on the role that debt had on the efficiency of farm enterprises. 
Technical efficiency is related to management success in operating the farm and financial factors 
are part of the management decision-making process. Economic theory has proposed five 
competing and sometimes complementary theories on the relationship between finance and 
production efficiency. These theoretical explanations are:  i) agency theory, ii) free cash flow, iii) 
credit evaluation, iv) embodied capital and v) adjustment cost. Some of the theories hypothesize 
a positive relation between debt and efficiency while other theories hypothesize a negative 
relation (Hadley et al. 2001, Davidova and Latruffe 2007). Table 1.1 summarizes the theories 
and their implications in relation to the level of farm debt and the farm’s level of technical 
efficiency. The direction of the arrow indicates the direction of causality. In the credit evaluation 
approach, for example, the level of debt a farm has taken on is a result of technical efficiency, 
and thus, debt levels are endogenous to the financial structure; more efficient farms are less risky 
and therefore more likely to be accepted for a loan request. All these theories will be developed 
and explained in detail in Chapter 2.  
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In the field of farm efficiency and financial structure research, there have been few 
studies on the direction of the relation of production and financial farm variables (Hadley et al. 
2001, p. 1). As in any globally competitive industry, farm managers are called upon to increase 
their focus on financial, management, and marketing decisions to achieve economic success. 
Technical efficiency is related to management success in operating the farm. This study 
investigated this issue in Kansas and to help develop management recommendations. 
A non-discretionary DEA model was used to compare efficiency measures with the 
input-oriented DEA model, in which farms are compared to each other to assess efficiency while 
controlling for differences in debt levels. In the non-discretionary DEA model, the level of total 
debt is introduced as a fixed or non-controllable input, so that each farm is compared to other 
farms that have taken on the same or smaller levels of debt. The non-discretionary DEA model 
provides an extension to the efficiency literature by comparing farms using “environmental 
variables.” In this dissertation, farms were compared in terms of all inputs in the input-oriented 
model, and in the non-discretionary model, farms were also compared in terms of capital 
availability to the farms that have an equal or smaller (i.e. worse) capital availability. Efficiency 
estimates2 were obtained for a particularly large sample of Kansas farms that use several inputs 
to generate multiple outputs.  
I calculated four efficiency measures using a non-discretionary or environmental DEA 
model. The influence of total debt on farms’ efficiencies was studied. Total debt was selected to 
represent farm credit constraint because it is a common capital measure of investment capacity. 
All four measure of efficiencies (i.e., overall, technical, scale and allocative efficiencies) were 
estimated annually for the 10-year sample from 1998 to 2007. Once efficiencies had been 
estimated annually for the sample, the scores were further analyzed to determine the factors 
explaining how additional debt is translated into improved efficiency.   
                                                 
2 If technical scores were systematically higher for farms with higher debt loads , this finding would support the 
credit evaluation, capital embodied, and free cash flow hypotheses. The difference between two hypotheses depends 
on whether or not debt levels were endogenous. A test similar to the Hausman test was applied to assess this 
research question (Davidova and Latruffe, 2007). 
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Table 1.1 Relationship between Technical Efficiency and Level of Farm Debt 
Theoretical Approaches and Hypotheses about the Relationship between Indebtedness and 
Technical Efficiency 
Approach Hypothesis 
Agency Theory Indebtedness→(-) Technical Efficiency 
Free Cash Flow Indebtedness→(+)Technical Efficiency 
Credit Evaluation Indebtedness←(+)Technical Efficiency 
Embodied Capital Indebtedness→(+)Technical Efficiency 
Adjustment Cost Indebtedness→(-) Technical Efficiency 
Adapted from Davidova and Latruffe 2007, p. 273 
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The precise research goal was to determine if farms were able to achieve best practice 
efficiencies when constrained by total debt. Efficiency scores for the input-oriented DEA model 
and the non-discretionary DEA model were compared and differences in cost efficiency scores 
caused by the capital constraint were reported. In the case where the debt constraint was binding, 
the efficiency scores between the input-oriented DEA model and the non-discretionary DEA 
model will be different. The change in efficiency between the two DEA models was examined in 
light of specialization of the farms (i.e., output mix) and other factors. Specific objectives 
included: 
• Calculate standard measures of efficiency, using four input oriented multi-output/multi-
input DEA problems constrained by the farm’s level of debt for a sample of 456 farms in 
Kansas for 10 consecutive years from 1998 to 2007. 
• Compare efficiency scores for each farm between the input-oriented DEA and the non-
discretionary DEA models. Determine if any farm is constrained by the amount of total 
debt, and how the total debt constraint has affected the level of efficiency scores for the 
farm. 
• Use results of the analysis to shed light on and develop strategies that can improve 
Kansas farms’ efficiency levels regarding the financial structure of the farming operation. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Production Economics 
In order to assess farm efficiency in production economics, two complementary 
observations of the operator’s behavior can be modeled depending on the research question and 
data availability. First, the operator theoretically behaves as a profit-maximizer or cost- 
minimizer when choosing the optimal bundle for the farming process. Second, the time horizon 
influences how many variables the producer can control. When the operator is planning for the 
long run, all inputs and outputs can be varied. On the contrary, when the time horizon is limited, 
the operator can choose to vary only some of the inputs, referred to as variable inputs. Other 
production factors, called fixed inputs, cannot be changed in this time horizon; fixed inputs may 
include such factors as the number of acres planted, or the choice of crop after the crop is 
planted. Farmers can make adjustments in fertilizer, herbicide or irrigation usage depending on 
the time of the season, or from one year to the next (i.e. in the short run). Fixed costs normally 
include: depreciation and interest paid (which represent part of the capital structure of the farm), 
and operating costs or overhead costs (which do not depend on production output). What is 
considered to be a fixed cost versus a variable cost of production varies in prior literature 
depending on the topic of interest.  
This chapter follows Coelli, Rao and Battese (2005) and Chambers (1988) to explain how 
production economics and the concept of efficiency is intrinsically related to the estimation of a 
frontier because efficiency measurements can only be derived with respect to a benchmark, i.e., 
an ideal level of performance or best practice frontier. Production and efficiency measurement 
are so interlinked that it is impossible to accurately define efficiency measures without referring 
to production economic theory. The reason for the intertwined relationship is that efficiencies 
can only be estimated with respect to a best practice or optimal frontier. Production economics 
attempts to describe the outer frontier of technological possibilities by which inputs are 
transformed into outputs. Production economics thus provides the theoretical foundation for 
understanding and calculating benchmark performance. In estimating this unobservable 
benchmark or frontier, parametric and non-parametric methods have been used. 
Parametric methods include econometric estimation of production or cost functions. They 
represent single-output technologies and estimate the production frontier or curve which traces 
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out the maximum feasible output for different input levels conditional on the technology in use. 
Transformations can be applied to multiple-output technology. Both production and 
transformation functions yield optimal output given technology and resources. These functions 
are required to conform to specific theoretical properties so that technology can be simplified 
into a single output production function that specifies the maximum possible output for a given 
input vector: y = f(x). Some properties commonly assumed about f(x) include: 
1. if x’ ≥ x then f(x’) ≥ f(x) (weak monotonicity); 
2. if x’ > x then f(x’) > f(x) (strict monotonicity); 
3. the input requirement set, V(y) = {x: f(x) ≥ y}, is a convex set (quasi-concavity); 
4. f(θx + (1-θ)x’) ≥ θf(x) + (1-θ)f(x’) for θ ∈ [0,1] (concavity); 
5. f(0,0,…,0) = 0 (weak essentiality); 
6. f(x1, …, xj-1, 0, xj+1, …, xn) = 0 for all xj (strict essentiality); 
7. V(y) is closed and non-empty; 
8. f(x) is finite, nonnegative, real-valued, and single-valued for all nonnegative and finite x; 
9. f(x) is everywhere continuous; and 
10. f(x) is everywhere twice-continuously differentiable (C2) (Chambers 1988, pg. 9). 
These functions need to be estimated econometrically and can take several functional 
forms, ranging from the relatively simple Cobb-Douglas to more flexible forms such the 
translog. Other functions related to production that can be econometrically estimated are cost 
functions, profit functions, and revenue functions. All of these can be formulated to account for 
multiple inputs and/or outputs.  As in the case of production functions, these latter functions need 
to conform to properties in order to satisfy the economic concept they represent.  
In a set theory orientation, any production technology is explained by output and input 
sets which need to satisfy some mathematical and economic properties to be an accurate 
representation of the production possibility frontier or curve. This approach is used in efficiency 
because of the direct relationship between technical efficiency and the input distance function3. 
Distance functions are alternative representations of production technology that model multiple-
input and multiple-output technological relationships. The directional distance function is loosely 
related to production function. Formally:  
                                                 
3 The input-oriented DEA problem for calculating technical efficiency under constant returns to scale is the inverse 
of the input distant function (Coelli et al. 2005, pg. 53). 
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where T = {(x,y): f(x) ≥ y } is the set of technologically feasible points, β is the distance 
parameter, and g = (-gx , gy)  is called the directional vector. If β = 0, then (x, y) is efficient. If gx 
set equal to 0, this is the output distance function which represents how much output would have 
to expand without changing the level of inputs before the point is on the efficient frontier. If gy 
set equal to 0, this is the input distance function which represents how much input would have to 
contract without output changing before the point is on the efficient frontier. When β = 0, this 
yields the production function which can be used to analyze efficiency of certain points: if β > 0 
then there is some type of inefficiency. 
2.2 The Cost Function 
This section will use production economic concepts to look at how farmers decide on the 
mix of inputs they wish to use. I will assume the case of a multiple-input multiple-output farm 
that has no influence on input prices—therefore input prices are given. The cost function for the 
farm can be written as C=C(w,y), where w represents a vector of input prices and y represents the 
level of output. The cost minimization problem for this farm is the cost function (Chambers 
1988): 
xC( , ) = min   such that   V( )w y w x x y⋅ ∈  
where V(y) is the input requirement set formed by the isoquant of the desired y. The cost 
function is the minimum cost of producing a given output level during a given time period 
expressed as a function of input prices and output.  
The cost function satisfies the following properties (Chambers 1988): 
1. Non-negativity: C(w,y)>0 for w>0 and y>0; 
2. No fixed costs: C(w,0)=0; 
3. Monotonicity in y: if y’≥y, then C(w,y’)≥C(w,y); 
4. Monotonicity in w: if w’≥w, then C(w’,y)≥C(w,y); 
5. Homogeneity of degree on in prices: C(λw,y)=λC(w,y); 
6. Concavity: C(w,y) is concave in w; and 
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7. Contintuity: C(w,y) is continuous in w. 
Suppose that we have no substitution production technology, so that the cost-minimizing 
point is always a particular input combination, call it x*, regardless of the input prices. The 
corresponding cost function is shown in Figure 3.1 by C*(w,y). Because of the no substitution 
production technology, we have the cost-minimizing bundle x* throughout, so as we increase the 
rental rate of the i th input, wi, the total costs of the bundle increase linearly. The cost of the 
bundle x* at any particular set of input prices w is: 
m-1
i i j
j=1
C*( , ) = * = * + *jw y wx w x w x∑  
where wixi* are the total payments to the i th input and are the payments to the other 
inputs. Thus, increasing only wi will increase total costs wx* linearly, making C*(w,y) a linear 
function.
 
m-1
j
j=1
*jw x∑
As we see in Figure 2.1, when wi=wi*, costs are w*x* (point e*) and when wi=wi', costs 
are w'x* (point f*). If we move away from the no substitution production technology and 
increase the degree of substitutability there will be different cost-minimizing bundles at different 
input prices. The new cost function is C(w,y) in Figure 2.1. Point e* is cost-minimizing on both 
the linear cost function C*(w,y) and the new concave cost function C(w,y). If the input price of 
the ith input increases from wi* to wi', costs increase to w'x* along the linear cost function, but 
along the concave cost function (which allows for input substitution) farmers will choose another 
cost-minimizing bundle x'. The costs of the new cost-minimizing bundle is less than that along 
the linear function C*( w,y) as depicted by the gap between  f* and f. This reflects input 
substitutability as farmers will choose an input combination x' with lower costs than x* by 
substituting away from the inputs whose costs have risen.   
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Figure 2.1  Cost Function with Respect to One Input Price 
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2.3 Measures of Efficiency 
This section will use production economic concepts to define and measure production 
efficiencies. Overall efficiency requires that an organization be technically efficient, allocatively 
efficient, and scale efficient.4 An overall efficient organization produces a given quantity, 
quality, and mix of outputs at minimum possible cost given existing technologies and prices. 
Technical efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to transform physical inputs into outputs relative to 
the best practice frontier given current technology, irrespective of prices.  Technical 
inefficiencies are largely the result of lack of managerial oversight of the production process 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Allocative efficiency measures whether the input mix, given 
technically efficient production for a set of output and input price levels, is chosen to minimize 
costs. Scale efficiency measures the extent to which a farm can take advantage of returns to scale 
by altering its size towards optimal scale; optimal scale is defined as the output level (or range of 
levels) where there are constant returns to scale5 in the relationship between outputs and inputs. 
The four measures of efficiency discussed all have values ranging from 0 to 1. For example, 
overall efficiency occurs when a farm is operating on the minimum cost frontier.6 The cost 
efficient farm will score 1 while farms operating above the best practice level are not fully cost 
efficient and will score between 0 and 1. 
My discussion of efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957). He proposed that 
the efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical efficiency, which reflects the 
ability of a firm to maximize output from a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which 
reflects the ability of the firm to use inputs optimally given their respective prices and 
technology. These two measures are then combined to provide a measure of total cost (or 
economic) efficiency. The following discussion begins with Figure 2.2 which illustrates Farrell’s 
(1957) concepts in input/input space (input-oriented measures) in a constant return to scale 
                                                 
4 Overall efficiency is defined as the product of technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and scale efficiency. I use 
the term “cost efficiency” to refer to the short-run measure that does not consider the inefficiencies due to the scale 
of operation. Cost efficiency is defined as technical efficiency multiplied by allocative efficiency. 
5 Returns to Scale: A technology can exhibit constant returns to scale if by multiplying all inputs by some factor, the 
level of output also increases by the same factor (i.e. the proportional increase ratio is 1 to 1). A technology exhibits 
decreasing (increasing) returns to scale if, after scaling all inputs, the level of output expands by less than (more 
than) the scaling factor.  
6 The choice of DEA model and theoretical assumption with respect to farmers’ behavior depends very much on the 
focus of the study. A revenue maximizing DEA problem would allow the researcher to look at the farms’ choice of 
outputs. However, since we are interested in inputs and farm performance, we have chosen a cost minimizing 
approach. 
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setting. I have chosen constant returns to scale to represent the farms’ technology because the 
technology can then be depicted using the unit isoquant. The graph for any other output level 
would be identical to Figure 2.2 except that the units on the axes would be re-scaled.  
The downward sloping curve passing through point B in Figure 2.2 is the unit isoquant, 
i.e., the combinations of inputs x1 and x2 needed to produce a unit of output under 100% efficient 
use of the technology (Coelli, Rao and Battese 2005, pg. 52). The downward sloping straight line 
passing through point C is the isocost line, which represents the relative price of the inputs. A 
fully cost-efficient firm would produce at the point of tangency between the unit isoquant and the 
isocost line (only the dot is shown in Figure 2.2). A firm producing at point A is neither 
technically nor allocatively efficient. It is not technically efficient because it uses input levels 
that lie above the unit isoquant. A technically efficient firm would use the input combination at 
point B. Technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of the length of ray 0B to that of 0A: TE = 
0B/0A. 
Producing at B, however, is still not allocatively efficient, as expenditures on inputs at B 
exceed those of the cost-efficient firm. The expenditures could be reduced to point C if inputs 
were used in their cost-minimizing combination. Allocative efficiency is defined as AE = 0C/0B. 
Cost efficiency of a firm operating at A, which takes into account both technical and 
allocative performance (Coelli, Rao and Battese 2005, pg. 52), is graphically depicted as CE = 
0C/0A and mathematically as CE = (TE)·(AE). If the assumption of constant returns to scale 
were relaxed, then the firm in question may also be inefficient due to non-optimal scale of its 
operations. The scale efficiency (SE) score reflects the amount costs could be reduced by 
changing the optimal scale. Overall efficiency (OE) can then be computed as OE = 
(TE)·(AE)·(SE).  
2.4 Methods of Measuring Efficiency 
Methods to calculate efficiency scores can be grouped into two categories: those that use 
econometric techniques to estimate a stochastic frontier function (the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach, SFA), and those that use mathematical programming techniques to compute a frontier 
based on the observable data points (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA).  
SFA is a parametric method because it fits the data to a production or cost function using 
specific functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas, logarithmic, or quadratic. SFA is used to 
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Figure 2.2 Measures of Efficiency 
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estimate a stochastic best-practice frontier function where observations are allowed to depart 
from the frontier due to random shocks and/or inefficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Some 
of the drawbacks of SFA include the need to specify a functional form to transform inputs into 
outputs. Production or cost functions of the Cobb-Douglas, quadratic, linear, log-linear or trans-
logarithmic forms are the most common specifications. The functional form needs to conform to 
the production and mathematical properties of the function it is representing. Some specifications 
may be too restrictive on the technology they represent, such as the Cobb-Douglas form, whereas 
other forms are more flexible. These latter specifications are difficult to estimate econometrically 
because imposing (or testing for) mathematical properties such as curvature require special 
constraints on the parameters. Moreover, any of the production function econometric 
specifications can only account for one output, so in the case of multiple-output farms, an 
aggregate of outputs must be constructed. Thus, SFA methods lack the ability to disaggregate 
outputs and therefore the information contained in a detailed data set of different production 
outputs is lost.  
A widely used non-parametric7 approach to frontier analysis is Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA),8 which was developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. DEA is based 
on the piece-wise lineal convex hull representation of frontiers as originally developed by Farrell 
(1957). It is a non-stochastic9 technique that uses mathematical linear programming to construct 
a frontier from a sample of data points. Early contributors of the frontier estimation method 
included Boles (1966), Shephard (1970) and Afriat (1972), who suggested mathematical 
programming methods that could achieve the task, but the method did not receive wide attention 
until the article by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), in which the term data envelopment 
analysis was first used (Coelli, Rao and Battese 2005). Since these pioneer studies, researchers 
have made continuous improvements in the field of frontier estimation and efficiency 
measurement.  
                                                 
7 Non-parametric refers to the characteristic that the method does not make or require any assumption on the 
functional form relating inputs into outputs. 
8 For a simple but illustrative application that explains some basics on the concept and estimation of efficiencies 
using the DEA method please refer to J.E. Beasley’s at http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~mastjjb/jeb/or/dea.html. 
9 In general econometric terms, stochastic refers to the ability of a model for account for randomness or error term in 
the estimation of the parameters and account for white noise in the data (Greene, 2003). 
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DEA compares the firms or units of analysis in terms of their use of inputs and their level 
of output, “enveloping” all the data points to construct a best practice frontier10. Efficiency ratios 
are compared across firms. The best performers are assigned an efficiency of 1 and they lie on 
the frontier itself. The less efficient units have an efficiency score of less than 1 and lie inside the 
production possibility frontier (and above the minimum cost frontier).  
DEA efficiency measures are relative, as they refer to the sample they are calculated 
from. These relative rankings can be fragile if the number of firms in the sample is small relative 
to the number of outputs and inputs being considered. In this dissertation the number of farms, S, 
were larger than the rule-of-thumb benchmark, M×N, where M is the number of outputs and N is 
the number of inputs. Overall, DEA’s flexibility in accommodating multiple outputs and inputs 
in different units with no need to express a specific technical relationship among them has been 
seen as an advantage.  
In summary, DEA and SFA are different techniques used to estimate efficiency measures. 
Both techniques have their merits and disadvantages. Some studies have compared both 
approaches (see Sharma, Leung and Zaleski 1999; Wadud and White, 2000; Puig-Junoy and 
Argiles, 2000). In general, estimates from both methods differ quantitatively. DEA efficiency 
estimates are smaller than SFA estimates11; but the ordering or ranking of the decision making 
units (DMUs) according to their estimated efficiency scores has been shown to be similar in both 
methods (Sharma, Leung and Zaleski 1999; Wadud and White, 2000; Puig-Junoy and Argiles, 
2000). Although the efficiency scores for each DMU did not coincide in all cases for both 
methods, the ranking of DMUs in terms of efficiency was highly correlated. 
                                                 
10 In production analysis, a production, revenue or cost frontier can be used with this method. In Chapter 2, the 
section on Conceptual Model explains that we are taking a cost approach to calculate efficiency scores, and thus, a 
best practice cost frontier.  
11 See Puig-Junoy and Argiles (2000), p. 14 about commentaries on the comparison of DEA and SFA and the results 
of their study, p. 7. 
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2.5 Studies on Causes of Efficiencies in Agricultural Production 
Kansas is the fourth largest exporting state in terms of value of agricultural exports in the 
U.S. A fair range of farm types, from livestock operations as well as crop enterprises and mixed 
farms, characterize Kansas agriculture. Kansas ranks first among all states in the export of wheat 
and its by-products, feeds and fodders and hides/skins. Kansas is also a major exporter of feed 
grains and products, live animals and meat (Economic Research Service 2008). These important 
factors justify the study of agriculture in the state, where agriculture is a major economic source 
of employment and revenue. This dissertation calculated production efficiencies for both 
livestock and crop farms in Kansas, and most importantly, examined some factors that may 
influence the farms’ efficiency scores. 
Once efficiency scores have been obtained, the factors that impact inefficiencies can be 
studied using two main approaches. Studies on factors affecting inefficiencies are mainly 
categorized according to the method researchers use to explain inefficiencies’ causes. The first 
method is called a one-step procedure. The one-step procedure estimates efficiency scores and 
the causes of inefficiency simultaneously. Only econometric methods can be employed in this 
approach. The second method, the two-step procedure, first estimates the overall efficiency 
scores and then a Tobit model12 is used to analyze the scores according to factors that may 
influence them such as farm size, farm financial structure, etc.  
The literature on efficiency and its possible causes is extensive. Some studies focus on 
low-income countries, others on farm-specific operations. In this literature review, the studies 
and results focusing on Kansas farms are examined first.  
Overall efficiency for multi-product Kansas farms has been addressed by authors such as 
Langemeier and DeLano (1999). They used DEA methods to estimate overall efficiency, along 
with allocative, scale and technical efficiencies for a sample of 195 Kansas farms from 1973 to 
1996. Overall efficiency measures for the sampled farms were regressed against operator’s age, 
farm size (using gross farm income as a proxy), and farm type according to the income source 
(i.e. crops, beef, dairy, swine, dry land, pasture, and mixed enterprise farm). Results indicated 
that age of operator was negatively related to overall efficiency and thus the implication is that 
younger operators are more efficient. Larger farms were found to be more efficient, as were 
                                                 
12 A Tobit regression is an appropriate estimation technique when the value of the dependent variable is bounded 
either from above or below or both; such is the case of inefficiency scores which are bounded between 0 and 1. 
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specialized crop and dairy farms. The authors calculated the persistence over time (i.e. 24 years) 
of the farms’ overall efficiency scores. Whereas some farms were consistently good performers, 
others were consistently bad; the authors found consistency in the ranking of farms over the 
sample period. 
Other studies applying DEA to measure efficiency in Kansas include articles focusing on 
specific farm operations. Gow and Langemeier (1999) estimated scores of overall, allocative, 
scale and technical efficiency for a sample of 123 cattle backgrounding farms from 1995 to 1997 
in Kansas. They used six inputs and one output for their calculations. The scores were examined 
in terms of farm characteristics including the degree of farm specialization or farm type, farm 
operator’s age and farm size. Average overall efficiency for the farms indicated that farms could 
reduce their costs by 60 percent producing the same amount of output. Farms could also improve 
their performance by increasing production as much as 30 percent by updating their technology. 
Costs would also be reduced by 17 percent if farms use the most efficient size and by 30 percent 
if farms use the cost-minimizing amounts and combinations of inputs. In summary, the most 
efficient farms had 39 percent of their income derived from backgrounding operations, the age of 
the operator was in the range of 40 to 65 years old, and average gross income was around 
$250,000.  
Morgan and Langemeier (2003) examined sustained competitive advantage13 for a 
sample of 224 Kansas farms with continuous data from 1982 to 2001. They computed overall 
efficiency for each farm and year. They found that sixty farms exhibited significantly above 
average overall efficiency levels or had a “competitive advantage.” Seventy-six farms exhibited 
statistically significant below overall efficiency levels or had a “competitive disadvantage.” 
Statistical t-tests on the efficiency scores revealed that farms in the top category were 
significantly larger, received relatively more of their gross farm income from dairy and swine 
production, had significantly lower expense ratios, and had significantly higher profit margins.  
Other studies have been applied to measure Kansas farms’ livestock-related operations. 
Coffey and Featherstone (2004) used DEA on a sample of 106 Kansas farms in 1998 to 
investigate multiproduct and product-specific economies of scale. They used an input approach, 
with two outputs, crops and livestock, and seven inputs. Results relevant to this essay include the 
                                                 
13 Morgan and Langemeier (2003) defined competitive advantage as a feature of a group of 60 farms out of a sample 
of 224 farms, which were identified using statistical tests as consistently having above average levels of overall 
efficiency over the 1982 to 2001 sample period. 
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finding that larger farms tend to expand to achieve increasing returns to scale, even though these 
farms do not achieve as much economies of scope14, by avoiding producing more than one 
output as smaller farms do. In agreement with the latter statement, Purdy, Langemeier and 
Featherstone (1997) point out the complex relationship between specialization and financial 
performance. Larger farms that may engage in enterprise specialization are able to decrease 
risk15, increase profits and enjoy product-specific economies of size; but they may miss out on 
economies of scope.  
Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995) used a one-step procedure; these 
studies have been the foundation for other studies applying SFA. These three models were the 
first to use the one-step procedure approach for multiple-output farms, and the one presented by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) was unique in that it used panel data. In Battese and Coelli (1995), the 
empirical estimation of a translog production function was applied to 10 cross-sections of data 
from paddy rice farms in India. As factors influencing technical efficiency Battese and Coelli 
(1995) investigated operator’s age, education, and a time trend. The coefficients in their 
inefficiency model were all jointly statistically significant; their results suggested that older 
farmers were more inefficient than younger farmers, and that there was a decline in inefficiency 
over time.  
Puig-Junoy and Argiles (2000) used both one- and two-step procedures on a panel of 
mixed farms in Spain. Their inefficiency model indicated that farms with a big share of rented 
land are significantly more inefficient. Hadley et al. (2001) tested the evidence linking 
production efficiency with financial variables. Their stochastic frontier model indicated a 
negative relationship between debt/asset ratios and technical efficiency.  
Also in 2000, Wadub and White (2000) compared technical efficiency scores estimated 
using a one-stage SF approach and a two stage DEA approach for a sample of rice farms in 
Bangladesh. The coefficients estimated from both sources were highly and positively related in 
ranking. They included several socioeconomic factors such as operator’s age, years of schooling, 
diesel irrigation fuel, plot size and soil degradation, to explain the difference in scores among 
farms. In all models, age, years of schooling and infrastructure (i.e. the use of diesel for 
                                                 
14 Economies of scope are cost reductions associated with output diversification.  
15 Part of the literature on agricultural efficiency and finance focuses on the interrelation between production and 
marketing risk and enterprise diversification in order to reduce this risk inherent to agricultural products.  
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irrigation, due to costs and water charges extraction and capacity) were negatively related to 
technical inefficiency. Farmers with less soil degradation were more technically efficient. 
Coelli, Rahman and Thirtle (2002) used DEA to calculate cost, technical, allocative and 
scale efficiency for a sample of 406 Bangladeshi rice farms. They divided the farms according to 
the type of rice grown, which depends on the season and so it is very much influenced by 
weather and other factors. For the two-step analysis, the efficiency scores of each measure for 
each output were regressed using a Tobit model against 12 farm characteristics: tenancy, 
education, family size, age, experience, infrastructure (i.e. roads and access to markets), working 
adults, land cultivated, soil fertility, non-farm income, extension support and training. They 
found that infrastructure, and non-farm income contributed significantly and positively to 
efficiency. Large families were generally found to be at a disadvantage, showing evidence of 
large unemployment. Other factors did not show a large impact on efficiency levels.  
Dhugana, Nuthall and Nartea (2004) used a two-step approach to study inefficiency and 
its causes in a sample of Nepalese rice farms. They used a DEA approach to estimate overall, 
allocative, technical, and scale efficiencies for one-output, multi-input farms in the sample. With 
five inefficiency score estimates (overall efficiency, allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency), the authors estimated a Tobit regression to 
explain the variations in the level of inefficiency among the farms. As factors affecting 
inefficiency in farms, they include farmer’s age, education, gender, and share of non-paid labor. 
Age (as well as a quadratic age term to measure returns) and education were statistically 
different from zero. More recently, Masterson (2007) applied SFA and DEA to measure 
technical efficiency and productivity in a sample of 8,131 farms in Paraguay from 2000-2001. 
Surprisingly, in the case of Paraguay, the results suggest that land tenure affects technical and 
land productivity adversely. In line with other studies, assets contributed positively to technical 
efficiency. Family labor was found to decrease technical efficiency and productivity, similar to 
the finding from Bangladesh where unemployment is a big problem.  
Based on previous studies, and despite the clear consistency and significance of results, 
the variables that have shown to be the most influential in explaining efficiency score variability 
across farms are farm financial variables (e.g. debt-to-asset ratio, level of debt), farm size, 
individual farm characteristics (e.g. age of operator, education, share of non-paid labor, share of 
land rented, and operator’s risk attitude) and technology proxies (e.g. labor-to-capital ratio) 
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(Davidova and Latruffe 2003). However, the reasons that farms may become unprofitable can be 
related to intrinsic factors of production as well as environmental and more social ones such as 
health of the main operator, divorce and other non-production causes. Thus, more research is 
needed in the area (Featherstone et al. 2005). 
As seen in this section, the literature on farm efficiencies and their causes is very 
extensive, but mostly focused on studying technical efficiency. Relatively few studies have been 
conducted explaining the variability in cost efficiency scores. As Coelli, Rahman and Thirtle 
(2002) points out, more studies need to include more efficiency measures than technical 
efficiency, which refers to use of the technology or transformation of inputs into outputs. 
Technical efficiency, as mentioned above, has been related to the study of management. Most 
studies offer only a partial picture of farm performance since they do not consider the mix of 
inputs (i.e., allocative efficiency), the scale of operation (i.e., scale efficiency), or minimum costs 
according to the production process and market prices (i.e., overall efficiency). While this 
dissertation uses a similar method to the many efficiency studies and its causes using a two-stage 
approach, it is innovative in that the analysis includes factors that affect all efficiency measures, 
giving a more general picture of performance than analyzing technical efficiency alone. This 
study’s contribution to the literature is from the use of a large and detailed dataset, the study of 
all measures of efficiency, and the assessment of a comprehensive list of factors to explain 
differences of all efficiency estimates across farms. 
2.6 Studies on Financial Farm Structure and Farm Efficiencies 
Economic theory assumes that firms maximize profits through simultaneously 
maximizing revenues and minimizing costs. In perfect competition, the free entry and exit of 
firms tends toward firms producing at the point where price equals long run average costs and 
long run average costs are minimized. In his seminal paper, Leibenstein (1966) illustrated how 
different principal-agent objectives, inadequate motivation and incomplete contracts become 
sources of inefficiency measured by the discrepancy between maximum potential output and the 
firm’s actual output. He termed this failure to attain the production or technological frontier as 
X-inefficiency. 
Recent financial theories emphasize the importance of agency costs and other financial 
costs in the determination of the firm’s capital structure (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 
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1986; Harris and Raviv 1991). While theoretical finance on capital structure has progressed, the 
practical applications of capital structure theories in the agricultural economics literature have 
been less satisfying. The main problem agricultural economics researchers face is that the 
theoretical determinants of capital structure, e.g. agency costs, credit evaluation and 
informational asymmetries, are not directly observable, and reliable farm data is difficult to 
acquire. 
Färe, Grosskopf and Lee (1990) examined the impact of financial constraints on farm 
economic performance. They used DEA for expenditure-constrained profit maximization 
following Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and Lee and Chambers (1986). Färe, Grosskopf 
and Lee’s (1990) research found that a quarter of the farms in their sample were financially 
constrained. Their sample consisted of a cross-section of 82 rice farms in California in 1984; 
they take into account 9 inputs, including 6 variable and 3 fixed inputs. In addition, they found 
that financially constrained farms, on average, are more efficient than financially unconstrained 
farms. These findings led Whittaker and Morehart (1991) to analyze a sample of 107,982 Mid-
western cash grain farms to measure the effect of farm financial structure on cost efficiency. 
Using farm expenditure data and a DEA approach, they calculated cost efficiency for the same 
sample with three different models: a financially unconstrained model, a debt-constrained model, 
and an asset-constrained model. Nearly 22 percent of the farms were constrained. The authors 
suggested adding uncertainty and risk to the model and a wider range of financial ratios.  
The finance literature contains five theoretical justifications and a similar number of 
empirical approaches to study the relationship between financial structure and production 
efficiency. Free cash flow, agency costs, credit evaluation, embodied capital and adjustment 
considerations have been hypothesized as possible explanations for the relationship between 
financial leverage and farm-level efficiency.  
The first approach, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow concept, suggests that debt obligations 
may motivate managers to become more efficient because of the stronger incentive between 
lenders and borrowers of debt servicing. The concept implies that farmers with higher debt 
obligations should be induced by lenders to exert greater effort (Barry and Robinson 2001), 
which would motivate farmers to become more efficient. Free cash flow therefore suggests a 
positive relationship between increased debt and efficiency. Nasr, Barry and Ellinger (1998), 
using non-parametric methods, found a positive relationship between efficiency and financial 
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structure linked to the free cash flow concept for a sample of 154 Illinois farmers over the seven-
year period 1988-1994. Giannakas, Schoney, and Tzouvelekas (2001) found support for the free 
cash flow concept in their applications to farm samples in Canada. 
The second approach, agency theory, is based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency 
cost concept, which suggests that the higher relative costs of external to internal funds may result 
in higher costs to borrowers. Lenders would only be interested in the payment of the debt 
borrowed. Firms then could be perceived sometimes as being interested in pursuing riskier 
business activities than lenders would prefer. When this occurs lenders may charge higher prices 
for debt capital and enforce greater control measures. Agency cost then implies the cost of 
monitoring, bonding, and adverse-incentive costs will be passed on by lenders to borrowers 
through interest rate adjustments, origination fees, collateral requirements, and other transfer 
mechanisms (Ellinger and Barry 1991). These costs, in turn, may reduce highly indebted 
farmer’s technical efficiency when compared with farmers having less reliance on borrowed 
funds (Nasr, Barry, and Ellinger 1998). Support for the agency theory-cost model can be found 
in Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji’s (1995) study of agricultural cooperatives. They found that debt 
levels increased short-run variable costs. The authors explained that as the level of farm 
indebtness increased, so did variables cost in the short-run. They explained this negative relation 
between debt and optimal cost performance to the costs that borrowers incur to satisfy lenders’ 
requirement as money markets could be characterized by imperfect market information. 
However, Featherstone and Al-Kheraiji (1995) found a small, positive relationship between debt 
and total-factor productivity, suggesting differences in the effects of debt depending whether the 
debt is used for financing short-, intermediate-, or long-run assets. This last finding pointed to a 
positive relationship between long-term debt and production efficiency, contrasting the findings 
reported previously where debt increased variable short-run costs.  
The third approach, the credit evaluation concept, postulates a positive relationship 
between financial leverage and farm efficiency. Banks prefer borrowers who are more 
technically efficient because banks evaluate loan applications according to the applicant’s 
probability of repayment. In addition to collateral requirements, lenders screen borrowers 
according to various variables that characterize applicants’ creditworthiness, such as 
profitability, liquidity, solvency, repayment capacity, financial efficiency, management and other 
variables (Ellinger, Splett and Barry 1992). Thus allowance of greater financial leverage by some 
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managers could be associated with greater technical efficiency because of increased lender 
expectations of farm creditworthiness. Barry, Baker and Sanint (1991) tested for evidence of the 
credit evaluation concept in agricultural loans. The authors noted that agricultural lenders 
constrain capital loans more than operating loans because variations in a farmer's recent financial 
performance are often explained by factors beyond the farmer's control. This, in turn, suggests 
that the credit evaluation concept implies a positive relationship between intermediate- and long-
term financial leverage and technical efficiency. 
Chavas and Aliber (1993) suggest the fourth theory, the embodied capital hypothesis, 
which implies that farmers with higher debt levels invest in technological change which creates a 
positive relationship between debt and efficiency. Farmers use debt to invest in embodied 
technology, which is incorporated in new or improved products, processes, systems, and services 
that are offered in the marketplace. The value of embodied technology depends upon the ability 
of the farmer to obtain a sustainable advantage over competitors, thereby achieving higher 
efficiency. Chavas and Aliber (1993) found evidence of a positive and significant relation 
between long-term debt-to-asset ratios and the technical efficiency scores of a sample of 
Wisconsin Dairy farms.  
The fifth theory, the adjustment hypothesis, was formulated by Paul, Johnston and 
Frengley (2000). It refers to markets that are transitioning from a more subsidized agriculture, 
such as farms in the old Soviet Union, to a more market-oriented one; this hypothesis implies a 
negative relation between debt and efficiency as less indebted farmers are supposed to be more 
technical efficient as they can adjust more easily to the new situation.16  
Because of the differences reported in empirical applications, it is difficult to definitively 
characterize the effects of short-, intermediate-, and longer-term debt financing on farm 
efficiency. Agency-cost effects would suggest a negative relationship between short-term 
borrowing and farm efficiency. Adjustment theory also suggests a negative relation between 
intermediate and long term borrowing and farm efficiency. Conversely, embodied capital, cash 
flow and credit evaluation support a positive relationship between borrowing and farm 
efficiency. Both positive and negative debt effects on farm efficiency have been found in 
empirical work. Embodied capital, cash flow, agency costs and credit evaluation concepts have 
more consistent explanations of the positive effects of longer-term debt on farm efficiency. This 
                                                 
16 For more information about these theories see Handley et al. (2001) and Davidova and Latruffe (2003). 
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result is expected because investment in assets which enhance farm productivity such as 
equipment and land require longer-term financing.  
In Kansas, recent studies have examined the interaction of finance, management, and 
marketing decisions to identify economically successful farms. For example, Nivens, Kastens 
and Dhuyvetter (2002) focused on a sample of Kansas farms to study management factors and 
their influence on production costs as a way of increasing farm profitability. They found that 
competitive market prices are not as important as other variables when farms want to increase 
profitability. Rather, farm managers can enhance profitability by outperforming neighboring 
farms in terms of managing risk, lowering costs, and undertaking other management tools.  
In the same fashion, several studies have been conducted in Kansas regarding the 
influence of financial factors on farm production and profit. Featherstone and Al- Kheraiji (1995) 
calculated a short-run variable cost function to investigate the relationship between debt and a 
firm’s efficiency in agricultural cooperatives. Their results indicated that there is no strong 
evidence that debt is associated with “long-run, suboptimal capacity” (p. 871). Their findings 
conform to the agency theory-cost theory since their findings show that debt levels increased 
short-term costs. The most important finding was that there seems to be differences in the 
influence of debt in the short versus the long term. Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) investigated 
the effects of financial constraints (i.e. debt) in farm machinery investment. They concluded that 
there might be “a trade-off between financial stability and efficiency in production” (p. 434).  
Hadley et al. (2001) suggested that empirical results have not supported each other; they 
also mentioned their uneasiness with the fact that the hypotheses do not exclude each other, i.e. 
the impact of financial farm structure on production efficiencies can be explained and supported 
empirically by more than one hypothesis. The stochastic frontier model developed by Hadley et 
al. (2001) found a negative relationship between debt/asset ratios and technical efficiency. They 
suggested results conform to the agency costs and adjustment cost theories, which corroborates 
the conditions of United Kingdom dairy farms and their recent trends; that is, adjustment from 
good to bad conditions. 
In a 2005 paper, Lambert and Bayda implemented DEA techniques to calculate technical 
and scale efficiencies and the impact of financial ratios for a sample of 54 North Dakota crop 
farms, for each year from 1995 to 2001. They constrained their models by short, intermediate 
and long debt in the same way as Färe, Grosskopf and Lee (1990). The results of the Tobit 
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models both for the technical efficiency scores and the scale efficiency scores indicated that 
technical efficiency was negatively related to short-term debt whereas it was positively related to 
intermediate and long term debt and loans. Along the same lines, intermediate and long term 
debt was positively related to scale efficiency, probably showing the importance of capital to 
expand in scale.  
Hadley (2006) used SFA in a one-step procedure to investigate the impact of farm debt 
ratios on farm technical efficiency levels for a sample of multi-output farms from 1982 to 2002. 
For the inefficiency model, he included the ratio of total debt to total assets, and a measure of 
current liquidity or “current financial stress” which relates to short-term debt.  
Davidova and Latruffe (2007) used DEA to calculate technical efficiency scores for a 
sample of 753 multi-output and multi-input individual and corporate Czech farms in 1999, 
divided into 4 sub-samples according to specialization and management. They used a Tobit to 
test for the influence of the debt-to-asset ratio. This capital structure measure was significantly 
and negatively related (except for crops) to technical inefficiency in their study. The findings are 
consistent with the agency theory and adjustment cost arguments, especially given the 
adjustment hardships for farms in the Czech Republic farms during the transition to a market 
economy.  
Although there is evidence supporting the relation between farm financial ratios and the 
level of technical efficiency, the evidence is not conclusive. This dissertation considers the 
association between farm productive efficiency and financial structure in a group of multi-
purpose farms in Kansas using a debt-constrained DEA model. This model allows the direct 
effect to be unambiguously interpreted since the effect is measured at the margin, holding 
constant all other inputs. This study was conceived as an extension of the work of Whittaker and 
Morehart (1991). Although the research on this topic is sparse, some different but related studies 
on farms in agricultural economics include Nasr, Barry and Ellinger (1998), Lambert and Bayda 
(2005), and Davidova and Latruffe (2007). All of the studies have highlighted and explored the 
importance of the relationship between all efficiencies and financial management such as 
financial structure. The motivation for this essay is that the relation between farm financial status 
and production is not well-understood, and that the research on the topic has produced a variety 
of results.    
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CHAPTER 3 - Methods 
3.1 Model Overview 
The first part of this chapter consists of a general overview of the models used in this 
research. The second part consists of the description of input-oriented DEA model used in essay 
1, which provides an assessment of relative technical, allocative, scale and cost efficiencies of 
the farms. The third part consists of the description of the non-discretionary DEA model which is 
constrained by total debt. The last part consists of a description of the Tobit regression models 
that are employed to assess the influence of selected farm-specific factors on calculated farm 
efficiency scores.  
The equivalence or mirror relationship between output maximization and input 
minimization in production economics is reflected in the formulation of the DEA model.  An 
input-oriented DEA model minimizes input costs to achieve a given level of output. An output-
oriented DEA model maximizes output given the existing levels of resources/inputs. The input 
DEA approach is well-suited to this study because detailed data on inputs are available. The 
input oriented DEA also is preferred over an output-oriented approach because it is 
computationally less demanding and therefore the problem can be solved with fewer constraints.  
Coelli, Rao and Battese (2005) provide an illustration of the method in several practical 
applications.  
Technical, allocative, scale and overall efficiencies are estimated by employing DEA, the 
nonparametric mathematical programming approach for a frontier analysis of inputs and outputs 
introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). One of the main advantages of 
nonparametric approaches is that the construction of the production frontier does not require any 
assumption about the functional relationship between inputs and outputs. The DEA model uses 
input and output data from each farm to construct a nonparametric frontier such that all observed 
farms lie on or above the envelopment (cost) frontier. Therefore, the productive efficiency of 
each farm is measured relative to the productive efficiencies of all other farms in the sample. 
3.2 Basic DEA Model 
This section provides the mathematical formulation of the DEA problems to address the 
study’s objectives. In the input-oriented model used in the dissertation, the objective is to select 
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the cost-minimizing level of inputs given the output levels. The envelopment surface of the 
input-oriented models can be either constant returns-to-scale (CRS) or variable returns-to-scale 
(VRS). Input-oriented CRS models were developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and 
are referred to in the literature as CCR models. 
The first DEA model used in this dissertation calculates efficiencies annually from 1998 
to 2007 for 456 Kansas farms using expenditure data (except for land) to measure inputs and 
outputs. The use of expenditure data for frontier analysis and estimation of cost efficiency is 
explained in Ferrier and Lovell (1990). Table 4.1 contains a summary of the DEA problems used  
in accordance with VRS and CRS return to scale technology assumptions. The input-oriented 
linear programming DEA problems calculate the minimum total cost and technical efficiency 
given an N × 1 vector of input prices, w, a vector of corresponding input quantities, xs, for each 
of the s = 1, …, s farms, and an M × 1 output vector, ys, for each of the s farms.  
Problems 1.1 through 1.4 calculate an efficiency measure for a single farm; each problem 
must be solved S times to obtain the complete set of efficiency measures for the sample. The 
scalars μs (s = 1, 2, 3…, S) are coefficients chosen by the model to construct the best practice 
frontier for the farm being analyzed.17 Under VRS, the frontier is a weighted combination of all 
farms in the sample. The frontier values of inputs and outputs for the farm being analyzed are on 
the right side of the first two constraints in each problem. The linear programs under VRS 
(problems 1.1 and 1.3) allow technology to have increasing, constant and/or decreasing returns to 
scale. The only difference between the VRS models (problems 1.1 and 1.3) and the CRS models 
(problems 1.2 and 1.4) is that the last constraint, 
S
s
s=1
1μ =∑ , is relaxed (i.e., omitted).  
  
                                                 
17 The vector formed by these scalars, μ, is an intensity vector of constants for the farm being analyzed indicating the 
way that other farms in the sample could be combined to construct the efficient frontier. Each element in the vector 
indicates the degree of participation of a given farm in the construction of the best practice frontier or “virtual 
reference farm” to which farm s is compared.  
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Table 3.1 Input-Oriented DEA Model- Basic Model 
Variable Returns to Scale Constant Returns to Scale 
Problem 1.1: Cost Minimization 
Minimizex*¸µ ∑Nj=1 wj • xjs*   
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis           i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs * ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • xjs        j=1, 2, 3…N 
µs ≥ 0 
∑Ss=1 µs =1 
Problem 1.2: Cost Minimization 
Minimizex*¸µ ∑Nj=1 wj • xjs*    
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis          i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs * ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
µs ≥ 0 
 
Problem 1.3: Technical Efficiency Θs vrs 
Minimizek¸µ Θs vrs 
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis             i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs • Θs ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs •xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
µs ≥ 0   
∑Ss=1 µs =1 
Problem 1.4: Technical Efficiency Θs crs 
Minimizek¸µ Θs crs  
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis             i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs • Θs ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs •xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
µs ≥ 0 
 
Notes: w is an N × 1 vector of input prices for the j=1, 2, 3…N inputs, xs  is a vector of 
corresponding input quantities for each of the s = 1, 2, 3…, S farms, and  ys is the output vector 
for i=1, 2, 3…M outputs for each of the s = 1, 2, 3…, S farms. 
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Table 3.1 to explains the estimation of the efficiencies. The solution to problem 1.2 is the 
minimum costs under constant returns. Problem 1.1 gives the minimum costs under variable 
returns to scale for each farm. In each case, overall cost efficiency for each farm s is calculated 
as the ratio of the farm’s minimum cost under constant returns to scale to the farm’s observed 
total cost, i.e., OEs=(xs*•w)/ (xs •w), where xs* is farm s’s cost-minimizing input vector and xs is 
farm s’s observed input vector. The solutions to problems 1.3 and 1.4 are measures of technical 
efficiency for a given farm under VRS and CRS, respectively. In both the VRS and CRS case, 
technical efficiency for farm s is TEs = Θs*, where Θs* is the solution to the appropriate technical 
efficiency problem. 
Allocative efficiency is calculated for each farm s as the ratio of the minimum cost under 
variable returns to scale (i.e. solution to problem 1.1) to farm observed costs weighted by the 
farm’s (pure) technical efficiency. Another way to calculate this measure is AEs= CEs/TEs. Scale 
efficiency is determined as the ratio of technical efficiency under constant returns to scale (i.e. 
solution to problem 1.4) to technical efficiency under variable returns to scale: SEs= TEscrs/TEsvrs 
.                   
3.3 Non-Discretionary Empirical Model: Constrained DEA 
The second model adds a total debt constraint to the input-oriented model discussed 
above to calculate efficiencies annually from 1998 to 2007 for 456 Kansas farms. The objective 
of the non-discretionary empirical model is to investigate how financial factors affect production 
performance. If farms are constrained by their level of debt or solvency, how does their 
performance compare to their counterparts?  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the concept of the non-discretionary DEA model. It is an example of 
a single output, two-input DEA problem where P’’ is efficient and P is inefficient. The 
inefficiency at point P may be due partly to an inability for a farmer to obtain adequate debt 
financing. Therefore, farm P produces less than the theoretical maximum, even if discretionary 
inputs are used efficiently. In this example, if farm P received more favorable access to debt 
financing it  
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Figure 3.1 DEA and Non-Discretionary Inputs 
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would be observed a P’. At P’, farm P would produce the same level of output using fewer 
inputs.  
Total debt is used in essay two as the prime financial strategy affecting a farm’s 
production efficiency, and especially cost efficiency. Conceptually, the set of farm inputs used in 
the production process (i.e. input quantities and the input mix) is strongly related to input prices. 
Total debt is made up of short-term debt, which is working capital used primarily to purchase 
inputs, intermediate debt, which is used to purchase equipment, and long-term debt, which is 
used to purchase buildings and land. Thus, total debt is expected to affect the structure and 
organization of farm economic performance. 
The basic model and the non-discretionary DEA model, which is constrained by total 
farm debt, were both used to calculate and compare farms’ technical efficiencies. 
Mathematically, the basic model was transformed into the non-discretionary model by adding 
debt capital measures. Debt capital is referred to as a non-discretionary variable because its level 
is constant. Each farm cannot (in the short run) optimize by changing this variable, and as such 
the model compares each farm to those that are in the same or worse “environment.”18 In Table 
3.2, DEA non-discretionary problems are presented to illustrate the calculation of technical 
efficiency and minimum costs under different economies of scale assumptions. Let the scalar ds 
denote the level of debt for farm s. The DEA model takes into account the level of farm debt for 
the farm being analyzed, ds, which is not a choice variable in the problem. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the two models implemented in terms of variables used and type of 
linear programming problem. Y is a matrix formed from the output vectors ys, where the s th 
column of Y is the output vector of farm s; X is a corresponding matrix formed by the input 
vectors xs, and D = (d1, …, dS) is the vector of debt levels. Note that non-discretionary model 
efficiencies are calculated from the same farms and years as the input-oriented model, with the 
same inputs and outputs. Thus, the only difference between models is that the non-discretionary 
model is financially constrained by total debt. 
  
                                                 
18 An environmental input is a factor of production that cannot be instantly adjusted or controlled by the 
manager/farmer at the time. To measure short term efficiency, fixed inputs are introduced empirically in DEA 
problems this way.  
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Table 3.2 Non-Discretionary DEA with Added Debt Constraint 
Accounting for Variable Returns to Scale Accounting for Constant Returns to Scale 
Problem 2.1: Cost Minimization 
Minimizex*¸µ  ∑Nj=1 wj • xjs* vrs 
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yjs          i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs * ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
ds  ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • ds 
µs ≥ 0 
∑Ss=1 µs =1 
Problem 2.2: Cost Minimization 
Minimizex*¸µ  ∑Nj=1 wj • xjs* crs 
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis        i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs * ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
ds  ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • ds 
µs ≥ 0 
Problem 2.3: Technical Efficiency Θs vrs 
Minimizek¸µ Θs vrs 
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis              i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs • Θs ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • xjs       j=1, 2, 3…N 
ds  ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • ds 
µs ≥ 0   
∑Ss=1 µs =1 
Problem 2.4: Technical Efficiency Θs crs 
Minimizek¸µ Θs crs  
Subject to 
yis ≤ ∑Ss=1 µs • yis           i=1, 2, 3…M 
xjs • Θs ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs •xjs    j=1, 2, 3…N 
ds  ≥ ∑Ss=1 µs • ds 
µs ≥ 0 
 
Note: w is an N × 1 vector of input prices for the j=1, 2, 3…N inputs, xs  is a vector of 
corresponding input quantities for each of the s = 1, 2, 3…, S farms, and ys is the output vector 
for i=1, 2, 3…M outputs for each of the s = 1, 2, 3…, S farms. 
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Table 3.3 Comparisons of DEA Models 
DEA Model Variables Description Model Objectives 
Input-Oriented Y, X Y is an M×S matrix of output 
quantities for the S farms 
X  is an N×S matrix of input 
quantities  
Technical Efficiency 
under VRS 
Non-Discretionary Y, X, D  Y is an M×S matrix of output 
quantities for the S farms 
X  is an N×S matrix of input 
quantities  
D  is a 1×S vector of total debt level 
for each farm s  
Technical Efficiency 
under VRS, debt-
constrained 
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Total debt level is a non-discretionary or environmental factor in this case because the 
farmer does not have any discretion over it. However, a new constraint is added to ensure that 
the best practice frontier so that it represents a “virtual farm” whose level of debt is equal or less 
than the farm being evaluated. Non-discretionary DEA calculates efficiencies by taking into 
account this non-production variable, presumed to limit the farms as the level of output does. 
Conceptually, this DEA model seeks to radially contract inputs given the fixed level of outputs 
and the fixed level of the farm’s own level of capital availability.  
If efficiency scores differ between the unconstrained and the constrained models, this will 
be evidence constraint is binding for these farms. The magnitude of the change will indicate the 
importance of their relation.  
The software used to solve the linear programming models is General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS). Ramanathan 2003 points out that the software is especially suited to 
large and complex computations (page 125). Although earlier versions of the software were not 
as well suited for repeated linear programming formulations, newest versions include tools 
specifically designed to solve DEA problems. The algorithms used are minos and conopt which 
can be used for linear programming problems.  
3.4 Panel Tobit Regression Analysis of Farm Efficiency and Inefficiency 
Scores 
Once efficiency scores have been obtained, the factors that impact inefficiencies are 
studied using a Tobit regression model (referred in the literature as a one-step procedure 
efficiency analysis). The efficiency estimates were transformed into inefficiency estimates 
calculated as unity minus the efficiency. For example, technical efficiency, TI, was defined as TI 
= 1 – TE. The other inefficiency variables, AI, SI, and OI, were defined similarly. In this way 
inefficiency scores were bounded between zero and one 19. 
Regarding the use of a Tobit model using Maximum Likelihood over the Ordinary Least 
Squares procedure, this choice is due to the fact that the latter model estimates would be biased 
and inconsistent. Since the observed dependent variable, inefficiencies (which are left censored 
for the 456 farms for each year yst has a censored distribution, the Ordinary Least Square 
                                                 
19 While the dependent variable is conceptually bounded from above (right-censored) at 1; none of the data points 
are on or near this bound, which would correspond to complete inefficiencies or zero efficiency. 
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estimates of the models may be biased because of the “unobserved values” of the dependent 
variable are not taken into account in the regression. The Tobit model could be regarded as a 
combination of a linear regression model and a probabilistic regression (i.e. Probit model). The 
likelihood function combines a probability density function and a conditional density function to 
account both for observed and non-observed values of the dependent variable. The reader is 
referred to Greene (2003), Baltagi (2001) for a detailed specification of the computational and 
statistical properties of these estimators; including specification of the log-likelihood function for 
the estimator, the computation of estimated errors, and the method of maximizing the likelihood 
function (this normally depends on the software package; Stata approximates the maximum log-
likelihood function of the estimators using Gauss-Hermite quadrature method). 
The dataset used in this study consisted of a panel of 456 farms observed over the 10-year 
period 1998 to 2007. The benefits of panel data, i.e. observation of the same 456 farms over a 10 
year period of time, derives from the rich information provided by the combination of cross-
sectional and time-series data. Baltagi20 (2001, p. 5) listed the advantages of using models 
designed for panel data. The author argued for the benefits of controlling for the characteristics 
of this type of data in the models; he pointed that: “Panel data give more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” 
(Baltagi, 2001, p. 6). In page 7, Baltagi mentioned specifically names of economists such as 
Kumbhakar who agree on the added explanatory power of panel data to estimate technical 
efficiency (p. 7), and by extension, all efficiencies.  
Baltagi (2001)21 also explained that panel Tobit models can include fixed or random 
effects. The first type models the individual, farm-specific effects as fixed parameters; that is; the 
method would be equivalent to creating as many dummy variables as the number of farms (units) 
to control for their fixed time-variant effect in the model. In the random effects panel data model, 
the individual specific effects are allowed to be random; thus allowing for variation of these 
influences across the “representative population”. Sometimes, depending on the data at hand, and 
                                                 
20 For more detailed information, the reader is encouraged to read Baltagi (2001) about panel data, characteristics, 
and models. 
21Baltagi (2001, p14) explained very clearly the difference between a fixed effect versus a random effect panel data. 
Additionally, fixed effect models cannot model time invariant independent variables such as sex; whereas random 
effects can, though it assumes that the independent variables are independent of the individual effects. These two 
extreme requirements can be relaxed by mixing the two models through the use of dummy variables. He also 
explained that in the case the true model is a fixed effect model, the Ordinary Least Square estimates will be biased 
and inconsistent of the true regression parameters.  
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the number of farms (i.e. units or firms) it is possible to combine both models. In this study, 
some of the panel data Tobit models control both for year individual effects and fixed farm 
individual effects such as farm output specialty. These additional variables entered the Panel data 
Tobit model as dummy variables.  
The random-effect Tobit22 model, which is especially designed to deal with panel data 
and the possible collinearity between data cross-sections, was chosen to capture farms’ 
individual-specific effects which are not included in the regression (such as farm quality of soil, 
evapotransporation, temperature, rainfall, type of crop, type of animal), assuming no correlation 
between the individual’s specific effects and explanatory variables. The model is described as: 
  yst*= f ( Zs; βs)                for s=1, 2, 3…S                                                                    
  yst=  yst*   if yst*>0,             or yst=0 otherwise 
and it takes the specific following form: 
  yst*= α + β Zst + us + vst 
where yst* is a vector of the farm cost inefficiency scores for the s=1, 2, 3… S farms. Cost 
inefficiency is a function of farm specific explanatory factors Z, and (α, β) are parameters to be 
estimated. In this formulation, the farm specific random effects or time invariant effects, us, are 
assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
σ2u, that is, us are iid N(0, σ2u). The overall disturbances of the model, vst , are iid N(0, σ2v) and 
independent of us. The subscript t indexes the time period over the ten years, from 1998 to 2007. 
In summary, the observed dependent variable yst has a censored distribution since its 
value is censored at zero. As stated before, estimates of this model with Ordinary Least Squares 
would be biased. Additionally, the choice between a Tobit model and a Panel data Tobit model is 
justified since the Tobit model does not take into account the individual farm specific 
heterogeneity and the model may suffer from multicollinearity. A Log-likelihood test to 
determine if the random individual component of the model is significant was performed in 
every instance to confirm the appropriateness of the each model. In all instances, the random 
effects were significant at a 1% significance level.  
                                                 
22Fixed-Effect Tobit models can be used when the number of farms (i.e. units, farms) is sufficiently large to allow 
for the effects to be fixed (such as female versus male labor supply Tobit model); however, in this instance, with 456 
farms and only 10 years, at this moment of time there does not exist a sufficient statistic to draw statistically  the 
individual effects us, which allows the fixed-effect to be conditioned out of the likelihood function, as this the 
procedure to estimate this models; please see Baltagi (2001, p, 206 and 213). 
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This panel Tobit model for two-stage inefficiencies’ estimates and causes has been 
reported in the literature to have some potential bias if the range of years considered is very 
small (Davidova and Latruffe, 2007; Greene, 2003). Ten years is considered adequate for 
efficiency analysis because of the relatively long time span. Greene (2003, page 768) also warns 
about the inability of the Tobit model to deal with heteroskedasticity which would arise from an 
unobserved relationship between the mean of the dependent variable and the variance of the 
model errors. Some authors have proposed some alternative Tobit models to correct for it when 
present, but no conclusive model has been formulated to avoid it and its possible effects even 
though this area has received attention in the last decade. As in the majority of studies on farms’ 
efficiencies (and other businesses and fields of interest), random-effect Tobit models are 
customary in the efficiency literature. They are applied here although these limitations must be 
kept in mind. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Data 
4.1 Data Source and Sampling Procedures 
Whole-farm data from the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) databank 
were used in the dissertation. The data were collected by farm management specialists who work 
with farmers in the six area associations (Figure 4.1) to be used for research and extension 
activities at Kansas State University and for filing income taxes. Specifically, a panel of 456 
farms with continuous data from 1998 to 2007 was used in the models. The dataset contains 
financial and production data from farm management members of the KFMA.  
The KFMA databank provides individual farm information on costs, revenue, production, 
and farm characteristics. The farms in our panel did not exit or enter farming during the sample 
period; all of them were in business and in the record system for each of the ten consecutive 
years of the study. The sampled farms are representative of mid-sized Kansas farms where 
owner-operators typically make the production decisions (Featherstone, Griebel and Langemeier 
1992). Farms with asset values of zero (either for short-term assets such as inventories of inputs 
and outputs and long-term assets such as equipment and land) were not included in the original 
sample. These farms were excluded to ensure that the sampled farms are those where owners 
make production decisions. This exclusion eliminates, for example, observations where the 
owner is an absentee landlord who custom hires all the production or where the decision maker is 
an individual whose intention is to farm temporarily. The SAS code to extract the observations 
meeting these criteria is in Appendix B.  The extracted data included 570 farms spanning all six 
area associations in Figure 4.1. 
In order to ensure the accuracy of the farms’ data, the extracted dataset was further 
screened based on production and financial criteria. Screening for production criteria were aimed 
at eliminating anomalous observations where essential inputs were reported in zero quantities. 
First, if a farm had zero seed expenditures in any individual year, the farm was deleted from the 
sample if its reported output that year included crop such as corn or grain sorghum, for which 
seed must be purchased annually23. Chemicals are also an essential input for most crops, but 
chemicals can be applied by custom hire, and these expenditures may be reflected in the machine 
                                                 
23 In Kansas, it is a common management practice to retain some of the previous year’s wheat production to be used 
as seed wheat for the next year. Thus wheat farms with zero seed purchases in any one year were retained in the 
sample 
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hire variable (capital) instead of the chemical variable. Thus, the variable for chemical purchases 
can be zero in some cases.  A third essential input for crops is fertilizer.  However, integrated 
farms with both crop and livestock enterprises can substitute commercial fertilizer inputs with 
organic fertilizer such as manure. Crop farms with zero expenditure on fertilizer in any year were 
deleted, unless the farm also had dairy or beef production, in which case the farm was retained 
with a zero recorded for fertilizer input. For livestock operations, essential inputs include feed 
and veterinary care. If a sampled farm for any year recorded expenditures on feed and veterinary, 
then the farm was retained only if it had dairy and/or beef output.  
The financial screening criteria were aimed at eliminating insolvent farms that were 
likely to be in or in danger of entering bankruptcy.  Such farms’ decisions are likely to be driven 
by immediate financial survival rather than long-run profitability.  To eliminate them, 
observations with total debt to total asset ratios higher than one were evaluated to determine the 
farm’s solvency. Farms whose total debt to total asset ratio (maximum of 1.7) was more than one 
and fluctuated substantially from one year to the next were deleted from the sample.   
A total of 114 farms were eliminated according to the criteria explained above, leaving a 
dataset with 570 – 114 = 456 observations for analysis. The variables in the final dataset were 
then manipulated in two major ways to construct variables consistent with the theoretical 
assumptions in the DEA model. First, while the DEA model requires output and input  data in 
physical units, the output quantities in the KFMA databank are recorded as sales (revenue in 
nominal dollars) and input quantities reflect nominal dollar expenditures. Expenditures and sales 
from the KFMA farm members are recorded on an accrual accounting basis. The price deflator 
for personal consumption expenditures from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis24 was first 
used to convert these values into real 2007 dollars. Both input and output monetary quantities 
were then converted into implicit physical quantities by using 12-month averages of price 
indexes for input and output prices in Kansas using US Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price 
Indexes, 1989-2007. The price of labor was calculated as the ratio of labor costs divided by the 
                                                 
24 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search/personal+consumption+expenditures/1 
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Figure 4.1 Kansas Farm Management Associations
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number of workers25. The prices of land for non-irrigated crop land, irrigated crop land, and 
pasture land prices for each of the nine Kansas regions were obtained from the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistical Service. Data on the interest rate to compute the opportunity cost of 
owned assets were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City26. 
The farms’ depreciable assets, including listed property, motorized equipment, machinery 
equipment and buildings, were adjusted to reflect economic depreciation instead of tax 
depreciation because of changes that occurred in the calculation of tax depreciation in 1993 that 
permitted rapid depreciation rates of these assets27. Table 4.1 defines the depreciation methods 
used for each type of property. 
  
                                                 
25 Workers include owner operator. 
26 http://www.kc.frb.org/agcrsurv/agrmain.htm 
27 In economics and accounting, economic depreciation is the change in market value of capital over a given period. 
It is calculated as the market price of the capital at the beginning of the period minus its market price at the end of 
the period. Economic depreciation differs from other accounting depreciation methods in that it is included in the 
calculation of implicit cost, and thus economic profit (http://en.wikipedia.org). 
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Table 4.1 Economic Depreciation Methods  
Type of Property Life-Method1 Salvage Value 
Listed Property2   
All Property 5 Years; 100% DB3-20% 35% 
Motorized Equipment   
Pickups, Autos 5 Years; 100% DB3-20% 35% 
Tractors, Combines, Etc. 10 Years; 100% DB3-10% 35% 
Machinery-Equipment   
Livestock Feeders, 
Planting/Cultivation 
Equipment 
5 Years; 150% DB3-27.5% 20% 
Tillage Equipment 15 Years; 150% DB3-10% 20% 
All Other Machinery and 
Equipment 
10 Years; 150% DB3-15% 20% 
Buildings   
Grain and Hay Storage, Swine 
Buildings, Fences and Yards 
10 Years; 200% DB3-20% 10% 
All Other Buildings 20 Years; 200% DB3-10% 10% 
1 The mid-month convention was used to compute economic depreciation in the year that an 
asset was purchased. 
2 Listed property included computers, related peripheral equipment, cellular telephones and 
similar telecommunication equipment. 
3 DB is defined as declining balance. 
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  4.2 Input and Output Categories and Data Aggregation 
A basic assumption of efficiency analysis is that farmers are striving to use inputs in a 
manner that optimizes long-run efficiency. Sample farms can produce up to seven outputs and 
use up to eight inputs; although not all farms produce all outputs or use all inputs. Farm outputs 
include all major production crops produced in Kansas and two important Kansas livestock 
outputs, beef and dairy production.  Farms specialize in crop or livestock production or a 
combination of both. Outputs for the sampled farms include:   
- small grain production,  
- feed grain production,  
- oilseed production,  
- hay and forage production,  
- beef production,  
- milk production, and 
- custom work.  
Small grain production includes production of barley, oats, rye, and wheat. Feed grain 
production refers to corn and grain sorghum production. Oilseed production aggregates 
production of soybeans, pinto beans, sugar beets, legume and grass seed, cotton, popcorn, 
sunflowers, tobacco, peanuts and rice, and miscellaneous cash crops. Hay and forage production 
entails production of alfalfa, brome and fescue, prairie hay and other, corn silage and other, 
straw, cereal and residue pasture and other miscellaneous hay and forage production. All beef 
enterprises are labeled as beef production, from feeding to breeding. Dairy production also 
includes milk production and other products. The last output, custom work, consists of income 
from farmers using their equipment to do farm work for other farmers.  
Farm inputs include classical production economics categories of labor, capital, land and 
materials. Given this multi-output setting, not all farms use all input types. Inputs are categorized 
as: 
- labor,  
- capital, 
- land (total acres), 
- livestock and dairy expenses, 
- seed, 
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- fertilizer, and  
- chemicals.  
The number of workers (paid and unpaid) on the farm, usually including the owner, are 
used as the labor input variable. The variable capital represents short-term and intermediate-term   
capital expenses. This input includes inventories of inputs and outputs, depreciation on 
intermediate-term assets, interest paid on short-term and intermediate-term liabilities, machinery 
and building repairs, machine hire, irrigation repairs and energy, fuel and oil expenses, and auto 
expenses. The land variable includes total farm acres operated (owned and rented), including 
irrigated and non-irrigated crop acres, and pasture acres. The variable livestock reflects 
expenditures on feed, veterinary, medicines and drugs, livestock marketing and breeding and 
other dairy expenses. Seed and fertilizer reflect expenses on seed, and fertilizer and lime, 
respectively. Expenses in herbicide and insecticide form the variable chemicals. The farms’ total 
level of debt is used in the non-discretionary DEA models, which includes the annual real dollar 
value of short-term liabilities, combined with intermediate-term and long-term loan debt. 
In addition to the above variables, other production and socio-economic variables were 
obtained for the statistical analysis of the farm efficiencies and their causes. Age of the operator, 
percentage of each input’s expense to total expenses, farm output as a percent of income, and 
owned land as a percent of total land operated were variables used for analyzing the effect of 
input usage and output choice on efficiencies.  
  4.3 Production and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Farms 
Table 4.2 provides definitions of the variables used in the dissertation, categorized by 
farm characteristics, inputs, outputs and efficiency measures (definitions for all the variables in 
the dataset can be found in Appendix A). Table 4.3 provides the means and standard deviations 
of the inputs and outputs, of variables that were used in the estimation of the relationship 
between farm financial performance and efficiency, and of the farm-specific variables that were 
hypothesized to influence technical efficiency. Average age of the primary farm operator 
(AGEOP) was 55 years. Average gross farm income (RGFI) was $302,645 from an average 
number of acres (LAND) of 1,806 using a total annual debt (TADEBT) of $257,911. The 
average economic total expense ratio (EXPR) was 1.15. An economic expense ratio above 1 
indicates that the farms on average had farm expenses exceeding farm revenue (i.e., were 
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incurring losses or were not covering all of their opportunity costs). Many farmers rely on off-
farm income (OFFI) of $12,990, on average, and custom work (CUSTWORK) of $4,579, on 
average, to continue farming over the long run. 
In Table 4.4 farms were divided into four gross income (RGFI) categories: those with 
less than $100,000 (14% of farms) in gross farm income, those with a gross farm income 
between $100,000 and $250,000 (41% of farms), those with a gross farm income between 
$250,000 and $500,000 (30% of farms), and those with a gross farm income above $500,000 
(15% of farms). An interesting comparison can be made between farms with gross farm income 
less than $100,000 (small farms) and gross farm income greater than $500,000 (large farms). 
Notice that the number of farms in both categories is approximately the same (14% for small 
farms and 15% for large farms). However, that is where the similarity between the two groups 
ends. Small farms have older operators (61 compared with 54), higher economic total expense 
ratios (1.63 compared with 0.94), more off-farm income ($21,109 compared with $6,043) and a 
higher percentage of acres owned (46% compared with 33%) than large farms. Small farms spent 
less (16% versus 24% and 5% versus 15%) as a percent of total expenses on seed, fertilizer and 
chemicals (PCROPE) and livestock than large farms. However, the small farms spend more on 
labor (PLABORE) with 34% of total costs spent on labor versus 15% for large farms.28 Other 
variables were similar across farms sizes. 
Medium farms with gross income between 100,000 and 250,000 and 250,000 and 
500,000 were similar across descriptive variables to large farms. Medium farms had more 
income from crops (PCROPI) (67%, 68% versus 63%) and less income from livestock (PLIVDI) 
than large farms (31%, 30% versus 36%). Medium farms with gross income between 100,000 
and 250,000 spent less on crops (PCROPE) (21% versus 24%) and more on labor (PLABORE) 
(24% versus 17%) than farms with gross income between 250,000 and 500,000. The 250,000 to 
500,000 farms spent about the same amount on crops and labor as the large farms.29 
In Table 4.5 farms were categorized by farm specialization with crops farms (44% of 
farms) defined as farms with 80% or more of gross farm income derived from crop enterprises, 
livestock and dairy farms (12% of farms) defined as farms with 80% or more of gross farm 
                                                 
28 T-test statistics for these variables ranged from a low of 21 to a high of 115 indicating that all of the means of the 
two farm groups were statistically different from each other at the α = 0.01 level. 
29 T-test statistics for these variables ranged from a low of 4 to a high of 60 indicating that all of the means of the 
paired farm groups were statistically different from each other at the α = 0.01 level.     
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income derived from livestock enterprises, and mixed enterprise farms (44% of farms) making 
up the remainder of the farm sample. These farms were similar across most of the variables; 
however, there are a few noticeable exceptions. Mixed farms had a higher off-farm income 
(OFFI) of $14,449 versus $11,833 for both crops farms and livestock and dairy farms. Gross 
farm income (RGFI) of $373,891 was higher for livestock and dairy farms than for crop farms 
($312,885) and mixed enterprise farms ($272,857). Total farm debt (TADEB) of $303,566 was 
higher for livestock and dairy farms than for crop farms ($241,418) and mixed enterprise farms 
($261, 513). Livestock and dairy farms generate more income than crop and mixed enterprise 
farms because they are larger and they require more debt financing because they require more 
land (for cow-calf operations) or capital (for dairies) per unit of output than crop or mixed 
farms.30  
In Table 4.6 farms were divided into six total debt (TADEB) categories: those with no 
debt (11% of farms), those with less than $50,000 in debt (12% of farms), those with between 
$50,000 and $100,000 of debt (14% of farms), those with between $100,000 and $250,000 of 
debt (27% of farms), those with between $250,000 and $500,000 of debt (22% of farms) and 
those with over $500,000 of debt (14% of farms). Total farm debt is an especially important 
variable because it was used as a proxy for farm financial structure in the estimation of the 
relationship between farm financial performance and efficiency scores, and as a farm-specific 
variable that was hypothesized to influence efficiency in the Tobit models.  
An interesting comparison can be made between farms with no debt or low-debt (with 
debt = 0 or less than 50,000 in debt) farms and high debt farms (with $250,000 to $500,000 and 
over $500,000 in debt). Low-debt farmers were older (AGEOP) (61, 57 versus 53, 53), had 
slightly higher total cost to farm income (EXPR) (1.28, 1.24 versus 1.06, 1.25), had higher crop 
expenses (PCROPE) (37%, 37% versus 23%, 22%), and higher labor costs (PLABORE) (28%, 
26% versus 18%, 15%) than high-debt farmers. All other variables are similar among debt sizes.    
These differences were expected.  Quite often farmer are required to seek outside sources 
of capital in the form of debt capital because of the size of their capital requirements. Whether 
the farmer should use someone else’s money for capital requirements and how much debt is 
appropriate are important questions to consider. A prudent farmer will monitor the financial 
                                                 
30 T-test statistics for these variables ranged from a low of 6 to a high of 10 indicating that all of the means of the 
paired farm groups were statistically different from each other at the α = 0.01 level.   
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health of the farm regularly and strive to maintain an appropriate amount of debt. Beginning 
farmers and existing farmers expanding their own farm operation need larger amounts of debt 
than older, more established farmers. However, the greater the debt the farmer uses in relation to 
his/her own funds (the debt/equity ratio) the greater the financial risk. Older farmers closer to 
retirement frequently do not want to take on the burden of extra risk to expand or to increase 
profitability through use of financial leverage31. It is important for older farmers planning for 
succession of the farm operation to determine and provide for how the farm assets will be 
distributed upon the farmer’s death. However, it is equally critical that a farmer plan for how 
debt is handled after the farmer’s death because a farmer’s outstanding debts must be settled by 
the estate before most distributions can be made to his/her heirs. For these reasons, many farmers 
reduce the amount of debt of the farm operation as they get older.  
  
                                                 
31 Financial leverage takes the form of a debt, the proceeds of which are reinvested with the intent to earn a greater 
rate of return than the cost of interest on the debt. If the farm's rate of return on assets is higher than the rate of 
interest on the debt, then its return on equity will be higher than if it did not borrow. On the other hand, if the farm's 
return on assets is lower than the interest rate, then its return on equity will be lower than if it did not borrow. 
Leverage allows greater potential returns to the farmer than otherwise would have been available. The potential for 
loss is also greater, because if the investment becomes worthless, the debt principal and all accrued interest on the 
debt still need to be repaid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki). 
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Table 4.2 Variable Definition by Category 
Variable Definition 
Farm Characteristics  
AGEOP Operator's Age ("Primary" Operator for Partnerships and Corporations) 
EXPR 
 
Total Cost of Production Divided by Total Farm Income Including 
Farming Operations, Government Payments, and Insurance Receipts 
ID From 1 to 456, Number of Farms 
MFIAC Real Gross Farm Income per Acre 
OFFI Income from Off-Farm Sources  
PCAPE Percent of Costs Spent on Capital  
PCROPE Percent of Costs Spent on Crop Expenses Including Seed, Fertilizer and 
Chemicals 
PCROPI Percent of Income from Crops  
PCWKI Percent of Income from Custom Work 
PLABCROP Percent of Labor Devoted To Crops 
PLABORE Percent of Costs Spent on Labor 
PLANDE Percent of Costs Spent on Land Cost 
PLIVDE Percent of Costs Spent on Livestock Expenses 
PLIVDI Percent of Income from Livestock 
POWNA Percent of Total Operated Acres that are Owned 
RGFI Real Gross Farm Income 
TADEBT Level of Total Annual Debt 
YEAR Year from 88 to 107, 1988-2007 
Inputs In Units 
CAPITA Capital Expenses  
CHEMICA Chemical  
FERTILA Fertilizer  
LABOR Number of Workers (Including Operator and Unpaid Workers) 
LANDA Total Operated Acres 
LIVE Livestock Expenses  
SEED Seed  
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Variable Definition 
Input Prices Per Unit In Real 2007 $ 
PCAPITAL Short-term and Intermediate-term Capital 
PCHEM Chemical 
PFERT Fertilizer 
PLABOR Labor 
PLAND Cash Land Rent 
PLIVE Livestock 
PSEED Seed 
Outputs  
CUSTWORK Custom Work in Real 2007 $ 
DAIRY Production of Diary Products in Pounds 
FGPROD Production of Feed Grain in Bushels 
HFPROD Production of Hay and Forage in Bushels 
LIVE Production of Livestock in Pounds 
SGPROD Production of Small Grain (Wheat) in Bushels 
SOYPROD Production of Oilseeds (Soybeans and Sunflowers) in Bushels 
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 2007 
Variable Unit Mean Standard Deviation 
Farm Characteristics    
AGEOP # of Years 55 11 
EXPR % 1.15 0.35 
MFIAC Real 2007 $ 33 79 
OFFI Real 2007 $ 12,990 19,832 
PCAPE % 38 8 
PCROPE % 22 9 
PCROPI % 66 31 
PCWKI % 2 4 
PLABORE % 22 9 
PLANDE % 10 6 
PLIVDE % 8 12 
PLIVDI % 32 31 
POWNA % 35 27 
RGFI Real 2007 $ 302,645   257,933 
TADEBT Real 2007 $ 257,911 310,418 
Inputs    
CAPITAL # of Units/Acre 73 70 
CHEM # of Units/Acre 11 9 
FERT # of Units/Acre 17 14 
LABOR # of Workers 1.5 0.9 
LAND # of Acres 1,806 1,202 
LIVE # of Units 254 575 
SEED # of Units/Acre 118 126 
Input Prices Per Unit  
PCAPITAL Real 2007 $ 38 8 
PCHEM Real 2007 $ 11 8 
PFERT Real 2007 $ 17 14 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
Variable Unit Mean Standard Deviation 
PLABOR Real 2007 $ 22 9 
PLAND Real 2007 $ 10 6 
PLIVE Real 2007 $ 8 11 
PSEED Real 2007 $ 12 13 
Outputs    
CUSTWORK Real 2007 $ 4,579 14,625 
DAIRY # of Pounds 135,850 626,070 
FGPROD # of Bushels 23,422 37,887 
HFPROD # of Pounds 98 280 
LIVE # of Pounds 76,929 155,482 
SGPROD # of Bushels 11,575 13,850 
SOYPROD # of Bushels 7,160 10,884 
 
Table 4.4 Summary Statistics Categorized by Gross Farm Income for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 2007 
  RGFI<100,000 
14% of Farms 
100,000≥RGFI<250,000 
41% of Farms 
250,000≥RGFI<500,000 
30% of Farms 
RGFI≥500,000 
15% of Farms 
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Characteristics      
AGEOP # 61 13 55 10 53 10 54 10 
EXPR % 1.63 0.46 1.17 0.26 1.02 0.21 0.94 0.27 
OFFI $ 21,109 25,732 15,186 19,866 9,717 15,925 6,043 16,743 
POWNA % 46 30 36 26 30 25 33 29 
RGFI $ 68,906 19,423 174,725 42,565 349,553 70,227 775,548 325,060 
TADEB $ 78,345 87,644 166,515 145,260 295,776 248,310 598,636 532,298 
Income from Outputs          
PCROPI % 62 32 67 28 68 30 63 35 
PCWKI % 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 
PLIVDI % 36 33 31 29 30 31 36 36 
Inputs          
LAND acres 764 452 1,470 741 2,143 985 3,011 1,738 
PCAPE % 37 9 38 8 38 8 37 7 
PCROPE % 16 7 21 8 24 9 24 11 
PLABORE % 34 10 24 6 17 5 15 5 
PLANDE % 8 5 11 6 11 6 9 6 
PLIVDE % 5 6 6 8 9 13 15 16 
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Table 4.5 Summary Statistics Categorized by Farm Specialization for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 2007 
  Crop Farms 
44% of Farms 
Livestock and Dairy Farms 
12% of Farms 
Mixed Enterprise Farms 
44% of Farms 
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Characteristics        
AGEOP # 55 11 56 11 55 11 
EXPR % 1.14 0.34 1.12 0.33 1.18 0.36 
OFFI $ 11,833 18,990 11,833 17,885 14,449 21,032 
POWNA % 33 27 46 31 34 25 
RGFI $ 312,885 247,716 373,891 331,378 272,857 239,425 
TADEB $ 241,418 291,092 303,566 377,556 261,513 307,045 
Income from Outputs        
PCROPI % 94 6 9 6 55 17 
PCWKI % 2 3 0 1 2 5 
PLIVDI % 5 6 90 6 43 18 
Inputs        
LAND acres 1,677 1,004 1,683 1,512 1,966 1,264 
PCAPE % 39 8 34 7 38 7 
PCROPE % 27 8 9 5 19 7 
PLABORE % 21 8 22 9 23 9 
PLANDE % 11 6 6 5 11 6 
PLIVDE % 1 3 29 14 9 9 
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Table 4.6 Summary Statistics Categorized by Total Debt for 456 Kansas Farms from 1988 to 2007 
  TADEB=0 
11% of Farms 
TADEB<50,000 
12% of Farms 
50,000≤ TADEB<100,000 
14% of Farms 
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Characteristics        
AGEOP # 61 13 57 11 55 12 
EXPR % 1.28 0.45 1.24 0.39 1.25 0.39 
OFFI $ 8,108 14,936 14,016 19,492 15,621 21,792 
POWNA % 0.46 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.27 
RGFI $ 228,216 192,119 191,959 150,087 207,936 158,134 
TADEB $ 0 0 28,479 13,390 74,459 14,405 
Income from Outputs        
PCROPI % 0.63 0.33 0.69 0.32 0.69 0.30 
PCWKI % 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
PLIVDI % 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.30 
Inputs        
LAND acres 1,491 1,006 1,245 889 1,455 929 
PCAPE % 0.37 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.08 
PCROPE % 0.19 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.09 
PLABORE % 0.28 0.11 0.26 0.09 0.25 0.08 
PLANDE % 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 
PLIVDE % 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
  100,000≤TADEB< 250,000 
27% of Farms 
250,000≤ TADEB< 500,000 
22% of Farms 
TADEB≥500,000 
14% of Farms 
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm Characteristics        
AGEOP # 54 10 53 9 53 9 
EXPR % 1.16 0.32 1.06 0.24 1.02 0.30 
OFFI $ 15,968 22,037 12,716 19,147 8,015 15,941 
POWNA % 0.34 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.37 0.26 
RGFI $ 242,976 169,551 340,102 202,766 603,916 399,507 
TADEB $ 167,759 43,414 358,777 70,776 849,694 409,658 
Income from Outputs        
PCROPI % 0.68 0.29 0.66 0.30 0.59 0.33 
PCWKI % 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 
PLIVDI % 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.40 0.33 
Inputs        
LAND acres 1,639 1,022 1,966 1,019 2,941 1,583 
PCAPE % 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.08 
PCROPE % 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.10 
PLABORE % 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.05 
PLANDE % 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.06 
PLIVDE % 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 
CHAPTER 5 - Results 
5.1 Efficiency Scores from Basic DEA Model by Year 
Efficiency estimates for the 456 sampled Kansas farms from the DEA problems per year 
and subsequent calculations are displayed in Table 5.1. All efficiencies (technical, allocative, 
scale and overall) range from 0 to 1; equivalently the scores can be reported as ranging from 0% 
to 100%. The models were run for each year from 1998 to 2007 individually (i.e. rather than the 
alternative of running the model with all ten years together. The first option gives an estimate of 
the cost frontier for each year, and thus, the cost frontier is not the same from year to year as it 
may reflects fluctuating conditions, and surely, it will reflect the effect of technical change over 
the years. If all the years are used to calculate the cost frontier, there is only one cost frontier, and 
all observations are measured with respect to it. It is theoretically expected that if all farms’ 
economic efficiencies for the sample were calculated for the 10 years together, the most efficient 
ones would be the ones in 2007 where technological advances are highest. 
Results for the 10 years analyzed show that the annual average technical efficiency for 
the sampled farms ranges from a minimum value of 0.86 (or 86%) in 2007 to a maximum of 
93% in 2006; the mean technical efficiency over the period is 90%. For the sampled farms and 
the years considered, farms could have reduced their input costs by an average of 10% to 
produce the same level of output if they had been fully technically efficient. Statistically, farms’ 
technical efficiency was on average 7% better in 2006 than it was in 200732. Technical efficiency 
mostly captures managers’ skills and abilities in operating the farm. The results indicate that 
some factors in 2007 were unexpected for operators, and thus, their production decisions were 
not as good as they had been in 2006.  
Allocative efficiency reflects the farm’s ability to choose the combination of inputs to 
minimize input costs, given prices, the farm’s output level, and its current technology. That is, 
AE measures the farm’s performance in finding the input mix where the input price ratio equals 
the marginal rate of substitution between inputs. The average estimate for the sampled period 
                                                 
32 The t-test value is 22.7, with 9118 degrees of freedom; the null hypothesis states that there is no difference 
between the average technical efficiency in 2006 and in 2007. The null was rejected at a 5% significance level 
indicating that the difference between the means is more than 0.  
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and farms was 0.80; farms could have produced the same level of output and reduced their input 
costs by as much as 20% by becoming fully allocatively efficient. The minimum average score 
was 0.75 and it occurred in 2007, whereas the maximum average score was 0.83 in 2004. For 
both technical and allocative efficiency, the minimum average annual estimates were found in 
the year 2007. The cost-minimizing input combination seems to have changed dramatically this 
year, maybe due to the new high prices of fuel and feed inputs during this year.   
Average technical efficiency estimates for the farms over the sample period are higher 
than allocative efficiency. The distribution of scores reveals that 63% of the farms had a 
technical efficiency score above or equal to 0.90, whereas only 52% of the farms had an 
allocative efficiency score above or equal to 0.80. Thus, in terms of overall efficiency, farms in 
the sample for the period studied are more allocatively inefficient than technically efficient.  
The relative performance of the farms’ observed scale of operation and an optimal size 
(i.e. where constant returns to scale is obtained) was evaluated with scale efficiency. The average 
scale efficiency estimate for the sample was 0.87; if the average farm were operating at optimal 
scale, it could have produced the same level of output while reducing its input costs by 13%. The 
distribution of scores indicates 65% of observations had a scale efficiency score equal or larger 
than 0.87. Table 5.1 shows that the minimum average score was .84 and it occurred in 2003 and 
2002, whereas the maximum average score was 0.91 in 2005. A T-test statistic of 22.92 (9118) 
demonstrates that the difference in average scale efficiency scores was statistically higher in 
2005 than in 2003. 
Overall efficiency is the product of technical efficiency, allocative and scale efficiency. Thus, 
this efficiency measure is affected and depends on the three components just mentioned. Table 
5.1 shows the average annual farms overall efficiency estimate over the 10 years analyzed. The 
average value for all years is 0.633, indicating that on average over the years farms have been 
inefficient. If farms had been operating at optimal scale and operating on the minimum cost 
frontier, the average farm could have reduced its costs by 36.7% while producing the same level 
of output. The distribution of scores also indicated that close to 50% of observations had an 
overall efficiency score higher or equal than the overall average. The minimum estimated value 
for the average overall efficiency of the 456 farms was 0.057, it occurred in 2002; the maximum 
average score was 0.69 in 2004. A t-test statistic of 30.11 (9118 degrees of freedom) indicates 
that the average overall scores for the farms are higher in 2002 than in 2004. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Estimates for Technical (TE), Allocative (AE), Scale (SE) and Overall (OE) Efficiency from 1988 to 
2007 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Efficiency Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
TE 0.91 0.13 0.89 0.13 0.89 0.14 0.93 0.11 0.89 0.14 
AE 0.80 0.13 0.80 0.12 0.80 0.13 0.82 0.11 0.76 0.13 
SE 0.86 0.14 0.85 0.16 0.85 0.16 0.90 0.11 0.84 0.15 
OE 0.62 0.18 0.62 0.19 0.61 0.18 0.69 0.17 0.57 0.19 
           
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Efficiency Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Efficiency Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
TE 0.88 0.14 0.92 0.13 0.91 0.12 0.93 0.12 0.86 0.17 
AE 0.80 0.12 0.83 0.12 0.81 0.12 0.82 0.13 0.75 0.15 
SE 0.84 0.16 0.90 0.13 0.91 0.13 0.90 0.13 0.87 0.16 
OE 0.59 0.19 0.69 0.18 0.67 0.18 0.69 0.18 0.57 0.20 
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In terms of mean efficiency values across years, 2002 and 2007 seem to be the years 
when efficiencies were the lowest and thus furthest from the efficient frontier; the other extreme 
occurred in 2004, when some average efficiency measures (e.g., allocative and overall 
efficiency) reached their highest values. None of the farms in the data sample were technically, 
allocatively or overall efficient all 10 years of the study. Figure 5.1 traces the number of fully 
efficient farms by year. The percent of fully technically efficient farms is the highest among all 
efficiencies. Consistently every year, the percent of fully technically efficient farms is around 
50% out of the 456 in the sample. The percent of fully allocative farms annually is around 10%; 
only around 5% of the farms were fully scale and overall efficient. 
In general, results in Table 5.1 point to technical efficiency estimates as the highest of 
technical, allocative and scale efficiency contributing to overall efficiency. Scale efficiency 
scores are on average the second largest, and allocative scores are the smallest of the three 
measures. As overall efficiency depends on these three measures; it can be said that technical and 
scale influenced overall efficiency the most. Overall inefficiencies are then mainly due to 
allocative inefficiency. Overall efficiency takes into account inefficiencies due to the use of 
technology, input choice, and scale. These scores provide a complete evaluation of farm 
performance. In order to further investigate farms’ overall efficiency and the characteristics of 
the most efficient ones, the following discussion groups farms according to their output 
specialization, their level of real gross income level as a proxy for size, and the level of farm 
debt. These categories were explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
Among crop farms, which constitute around 44% of the total sample, 6% of the 
observations (out of the 44%) were fully overall efficient. Out of the livestock farms (12% out of 
the 456 farms), close to 7% of farms were fully overall efficient. Only 3.5% of all type mixed 
farms were overall efficient from 1998 to 2007. Overall efficiency results by farm output 
specialization seem to indicate that livestock and crop farms perform somewhat better than 
mixed ones, but these difference in efficiency were not statistically significant. 
Regarding farm size, as approximated by farm real gross, farms were grouped into 4 
categories consistently from group 1 (small farms) to group 4 (large farms) the percentage of 
fully overall efficient farms increased significantly. 102 observations were fully overall efficient 
among large farms, which represent close to 14% of farms in this 4th category. Conversely, only 
1.2% of observations in the 1st category were fully overall efficient. In categories 2 and 3, fully  
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Figure 5.1 Number of Fully Efficient Farms (of 456 Farms) from 1988 to 2007 
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Figure 5.1 Continued 
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efficient observations accounted for 2.4% and 5% respectively, of all observations in these 
groups. These results suggest that size does influence overall efficiency in a positive way.  
Among the 6 debt categories, fully overall efficient observations in categories 1 through 5 
ranged from close to 3% to 6% within each group. 10% of farms in debt category 6 (representing 
the highest debt loads of more than half million dollars), were fully overall efficient, and this 
value was statistically different than those for the other debt groups. Thus, the level of debt does 
appear to influence overall efficiency, also implying it impacts technical, allocative and/or scale 
efficiency. 
In summary, the type of farm in terms of output specialization, size as measured by real 
gross farm income, and total farm debt offered some reasons for the difference in value of farms’ 
overall efficiency and their attainment of full overall efficiency. Section 5.3 in this Chapter is 
devoted to research socio-economic and individual farm factors that may influence farm 
efficiency scores in more detail using econometric methods. 
 
  
5.2 Efficiency Scores in Debt-Constrained Model 
This section presents efficiency scores when the level of farm debt is fixed. In this case, 
the level of debt, which is an approximation for the farm’s capital availability, is regarded as a 
fixed input because it cannot be adjusted by the operator. Conceptually, this variable is similar to 
capturing and accounting for uncontrollable factors such as farm soil quality in the production 
process. As explained in Chapter 3, non-discretionary DEA models account for the direct effect 
on efficiencies of factors beyond the control of the operator. The level of total debt was used in 
this way to capture the direct effects of farm capital availability on production. The modified 
DEA model allows a reference farm to be compared in terms of their outputs, inputs, input prices 
to those farms that have a smaller or equal level of debt as the reference farm. Debt constrained 
farms can be thought of as not being able to achieve their potential due to their shortcoming in 
capital availability33.  
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics for the efficiency scores when the level of farm 
debt was fixed. Technical, allocative, scale and overall efficiencies and inefficiencies for the 
sample farms are listed for the two models, the basic and the debt-constrained model. The mean 
values for all farms all years revealed that on average, efficiency scores for the debt-constrained 
model were larger than those from the basic model. With the debt-constrained model, technical, 
allocative and scale efficiencies had mean values of 92%, 82%, and 89%, respectively. Each of 
the efficiencies had a mean which was 2% larger than the basic model. The average overall 
efficiency score under the debt-constrained model was 68%; which was 5% larger than the 
average overall efficiency score for the basic model.  
 
                                                 
33 Specifically, the efficiencies under study correspond to the farm efficiencies scores obtained through the Non-
discretionary DEA model or Debt-constrained DEA model. The farm efficiencies in these models were calculated as 
in the same way the basic DEA model. There were seven (discretionary) inputs and three outputs; however, this 
model was modified by adding the constrained that the farms were compared only to corresponding farms with the 
same or less level of debt. As pointed out before, the resulting the Debt-constrained model rendered farm 
efficiencies which were compared not only in terms of the discretionary inputs, but also in terms of their level of 
debt.  
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Debt-Constrained Models for 456 Kansas Farms from 
1988 to 2007 
Model Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Basic Inefficiency Scores  
Technical 0.10 0.14 0 0.69 
Allocative 0.20 0.13 0 0.83 
Scale 0.13 0.15 0 0.94 
Overall 0.37 0.19 0 0.99 
     
Debt-Constrained Inefficiency Scores  
Technical 0.08 0.13 0 0.69 
Allocative 0.18 0.13 0 0.74 
Scale 0.11 0.14 0 0.96 
Overall 0.32 0.20 0 0.99 
  
Basic Efficiency Scores  
Technical 0.90 0.14 0.31 1 
Allocative 0.80 0.13 0.17 1 
Scale 0.87 0.15 0.06 1 
Overall 0.63 0.19 0.01 1 
     
Debt-Constrained Efficiency Scores  
Technical 0.92 0.13 0.31 1 
Allocative 0.82 0.13 0.26 1 
Scale 0.89 0.14 0.04 1 
Overall 0.68 0.20 0.01 1 
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For technical and overall efficiencies, these results are expected because of mathematical 
properties of the two linear programming problems from which the efficiencies are calculated.  
Compared to the basic models (see Table 5.1), the debt-constrained models (Table 5.2) impose 
an additional constraint requiring the farm under analysis to be compared to a “virtual reference 
farm” with the same or less debt. Otherwise the models are equivalent. Because both problems 
are minimization problems, the debt constrained problem must produce an objective value that is 
greater than that from the basic model. If the debt constraint does not bind, the solutions to the 
two types of problems are identical (by definition a non-binding constraint has no effect on the 
solution). If it does bind, this means the constraint is limiting the objective from reaching its 
previously low level. While TE and CE scores can only stay the same or increase, AE and SE 
may move in either direction because they are calculated as ratios of the TE and CE scores. To 
illustrate, note that AE can be calculated as AE = CE/TE.  If, for example, adding debt 
constraints to the models caused a farm’s TE score to increase while leaving CE unchanged, its 
debt-constrained AE score would decrease. The opposite would be true if the farm’s TE score 
was unaffected while its CE score increased. 
Table 5.2 also contains the average inefficiency scores for the sample for each model. 
The average sample inefficiencies for the basic model were larger than the ones for the debt-
constrained model, imposed by the definition of inefficiencies as unity minus the farm efficiency 
score. The maximum values of inefficiencies were the same in both models for technical and 
scale efficiency; the maximum value for allocative inefficiency was larger in the basic model 
than in the debt-constrained one, however, it was the contrary for scale inefficiency. 
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistics of the Impact of Level of Debt on Efficiencies for 456 Kansas 
Farms from 1988 to 2007 
Efficiency Impact Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Technical Positive 877 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.48 
 Negative 0     
 No Difference 3,683     
       
Allocative Positive 1,590 0.07 0.09 2E-05 0.60 
 Negative 464 -0.03 0.04 -0.27 -1E-07 
 No Difference 2,506     
       
Scale Positive 1,435 0.06 0.08 6E-08 0.56 
 Negative 811 -0.03 0.05 -0.45 -2E-05 
 No Difference 2,314     
       
Overall Positive 2,002 0.10 0.11 6E-08 0.64 
 Negative 0  
 No Difference 2,558     
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Table 5.3 divides the sample into 3 groups for each efficiency measure: observations 
whose efficiency score increased under the debt-constrained model compared to the basic model, 
observations for which the debt-constrained efficiency score was lower than that under the basic 
model, and those for which the efficiency scores were the same in both models.  The mean and 
other statistics in this table refer to the observed difference between efficiency scores according 
to the direction of the change.  As discussed above, a farm’s technical efficiency score from the 
debt constrained model can only be larger or identical to the score from the basic model.  The 
mean technical efficiency score among the debt-constrained group (i.e., observations where the 
efficiency score rose) was 80%. The average increase in technical efficiency in this group was 
9%. The mean technical efficiency for the unconstrained group (81% of the sample) was 92%. 
The difference in means across groups was statistically significant, implying that although 
constrained farms had higher technical efficiency scores when they are compared to farms with 
similar or worse debt levels, they still do not perform as well as unconstrained farms. 
A similar story applies to overall efficiency.  Again, mathematically, these scores can 
only increase or stay the same. The mean efficiency of constrained farms was 62%, while the 
mean efficiency for unconstrained farms was 63%. The difference between the means was 
significant at a 5% level. For constrained farms, their average efficiency score was 10% higher in 
the debt-constrained model than in the basic model. 
In the case of allocative and scale efficiency, observations changed positively, negatively, 
and not at all. With respect to allocative efficiency, most observations were not constrained 
(55%); their mean allocative efficiency was 81%. 35% of observations were positively 
constrained in their allocative efficiencies; these observations’ mean technical efficiency was 
77%. Only 10% of the observations decreased their basic allocative scores; the average debt-
constrained allocative efficiency for this group was 78%. Comparing scale efficiency scores 
between the debt-constrained model and the basic one gave these results: unconstrained farms 
had a mean scale efficiency of 87%, positively constrained farms had a mean scale efficiency of 
84%, and negatively constrained farms had a mean scale efficiency of 89%. The difference in 
mean scale efficiencies between the latter two groups was statistically significant. 
In general, Table 5.3 shows that for most efficiencies, except for scale efficiency, the 
farms that were not constrained by debt scored higher than the farms that were constrained. In 
the case of scale efficiency, negatively constrained farms performed the best. The farms that 
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were constrained positively, despite the increase in efficiency accounted by the level of farm 
debt, scored lower than farms that were negatively constrained and their scored had decreased.  
Farms in the sample showed that around 50% of all farms were debt-constrained, and 
thus they underutilized their level of debt relative to their optimal cost-efficient level or over 
utilized it. Farms constrained in the technical efficiency debt-constrained DEA model showed 
very low levels of the debt-to-asset ratio, around 0.10. Comparatively, unconstrained farms in the 
technical efficiency DEA model had a mean debt-to-asset ratio of .31. Such a gap in debt-to asset 
ratios suggests constrained farms were not using all their capital possibilities, maybe due to risk-
aversion or price-uncertainty. Consistently, for all efficiencies reported in Table 5.3, non-debt 
constrained farms had a debt-to-asset ratio around 0.35; whereas constrained farms had a debt-to-
asset ratio around 0.012. 
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5.3 Causes of Farm Inefficiencies and Efficiencies 
The analysis continued with a two-step procedure where a series of panel Tobit models 
were used to regress DEA efficiency estimates on farm characteristics. The dependent variable in 
these regressions were the inefficiency scores (unity minus efficiency) from the basic DEA 
models reported in Section 5.1. The independent variables were financial, production, and socio-
economic farm characteristics. Four models used socio-economic characteristics to measure their 
causality on inefficiency scores for technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale efficiency, 
and overall efficiency. In section 5.3.2, another set of four models used normalized input costs to 
measure the effect of input combination and allocation in the farms efficiencies. 
Table 5.4 names and describes the variables used in these econometric Panel Tobit 
models. Table 5.5 gives summary statistics of the characteristics of farms selected as explanatory 
variables; these variables and the justifications for including them are described in detail below. 
The means reported are the overall average across all observations in the sample (all 456 farms 
for all 10 years, 1998-2007). The summary statistics provide a picture of the typical farm in the 
sample. The mean percentage of owned land is 35%, close to 80% of labor costs is devoted to 
crops, the farms earn an average of 32% with livestock operations, 66 with crop operations and a 
mean 2% with custom hire operations. The mean age for “older farmers” is 65. Farms have a 
mean debt of 28% of their assets; and the mean farm in the sample has as much as 30% of 
acreage as pasture grass. The mean farm in the sample spends $73 per acre in short and 
intermediate capital inputs. It spends equal proportions of total costs on land and fertilizer 
resources; and the average sample farm spends around $11 and $12 per acre in chemical and 
seed inputs respectively.  
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Table 5.4 Definition of Variables used in Basic DEA and Panel Tobit Models 
Variable Definition 
AI Allocative Inefficiency 
CAPITA Capital Costs per Acre 
CHEMICA Chemical Costs per Acre 
FERTILA Fertilizer Costs per Acre 
LANDA Land Costs per Acre 
M55AGE Variable for Operators Older than 55 Years 
RNFICA Net Farm Income per Acre 
PCROPI Percent of Income from Crops  
PCWKI Percent of Income from Custom Work  
PLIVDI Percent of Income from Livestock  
OI Overall Inefficiency 
POWNA Owned Acres as a Percent of Total Operated Acres 
PPASTA Pasture Acres as a Percent of Total Acres  
SEEDA Seed Costs per Acre 
TDTA Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
OFFI Off-farm Income  
SI Scale Inefficiency 
TI Technical Inefficiency 
YEAR Year from 88 to 107, 1988-2007 
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Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Basic DEA and Panel Tobit Models 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. 
CAPITA $ 73 71 
CHEMICA $ 11 9 
FERTILA $ 17 14 
LANDA $ 17 10 
M55AGE # 65 6 
OFFI $ 12,990 19,832 
PCROPI % 0.66 0.31 
PCWKI % 0.02 0.04 
PLABCROP % 0.78 0.22 
PLIVDI % 0.32 0.31 
POWNA % 0.35 0.27 
PPASTA # 0.31 0.24 
RNFICA $ 33 79 
SEEDA $ 12 13 
TDTA % 0.28 0.23 
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5.3.1. Results of Causes of Inefficiencies 
Four Tobit models of DEA Inefficiency estimates were performed to examine the farm 
characteristics that can influence farm inefficiencies. The influence of causality, positive 
(increasing) or negative (i.e. decreasing) and its magnitude were measured for a set of farm 
specific characteristics based on the literature review in Chapter 2. Farm inefficiencies are 
described in Section 5.2. The inefficiency are calculated as unity minus the farms’ technical 
efficiency score yearly, the farms’ allocative, scale and overall efficiency yearly; and all farms 
efficiency and inefficiency scores were derived using the for the basic DEA model.  
The farm characteristics used as explanatory variables were selected based on the 
literature review in Chapter 2. The model includes 18 explanatory variables:  
1. MFIAC, size of operation, measured by gross income per operated acre;  
2. POWNA, the ratio of owned acres to operated acres;  
3. OFFI, income from off-farm sources;  
4. PLABCROP, percent of labor costs devoted to crops;  
5. PLIVDI, percent of income from dairy and livestock operations;  
7. PCWKI, percent of income from custom work;  
8. M55AGE, combination of a dummy variable for farmers older than 55 years and their 
actual age;  
9. TDTA, the ratio of debt-to-asset ratio;  
10; PPASTA, percent of acres devoted to pasture grass;  
11-18. YEAR 1998 to YEAR 2006, dummy year variables from 1998 to 2006 (the year 
2007 is not included to avoid perfect collinearity.  
Sections 3.4 and 5.1 pointed out how farm size could affect efficiency positively. Income 
as an approximation for farm size was preferred over total farm acreage since acreage could be a 
biased measure of size for multiple-enterprise farms. Gross income is hypothesized to increase 
efficiency. Income from off-farm sources is likely to influence how much time and incentive the 
operator has to spend on management activities, which may impact efficiency. The percentage of 
owned acres to operated acres is also included as it is likely to influence management decisions; 
owner operators may be more likely to have a longer-term planning horizon than those who rent 
most of their land. 
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Output specialization also is likely to affect efficiencies, so variables measuring the 
degree of farm specialization were introduced. The percentages of farm income from crops, 
livestock and custom work were included in the model. To avoid perfect collinearity, the 
percentage of income from crops, PCROPI, was eliminated from the model. Thus crop farms can 
be considered the “base” group in the model and the impact of adding another output to 
production was measured using the income variables related to livestock and custom work. As 
another indicator of specialization, the percentage of labor devoted to crops was also included in 
the model.  The percent of pasture acres to total operated acres also can measure the allocation of 
the farm resources to the different enterprises. The impact of these specialization variables was 
hypothesized to depend on the efficiency measure being analyzed. 
The financial structure of the farm was included in the analysis to capture the impact of 
financial position of the farm. As explained in Section2.6, the evidence regarding the impact of 
farms’ debt and the financing method is unresolved. Initial comparisons in Section 5.1 revealed 
some positive effect of the level of debt on farms’ overall efficiency. In Chapter 2, some 
compelling theories were considered to explain the effect, if any, of debt on efficiencies. Some of 
these theories implied a positive relationship between debt and efficiency while others implied a 
negative relationship. The direction of impact is thus indeterminate and may also differ across 
efficiency measures. A positive relationship between debt and efficiency would lend support, for 
example, to the embodied capital theory.  Under this theory, the positive effect would reflect the 
benefits of the operators’ access to debt financing, which allows him or her to make timely 
purchases of variable inputs in the short run and investments in improved technologies and 
additional capital items to expand scale in the long run. However, the various theories are not 
mutually exclusive, so that a positive relationship would support other theories as well.  This 
issue will be discussed again below based on the estimation results that follow.  
The age variable accounted for older farmers as opposed to younger ones. Younger 
operators have fewer years of experience in managing the farm, which can influence the 
efficiencies in a negative way; however, one can also argue that younger operators tend to drive 
changes in technology. Older farmers, on the other hand, may be more eligible candidates for 
financial lenders as older operators tend to have more assets, and thus, more collateral and better 
prospects of repaying the loan. Again, the sign of this variable was undetermined, and it was 
most likely to depend on the efficiency measure being analyzed.  
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Finally, 8 year-specific dummies were introduced to account from efficiency measures 
changing from year to year as the optimal minimum cost frontier is calculated yearly. In 
addition, this variable accounted for time-varying factors such as weather, production pests or 
crop and livestock outbreaks and diseases. In consequence, the impact of this variable on each 
efficiency was difficult to hypothesize. 
Tables 5.6 through 5.9 report the results of the technical inefficiency model, the 
allocative inefficiency model, the scale inefficiency model and the overall inefficiency model34. 
The tables include the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance, standard errors, z 
statistics, and significance level. The Z-test tests the null hypothesis that a given explanatory 
variable is statistically significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable, given the 
other explanatory variables in the model. Most of the coefficients were statistically significant, 
although their significance level depended on the model. Also, the Tables report the number of 
observations for each model, the value of the log-likelihood function of the model and its 
significance, and finally, the log-likelihood ratio test for the significance of the panel effects. 
First, in order to assess the causality of farm characteristics on the inefficiencies, 
including a comparison between the models, each characteristic’s estimated coefficient was 
reported and compared by model. Because the dependent variables of the models were 
inefficiencies, negative signs imply that an increase in the levels of the explanatory variable 
would decrease levels of the corresponding inefficiency. For the sake of interpretation of the 
models, it should be noted that the base sample farm was a farm producing crops in 2007, thus, 
all effects of explanatory variables should be interpreted relative to the average farm in 2007.  
  
                                                 
34 The Tables illustrate the results of a Panel Tobit estimation of each of the inefficiencies from the Basic DEA 
model and the farm characteristics described. The inefficiencies scores were the dependent variable; the farm 
specific characteristics were the independent or explanatory variables. 
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Table 5.6 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.5688* 0.1102 5.16 0 
MFIAC -0.0027* 0.0002 -17.97 0 
POWNA -0.0783* 0.0303 -2.59 0.01 
OFFI -5.09E-07 0 -1.36 0.173 
PLABCROP 0.1132** 0.0512 2.21 0.027 
PLIVDI 0.0128 0.0364 0.35 0.726 
PCWKI -0.9803* 0.1847 -5.31 0 
M55AGE -0.0058* 0.0015 -3.89 0 
TDTA -0.1256* 0.0395 -3.18 0.001 
PPASTA -0.0072 0.0417 -0.17 0.863 
YEAR 1998 -0.1975* 0.0224 -8.8 0 
YEAR 1999 -0.1412* 0.0212 -6.66 0 
YEAR 2000 -0.1292* 0.0201 -6.43 0 
YEAR 2001 -0.1879* 0.0199 -9.44 0 
YEAR 2002 -0.1472* 0.0188 -7.83 0 
YEAR 2003 -0.0651* 0.0174 -3.73 0 
YEAR 2004 -0.1113* 0.0175 -6.36 0 
YEAR 2005 -0.1488* 0.0173 -8.62 0 
YEAR 2006 -0.1851* 0.0174 -10.61 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function -289.70*      
Wald Chi2 (18)          433.75      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 585.50*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Table 5.7 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.3794* 0.0588 6.45 0 
MFIAC -0.0015* 0.0001 -21.95 0 
POWNA 0.0095 0.0169 0.57 0.572 
OFFI -1.62E-07 0 -0.78 0.434 
PLABCROP 0.0788* 0.0262 3 0.003 
PLIVDI 0.0381** 0.0190 2 0.045 
PCWKI -0.5091* 0.0837 -6.08 0 
M55AGE -0.0013*** 0.0008 -1.66 0.098 
TDTA -0.0555* 0.0211 -2.63 0.008 
PPASTA -0.0234 0.0223 -1.05 0.295 
YEAR 1998 -0.1243* 0.0120 -10.34 0 
YEAR 1999 -0.0900* 0.0115 -7.85 0 
YEAR 2000 -0.0975* 0.0110 -8.86 0 
YEAR 2001 -0.1343* 0.0107 -12.56 0 
YEAR 2002 -0.0740* 0.0103 -7.16 0 
YEAR 2003 -0.0897* 0.0097 -9.2 0 
YEAR 2004 -0.1188* 0.0095 -12.53 0 
YEAR 2005 -0.1038* 0.0094 -11.08 0 
YEAR 2006 -0.1240* 0.0091 -13.56 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 1267.22*      
Wald Chi2 (18)          703.39      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 540.16*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level, ** at α = 0.05 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table 5.8 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.0865 0.0670 -1.29 0.196 
MFIAC -0.0011* 0.0001 -18.99 0 
POWNA 0.0595* 0.0176 3.37 0.001 
OFFI 7.04E-07* 0 3.53 0 
PLABCROP 0.0611* 0.0242 2.53 0.011 
PLIVDI 0.1387* 0.0179 7.75 0 
PCWKI -0.2105* 0.0769 -2.74 0.006 
M55AGE 0.0033* 0.0010 3.49 0 
TDTA -0.0445* 0.0218 -2.04 0.041 
PPASTA -0.0606* 0.0220 -2.76 0.006 
YEAR 1998 -0.0398* 0.0117 -3.39 0.001 
YEAR 1999 -0.0113 0.0111 -1.02 0.306 
YEAR 2000 -0.0051 0.0104 -0.49 0.625 
YEAR 2001 -0.0732* 0.0100 -7.36 0 
YEAR 2002 0.0001 0.0095 0.01 0.995 
YEAR 2003 0.0178** 0.0088 2.03 0.042 
YEAR 2004 -0.0542* 0.0084 -6.44 0 
YEAR 2005 -0.0820* 0.0082 -9.95 0 
YEAR 2006 -0.0795* 0.0080 -9.97 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 1667.10*      
Wald Chi2 (18)          773.62      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1273.83*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Table 5.9 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency and Farm Characteristics, Panel Tobit 
Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.4780* 0.0681 7.02 0 
MFIAC -0.0026* 0.0001 -35.65 0 
POWNA 0.0120 0.0193 0.62 0.533 
OFFI 4.72E-07** 0 2.02 0.043 
PLABCROP 0.1206* 0.0291 4.14 0 
PLIVDI 0.1128* 0.0214 5.26 0 
PCWKI -0.7539* 0.0930 -8.11 0 
M55AGE 0.0007 0.0009 0.71 0.478 
TDTA -0.1231* 0.0241 -5.11 0 
PPASTA -0.0677* 0.0253 -2.67 0.008 
YEAR 1998 -0.1665* 0.0134 -12.39 0 
YEAR 1999 -0.1102* 0.0128 -8.6 0 
YEAR 2000 -0.1042* 0.0122 -8.52 0 
YEAR 2001 -0.2056* 0.0119 -17.29 0 
YEAR 2002 -0.0981* 0.0115 -8.54 0 
YEAR 2003 -0.0651* 0.0108 -6.05 0 
YEAR 2004 -0.1579* 0.0104 -15.14 0 
YEAR 2005 -0.1795* 0.0103 -17.39 0 
YEAR 2006 -0.2010* 0.0101 -20 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 1246.2*      
Wald Chi2 (18)          1837.44      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 676.22*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Also, it should be noted that the estimated coefficients in the Tobit model are not 
equivalent to the expected marginal effects of the variables. The coefficients reflect the change in 
the dependent variable in response to each explanatory variable, conditional on the fact that the 
observation is not censored (in this case, conditional on an inefficiency score that is strictly 
positive). The marginal effects would account for the probability that the observation is not 
censored. The discussion below will present the regression coefficients and as such apply to the 
farms not on the efficiency frontier.  However, in datasets such as ours, where there are relatively 
small number of censored observations, the coefficients and marginal effects are numerically 
similar. All marginal effects are reported in Appendix C.   
The explanatory variables were found to have the following effects on inefficiency:  
• MFIAC. The variable affected all inefficiencies negatively and was 
statistically significant in all 4 models. Overall and technical inefficiency 
decreased the most as the size of the farm increased. Conversely, allocative 
and scale inefficiency decreased the least as the size of the average sample 
farm increased. These results support the hypothesis that larger farms are 
more efficient.  
• POWNA. This variables was statistically significant for technical and 
allocative inefficiency, but not for scale or overall inefficiency. The results 
indicate that as the ratio of owned acres increases, the level of technical 
inefficiency of our average crop farm in 2007 decreases; however, 
allocative inefficiency increased slightly. 
• OFFI. Off-farm income was significant only for the scale and overall 
inefficiency model, and its magnitude was smaller35 compared to the rest of 
the coefficients of the model. 
• PLABCROP. The percent of labor costs devoted to crop outputs was 
significant and positive for all the models. The highest coefficient 
corresponded to the overall inefficiency model. The sign of the variable 
indicated that an increase in labor devoted to crops would increase all 
                                                 
35  The effect is small in elasticity terms compared to the other variables, which is a valid way to compare across 
variables of differing magnitudes (see Appendix C).  
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inefficiencies. This could be interpreted as a sign that too much labor was 
allocated to crops for the sample average farm. 
• PLIVDI. This variable was significant and positive for allocative, scale and 
overall inefficiencies. The largest value was for overall inefficiency. These 
results indicate that an increase in the livestock income would increase 
inefficiencies, suggesting diseconomies of scope between crop and 
livestock production. 
• PCWKI. The percent of income from custom work per acre for the average 
sample farm was significant and negatively related to all inefficiencies. The 
magnitude of this variable’s coefficients differed across models. The 
highest estimated coefficient corresponded to technical inefficiency. These 
results imply that custom work is a complement output to crop operations 
and economies of scope can be achieved by producing these outputs 
together. 
• M55AGE. This variable was significant for all inefficiency models except 
for the overall inefficiency model. The magnitude of the coefficients are 
small in all models as compared to the rest of coefficients in the respective 
models. However, since age was measured in years and most of the other 
variables have values between zero and one, age elasticity ranged up to -0. 
01; the effects were not so small when compared to other variables in terms 
of marginal effects36.Additionally, results indicate that farmers older than 
55 years are able to decrease technical and allocative inefficiency; however, 
older farmers increased scale inefficiency. 
• TDTA. The liquidity variable was significant for all models. Higher levels 
of the ratio decreased all inefficiencies considerably. One explanation for 
these results is that lenders prefer borrowers with higher efficiency in 
production (i.e., the credit evaluation hypothesis). Another explanation is 
that debt levels affected efficiency favorably when assets grow, possibly 
through reinvestment in technology and long-term assets (i.e., the embodied 
                                                 
36 See Appendix C for a report of corresponding marginal effects and elasticities. 
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capital hypothesis). The results of this variable are further discussed at the 
end of this section. 
• PPASTA. The effect of pasture acre as percent of total operated farm acres 
was significant for all inefficiencies. An increase in the percent of pasture 
acres, as opposed to crop acres, decreased all inefficiencies for the sample 
mixed farm in 2007.  
• YEAR 1998-YEAR 2006. All year dummies were significant in all models 
except the scale inefficiency model. In addition, in these three models, the 
yearly effects indicated that for all years the inefficiencies were reduced 
compared to 2007. The magnitude of the impact of the yearly variables was 
higher for most years for the technical and overall inefficiency models. The 
highest values across models were for the years 2001 and 2006. 
In general, Table 5.6 through Table 5.8 suggest that most of the selected farm specific 
characteristics are significant in explaining farm inefficiencies. The percentage of income from 
custom hire work and the debt-to-asset ratio emerged as important factors that had a significant 
and positive impacts on all measures of efficiency. In general, the coefficient estimates on all 
variables were similar across the four models. The scale inefficiency model, in Table 5.8, was 
the most different among the models. First, the magnitude of the coefficients were relatively 
smaller than in the other models. Secondly, four of the year dummies are not significant 
(contrary to the rest of the models, where all were significant and shared the same sign). Also, 
there was some change in the direction of impact by some variables: the year 2003 increased 
scale inefficiency; the percent of acres owned also increased inefficiency, unlike technical 
efficiency. The results for the overall inefficiency model, Table 5.8, were similar in significance, 
magnitude and sign to most of the coefficients to the technical and allocative inefficiencies 
models. For overall inefficiency, all years decreased overall inefficiency. The overall largest 
effects on inefficiencies were the percent of income from custom work, percent of labor devoted 
to crop, size, age of operator , the years 2006, 2001, 2005, 1998, and 2004 respectively ; and 
finally the ratio of total debt to assets (Please, to look at the specific elasticity values, refer to 
Appendix  C).  
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the literature on finance and production has derived different 
hypothesis to explain the relation, if any, between efficiencies and the level of farm debt. 
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According to the regression analyses in this study, the total debt-to total asset ratio was found to 
have a positive effect on all efficiency scores. Three theories support these findings: credit 
evaluation, free cash flow, and embodied capital. All of them hypothesized a positive 
relationship between long term debt and a farms’ technical efficiency. The first theory relates to 
lenders’ expectations’ on borrowers. Thus, efficiency is a cause of the level of debt. According to 
this, in Kansas, it could be the case that the most efficient farmers are given more credit capacity 
given lenders’ high expectations of loan repayment. The second theory suggested that farmers 
who are indebted need to meet their repayment obligations; therefore, this fact can motivate them 
to improve their efficiencies. In this situation, Kansas farmers would be more in debt to achieve 
higher efficiency. The relationship between the first and second hypotheses is marked by a 
difference in the direction of causality between the level of debt and efficiency. The third and 
last theory emphasized the role of debt in adopting new technology. According to this latter 
hypothesis, farmers who invest the most, i.e. exploit higher capital availability and have higher 
debt levels, were able to apply new technologies and this contributes to them being more 
technically efficient. In this case, the level of debt and liquidity of the farm would be the cause 
for higher farm efficiency scores.  
The theories can be distinguished by the direction of the causality between efficiency and 
financial leverage. Both the free cash flow and embodied capital theories posit that debt causes 
improved efficiency, while credit evaluation implies that efficiency causes more debt. Davidova 
and Latruffe (2007) implemented a procedure to test for exogeneity of the financial variable in 
Tobit models. The authors concluded that in their study, endogeneity of the financial variable 
could be rejected at a 5% significance level from his sample of individually owned farms (i.e. 
evidence against credit evaluation in their sample), but not from the state-owned farms. Baum’s 
(1999) procedure for STATA to test to exogeneity in Tobit panel models was implemented in the 
present study. The null hypothesis that the total average debt to asset ratio is exogenous to the 
inefficiency estimates fails to be rejected at a 5 percent significance level. Thus, in this sample of 
mixed Kansas farms, the level of debt is exogenous and positively related to the farm’s technical 
efficiency. The evidence here thus supports both the embodied capital theory, where more 
capitalized farms are able to incorporate newer and more productive technologies; and the 
evidence also point to the free cash flow theory where more indebted farmers feel forced to 
improve their efficiencies scores to respond to their debt repayment obligations. The same 
 86
question answered with econometric methods, using a 2-step procedure, was also addressed in 
the previous section. There, all efficiency estimates when controlling for the level of debt 
showed on average than farms’ efficiency increased. Both the non-parametric and parametric 
approaches have rendered the same results. The effect of debt, according to our sample, increases 
farm efficiencies.  
5.3.2. Results of Input Usage on Efficiencies 
The regressions above describe how farmer characteristics affect inefficiency, but they 
provide little insight on the behaviors of farmers that cause the inefficiency.  Some farmers are 
likely to be less efficient than others because they make systematic errors in management, using 
excessive inputs in some categories while using too little in others. Following Featherstone, 
Langemeier, and Ismet (1997), I assess this question by performing panel Tobit regressions of 
the four types of DEA efficiency scores on input usage in different categories.  The sets of inputs 
included all inputs used by the sampled farms to produce their outputs. They are expenditures per 
acre in land, capital, labor, seed, fertilizer and chemicals. Efficiency scores from the basic DEA 
problem are used as the dependent variables; they are technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, 
scale efficiency and overall efficiency respectively. Summary statistics of these scores were 
reported in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The introduction to Section 5.3 contains a summary statistics of 
the input costs percents per acre for the sampled farms over the period examined.  
Tables 5.10 to 5.13 describe Panel Tobit regressions in which efficiencies were regressed 
against seven categories of inputs utilized by the farms, and nine dummy variables to capture 
yearly unobserved factors such as weather, and crop and livestock diseases. These Tables 
correspond to a technical efficiency model, an allocative efficiency model, a scale efficiency 
model and an overall efficiency model. The Tables illustrate the results of the Panel Tobit 
estimation for each of the efficiencies and the farms’ input usage. As in the previous section, the 
tables include the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance, standard errors, z 
statistics, and significance level. Tables report the number of observations for each model, the 
value of the log-likelihood function of the model and its significance, and finally, the log-
likelihood ratio test for the significance of the panel effects.  
In Table 5.10, results for the technical efficiency model show that three variables out of 
the 16 included in the model were not statistically significant. The input costs for land and 
livestock were not significant. All year dummies were significant except for the year 2003, and 
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all influenced efficiency in a positive way; this could mean that over the period farms’ technical 
efficiency has improved. This fact was theoretically expected as time usually increases the level 
of technology. The input costs that were significant were similarly small in magnitude. The 
findings support that an increase in the percent of the costs of labor increases technical efficiency 
slightly; the impact is more significant for an increase in the percent of livestock costs per acre. 
Theoretically, labor costs are mostly related to operators’ cost or farms’ profit; this explains the 
result that increasing costs to labor increased technical efficiency. The increase in technical 
efficiency as livestock costs increased was unexpected. With respect to the positive influence of 
livestock cost on technical efficiency, the finding could be seen in the light of results in Section 
5.1 where specializing in livestock was slightly better than specializing in the other two outputs. 
The fact that this latter coefficient was low could be also the result of a biased problem in the 
specification of the variable. Percent of livestock costs per acre could be negatively biased with 
respect to the rest of the input variables considered since the beef and dairy expenses do not 
depend on operated acres as strongly (i.e. the correlation factor is considerably smaller) as crop 
and custom work inputs. Contrary to the effects of the variables just mentioned, the variables 
SEEDA, CHEMICA and FERTICA decreased the level of efficiency of the sampled farms, as 
input costs tend to affect farms technical efficiency. The largest effect in this model was the year 
2006, maybe because it has been especially different from 2007, when some new industries such 
as ethanol production have affected the market for feed production and supply. 
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Table 5.10 Relationship between Technical Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit 
Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.8808* 0.0195 45.26 0 
LANDA 0.0007 0.0007 1.01 0.313 
LABORA 0.0008* 0.0003 2.9 0.004 
LIVESA 0.0002 0.0002 1.11 0.268 
CAPITA 0.0012* 0.0002 5.69 0 
SEEDA -0.0023* 0.0005 -4.43 0 
CHEMICA -0.0022* 0.0006 -3.48 0.001 
FERTILA -0.0010** 0.0004 -2.26 0.024 
YEAR 1998 0.0508* 0.0141 3.6 0 
YEAR 1999 0.0295** 0.0142 2.08 0.038 
YEAR 2000 0.0339** 0.0140 2.42 0.016 
YEAR 2001 0.0844* 0.0140 6.01 0 
YEAR 2002 0.0387* 0.0139 2.79 0.005 
YEAR 2003 0.0198 0.0136 1.45 0.146 
YEAR 2004 0.0802* 0.0139 5.78 0 
YEAR 2005 0.0710* 0.0136 5.22 0 
YEAR 2006 0.1117* 0.0140 8 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function -900.02*      
Wald Chi2 (16)          255.44      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1082.95*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Table 5.11 Relationship between Allocative Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit 
Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.7503* 0.0103 72.71 0 
LANDA 0.0001 0.0004 0.15 0.878 
LABORA -0.0003** 0.0001 -2.51 0.012 
LIVESA 0.0003* 0.0001 3.65 0 
CAPITA -0.0001 0.0001 -0.57 0.566 
SEEDA -0.0003 0.0003 -1.2 0.231 
CHEMICA 0.0007** 0.0003 2 0.046 
FERTILA 0.0005** 0.0002 2.09 0.037 
YEAR 1998 0.0570* 0.0078 7.35 0 
YEAR 1999 0.0571* 0.0078 7.28 0 
YEAR 2000 0.0522* 0.0078 6.7 0 
YEAR 2001 0.0805* 0.0077 10.46 0 
YEAR 2002 0.0108 0.0077 1.4 0.162 
YEAR 2003 0.0547* 0.0077 7.15 0 
YEAR 2004 0.0932* 0.0076 12.21 0 
YEAR 2005 0.0684* 0.0075 9.06 0 
YEAR 2006 0.0798* 0.0076 10.55 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 2256.21*      
Wald Chi2 (16)          299.09      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1180*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Table 5.12 Relationship between Scale Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.8518* 0.0100 85.18 0 
LANDA 0.0014* 0.0004 3.72 0 
LABORA -0.0008* 0.0001 -8.22 0 
LIVESA 0.0003* 0.0001 4.43 0 
CAPITA 0.0003* 0.0001 3.17 0.002 
SEEDA 0.0002 0.0002 0.91 0.364 
CHEMICA 0.0004 0.0003 1.41 0.158 
FERTILA -0.0001 0.0002 -0.73 0.464 
YEAR 1998 -0.0123** 0.0061 -2.01 0.044 
YEAR 1999 -0.0181* 0.0062 -2.92 0.003 
YEAR 2000 -0.0189* 0.0062 -3.08 0.002 
YEAR 2001 0.0342* 0.0061 5.63 0 
YEAR 2002 -0.0295* 0.0061 -4.83 0 
YEAR 2003 -0.0315* 0.0060 -5.22 0 
YEAR 2004 0.0378* 0.0060 6.3 0 
YEAR 2005 0.0439* 0.0060 7.36 0 
YEAR 2006 0.0387* 0.0060 6.5 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 3567.45*      
Wald Chi2 (16)          563.66      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 2186.98*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Table 5.13 Relationship between Overall Efficiency and Input Usage, Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.5536* 0.0138 40.01 0 
LANDA 0.0010** 0.0005 1.98 0.047 
LABORA -0.0009* 0.0001 -6.51 0 
LIVESA 0.0005* 0.0001 4.92 0 
CAPITA 0.0003** 0.0001 2.11 0.035 
SEEDA -0.0003 0.0003 -0.85 0.396 
CHEMICA 0.0006 0.0004 1.39 0.164 
FERTILA 0.0002 0.0003 0.81 0.42 
YEAR 1998 0.0600* 0.0098 6.1 0 
YEAR 1999 0.0495* 0.0100 4.97 0 
YEAR 2000 0.0388* 0.0099 3.92 0 
YEAR 2001 0.1245* 0.0098 12.74 0 
YEAR 2002 0.0087 0.0098 0.89 0.373 
YEAR 2003 0.0293* 0.0097 3.01 0.003 
YEAR 2004 0.1334* 0.0097 13.78 0 
YEAR 2005 0.1141* 0.0096 11.89 0 
YEAR 2006 0.1288* 0.0096 13.44 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 1567.11*      
Wald Chi2 (16)          582.59      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1301.34*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 level 
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Most of the variables in the Allocative Efficiency Model in Table 5.11 are significant and 
positive. All years have affected allocative efficiency positively (except for year 2002, which is 
not significant), implying that the allocative efficiency of the farms increased from year to year 
prior to 2007. Input costs which affect allocative efficiency in a positive way were LIVESA, 
CHEMICA, and FERTILA. These results indicated that livestock related inputs, chemicals and 
fertilizers were being over utilized; whereas labor and seed were being underutilized. Farms 
could then improve their allocative efficiency by reallocating the input usage. Variables in this 
model had magnitudes similar to the preceding model. The largest effect on allocative efficiency 
was the positive effect of year 2004. This year was mentioned in Section 5.1 as an especially 
good year for farms’ efficiencies over the period studied. 
The model of Scale Efficiency is illustrated in Table 5.12. Similar to the model were 
inefficiencies were explained in terms of their causes, this model shows how the same factors 
affect efficiency in different magnitudes and ways. All years but one were significant in this 
model; however, four out of the nine years considered had a negative influence on scale 
efficiency. Results suggest that farms in the latter years of the sample have decreased their level 
of scale efficiency with respect to the optimal yearly frontier. This fact would be mostly 
explained by examining the returns of scale of the sampled farms over the sampled period. Also, 
it is worth noticing the sharp movements in consolidation and adaptation of farms in recent 
years, which could be related to scale efficiency. The variables SEEDA, CHEMICA, FERTILA 
were not statistically significant, as the year 2001 was not. The input variables LANDA, 
LIVESA, and CAPITA increased the levels of scale efficiency of the sampled farms. Farms 
could increase costs of these inputs to increase their level of scale efficiency, and decrease labor 
costs since they affect scale efficiency negatively.  
Table 5.13 summaries the results for the Overall Efficiency Model. As in most of the 
preceding models, all year dummies affect overall efficiency scores in a positive way. All years 
seem to have increased overall efficiency compared to 2007. The highest impacts were from the 
year 2001 and 2006. The input variables LANDA, LIVESA, and CAPITA increased the levels of 
overall efficiency of the sampled farms. The input variables LABORA and SEEDA decreased 
the levels of overall efficiency of the sampled farms. The variables CHEMICA, FERTILA, and 
YEAR 2002 were not statistically significant. In overall terms, the input usage variables have 
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considerably smaller coefficients, especially when compared with yearly effects. These findings 
apply to all models explained in this section. 
In summary, the models in this sub-section were consistent in that most of the yearly 
individual effects were significant and mostly were positively related to efficiencies. The models 
also showed that input usage affected efficiencies in different ways. For example labor costs 
affected technical efficiency in a positive way, but impacted overall efficiency in a negative way; 
the magnitude of the impact was similar in both cases Overall, only labor and seed expenditures 
could be lowered to improve the level of overall efficiency of the farms. However, the impact is 
quite small. Overall, the year 2004 was when overall efficiency of farms increased the most 
towards the optimal cost frontier.  
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions and Implications 
The literature review described the results of prior research on farm efficiency covering 
numerous geographical regions of the United States and several other countries. These studies 
applied many different frontier approaches, both parametric and non-parametric. The efficiency 
estimates from non-parametric studies are similar to those from parametric frontier models, but 
the nonparametric methods generally yield lower mean efficiency estimates and seem to have 
greater dispersion than the results of the parametric models. The number of research questions 
addressed and answered have been considerable; new or modified methods and data sampling 
are the important contributions now at the research frontier. 
In this dissertation, the efficiencies of 456 sampled farms, chosen to be representative of 
members of the KFMA, were analyzed from 1998 to 2007 using different factors to address the 
objectives stated in Chapter 1. In general, in this dissertation as well as in previous studies 
related to Kansas, efficiency scores for technical, allocative and scale efficiency were around 
80% to 90%. Overall efficiency had lower scores, 68%, also in line with previous research 
conducted on Kansas farms. Unlike technical efficiency and other efficiency measures, overall 
efficiency scores have not been reported in many previous research articles. The similarity in 
efficiency values for farms across different studies suggests that estimates of mean efficiency for 
farms may be a reliable guide for policy and research purposes.  
6.1 Implications of Sources of Inefficiency in Kansas Farms 
The inefficiency Panel Tobit models helped us identify some causes that explain the 
sampled farms’ inefficiency scores. By reciprocity of efficiency and inefficiency scores, the 
models gave insight into the factors which affected efficiencies the most, and in which direction. 
The results of the farms’ efficiencies have shown the importance of the link and influence 
of the size of the farm operation on the farms’ efficiencies. Larger farms seemed to have a 
competitive advantage over smaller farms in terms of choosing and having access to more 
optimal input bundles for their operations. Larger farms were more technically, allocatively, 
scale, and overall efficient, lending robust support to the hypothesis that size is associated with 
improved efficiency. Farms specializing in livestock products such as dairy and beef were 
reported to be slightly more overall efficient than crop or mixed farms. The effect of the ratio of 
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owned to operated acres depended very much on the efficiency measure considered. It was 
significant and positively related to technical efficiency, but negatively related to allocative 
efficiency. Off-farm income was not significant in explaining the efficiency scores. However, the 
percent of labor costs devoted to crop outputs indicated that too much labor was dedicated to 
crops, and that the multi-output representative Kansas farm could reduce all efficiencies by 
decreasing the costs of labor devoted to crop operation.  
Very interestingly, results also showed a high degree of complementarity between farm 
crop operations and custom work, suggesting the existence of economies of scope between these 
two outputs. However, the results suggested diseconomies of scope between crop and livestock 
farm operations. Operators’ age rendered different results. Older farmers achieved better farm 
technical and allocative efficiencies, but the effect was the opposite for scale efficiency. This 
result seemed to indicate that experience is important in choosing optimal input bundles, as well 
as managing the farm’s operations (i.e. managerial skills). However, it seemed that younger 
farmers were best at deciding on the farm’s scale of operation. The effect of pasture acres as 
opposed to crop acres was positive for all efficiencies. For the representative mixed Kansas farm, 
a decrease in crop acres would increase all efficiencies. This finding corroborates other evidence 
that livestock farms have a tendency to perform better than crop farms, and mixed farms. 
The impact of the yearly variables on Kansas efficiencies was significant and mostly 
positive. The effect was higher for most years for technical and overall efficiency. The highest 
impacts across models for all years were for the years 2001 and 2006.  
The financial leverage variable (debt to asset ratio) was significant for all models. Higher 
levels of the ratio increased all efficiencies considerably. These results could have different 
implications: They can imply that lenders prefer borrowers with higher efficiency in production 
(i.e. credit evaluation hypothesis). But also, these results might suggest that debt levels affected 
efficiency favorably when assets grow, possibly through reinvestment in technology and long-
term assets (i.e. embodied capital hypothesis).  
During the time period studied, it is clear that most farms invested heavily in equipment 
and infrastructure (as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio), and that this positively affected their 
overall efficiency scores. According to this hypothesis, farms that invest the more in capital farm 
stocks are the ones that promote technical change and end up in the best practice frontier (Chavas 
and Aliber 1993, “Embodied capital hypothesis”). This finding was supported by the fact that 
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age was a positive factor in efficiency because age can be a proxy both for experience and for the 
probability of technological adoption on the farm. Thus, the difference between the two 
hypotheses in explaining the results could be the direction of the causality between efficiency 
and financial leverage. With the sampled farms used, the embodied capital hypothesis seemed to 
fit better the results of the positive influence of capital availability on efficiencies. More 
capitalized farms are able to incorporate newer and more productive technologies. The findings 
also lend support to the free cash flow theory, which suggests that more indebted farms are more 
efficient because of lender oversight.  
The impact of debt on efficiency was also addressed in using non-econometric methods, 
particularly a discretionary DEA model. The results of this model agreed with the 2-step 
econometric results just discussed. In the DEA model, when debt is taken into account as one 
more factor of production, all average estimates of all efficiencies increased when controlling for 
the level of debt. Both the non-parametric and parametric approaches have rendered the same 
results. The effect of debt, according to our sample, increased farm efficiencies, especially 
technical and overall efficiencies.  
Regarding efficiencies and the impact of input usage,  the results of the Efficiency Panel 
Tobit models showed that input usage affected efficiencies in a different way. For example, labor 
costs affected technical efficiency in a positive way, but it affected overall efficiency in a 
negative way; the magnitude of the impact was similar in both cases. In regards to allocative 
efficiency, results indicated that livestock related costs and chemical and fertilizer costs were 
being over utilized; whereas labor and seed were being underutilized. As for scale efficiency, 
farms could increase expenditures on livestock, capital and land inputs to increase the farms 
level of scale efficiency. Additionally, the farms could decrease labor costs since they affect 
scale efficiency negatively. Finally, in the case of overall efficiency, only labor and seed 
expenditures could be lowered to improve the level of overall efficiency of the farms. In general, 
the year 2004 was when overall efficiency of farms increased the most towards the optimal cost 
frontier, the year 2006 was the second higher positive yearly impact.  
6.2 Implications from the Impact of Debt on Efficiencies in Kansas Farms 
The non-discretionary DEA models accounted for the direct effect on efficiencies of 
factors beyond the control of the operator. In this case, the level of total debt was used to capture 
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the direct effects of farm capital availability, i.e. the level of debt on production efficiencies. The 
farm efficiencies calculated with this model are based on comparisons to other farms that have a 
lesser or equal level of debt.  
The mean efficiency scores from this model were 92%, 82%, and 89%, for technical, 
allocative, and scale efficiency, respectively. Each of the efficiencies had a mean that was 2% 
higher than in the basic model. Similarly and according to the calculation of overall efficiency as 
a multiplicative function of the other three efficiencies, the average overall efficiency score was 
68%; 5% larger than the average overall efficiency score for the basic model. In conclusion and 
for this sample of farms and years, farm’s efficiencies systematically rose when controlling for 
the level of farm debt.  
A detailed comparison of the changes in farms’ efficiencies derived from the debt-
constrained model and those efficiency estimates derived from the basic model, offered a unique 
characterization of the farms. Some farms’ efficiencies were found to increase when accounting 
for the level of debt, that is, their efficiency score from the debt-constrained model was better 
than the corresponding one from the basic model. For some other farms, the level of debt 
impacted certain types of efficiencies negatively, decreasing them with respect to the basic 
model. And for the last group of farms, the level of debt did not impact at all their efficiency 
scores. This latter group of farms is referred as unconstrained farms because their fixed level of 
debt did not impede them to achieve their optimum. In terms of technical, allocative, scale and 
overall efficiency, close to 20%, 45%, 49 % and 44%, respectively, of farms in the whole sample 
were constrained by their level of debt.  
Among the constrained farms, the technical and overall efficiency scores of all 
constrained farms increased compared to scores in the basic model. By the mathematical 
properties the DEA programming models, debt constraints can only change these efficiency 
measures in a positive direction or not at all.  Nevertheless, even when controlling for their debt 
levels, these farms as a group were less efficient, both in terms of technical and overall 
efficiency, than unconstrained farms. For allocative and scale efficiency, some farms’ efficiency 
scores changed positively when controlling for their level of debt while others’ scores were 
impacted negatively. The majority of these farms changed in a positive way, and for an average 
13% of farms, the effect of debt was negative. These results suggest that positively influenced 
debt-constrained farms could benefit from having and using more debt; and conversely, 
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constrained farms were negatively influenced by their debt levels and were carrying “too much 
debt.” Farms debt-constrained (for all efficiencies) showed very low levels of the debt-to-asset 
ratio, averaging around 0.12. Comparatively, unconstrained farms had a mean debt-to-asset ratio 
of 0.35 (for all efficiencies). Such a gap in debt-to asset ratios suggest that in general constrained 
farms were not using all their capital possibilities, as the DEA result suggest that most debt-
constrained farms could increase their efficiency scores if they could take on more debt. The 
reasons for these farmers under-utilizing debt capital is a topic for future research, discussed in 
more detail below. Possible causes to investigate include risk-aversion, price uncertainty, and 
government programs. Another topic for investigation is why some debt-constrained farms have 
efficiency scores that are negatively impacted by debt. 
6.3 Future Research 
The management performance-efficiency literature on farms was among the least 
developed of the different types of applications of farm efficiency. Farm efficiency and factors 
such as debt, and other forms of “managerial skills” offers an opportunity to provide managers, 
policy makers, and lenders with information that may help identify input misallocation and 
improve farm performance. To further contribute to this field of research and complementing the 
purpose of this dissertation, some additions into the models could be of help in answering the 
research question.  
First, the use of more financial ratios as a reflection of the financial performance of the 
farm would be of great interest regarding their impact on efficiencies. These additional ratios 
might include additional leverage ratios differentiated by the time frame (e.g., long versus 
intermediate term), and profit ratios. Other useful information to incorporate would be the effect 
of the source of finance and the different type of loans; crop sharing, bank intermediate loans and 
others could have different impacts on the efficiency of farm behavior regarding debt. Surely, 
incorporating operators’ risk attitude (degree of risk aversion) into the problem could provide 
some insight into why some farmers with similar assets are more prone to obtain a loan, whereas 
others are less prone to. Government programs and their effects is another variable which could 
impact efficiencies and farmers’ financial management. In this dissertation, Appendix D presents 
an exploratory study on farms that are debt-constrained versus these farms that are not. The 
sample of farms was divided to test why some farms increased their efficiency levels in face of 
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debt levels, while some others do not. A detailed and conscientious study of technical, allocative, 
scale and overall efficiency focusing on the factors determining the positive or negative impact 
of debt and accounting for possible sampling bias selection would be of great interest and value.  
A related question is the optimal level of debt that maximizes farm efficiency 
performance.  Addressing this question would likely involve new or modified efficiency analysis 
techniques, which likely could shed new light on such issues as the influence of access to debt 
financing and how farms may misallocate inputs in order to comply with debt obligations  
The field of efficiency estimation is undergoing a big transition. There are a number of 
important methodological developments in the broader efficiency literature under way that may 
help resolve some of the conflicts among methods. These improvements may make efficiency 
estimation more accurate, and help find the determinants of efficiency. For the nonparametric 
techniques, these developments include non-radial measures, the use of “composite” frontiers 
which embody the best parts of different decision making units, the use of output distance 
functions, measurement of confidence intervals, optimization of the number of constraints, and 
finding a statistical basis for the non-stochastic approaches. A re-sampling of the data sets may 
be useful to account for some of the random error in the farm accounting data sets.  
Finally and throughout this dissertation, numerous studies on efficiency applied to 
agricultural economics problems have been discussed. Their results have been highly informative 
and helpful for interested parties. However, these methods are by no means limited to addressing 
problems related to agricultural economics. Efficiency analysis is used to investigate any 
production process, such as the transformation of doctors’ number and hospital facilities into 
patients’ recovery. Efficiency studies are an increasingly widespread tool to learn how to 
improve production processes. They are very actively used in fields such as health economics 
and the engineering sciences. Results from these applications influence many parties. In terms of 
applications, research on efficiency largely focused on using efficiency estimates and causality 
factors. These findings are used: (1) to inform government policy makers and concerned parties 
on industry efficiency and tendencies; (2) to address research issues by determining how 
efficiency varies according to selected factors and identifying the operators who make the most 
informed decisions; and (3) to improve managerial performance by identifying best-practice 
farms. Efficiency analysis has a promising future in many research areas. 
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Appendix A - Kansas Farm Management Association Databank 
The reader is encouraged to read Michael R. Langemeier, June 2003, “Kansas Farm 
Management Association SAS Data Bank Document. Contribution No. 03-420-D from the 
Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-4008. 
This publication contains a definition of the dataset and the variables included in the data bank. 
Most of the variables used in this dissertation are listed in the following table. For the definition 
of other variables not included below please refer to the above publication.  
Variable Definition 
 Farm Characteristics 
FARM Farm ID Number 
ID From 1 to 456, Number of Farms 
PCE Producer Consumption Expenditure Index 
V008 Business Organization Type 
V010 Number of Unpaid Operators 
V011 Number of Workers Including Operator, Family and Hired Labor 
V012 Number of Family Dependents 
V013 Operator's Age ("Primary" Operator for Partnerships and Corporations) 
V340 Farmstead and Waste, Owned 
V341 Farmstead and Waste, Rented 
YEAR Year From 88 to 107, 1988-2007 
 Inputs 
ACCOST Actual/Observed Farm Costs (Same as Accostd) 
ACCOSTD Actual/Observed Farm Costs (Same as Accost) 
BASSETS Beginning Annual Total Assets 
BCDEBT Beginning Short-Term Debt 
BCINV Beginning Short-Term Assets 
BDEBT Beginning Annual Total Debt 
CACRES Total Crop Acres 
CHEM Units of Chemical Used 
CRLAND Total Crop Land 
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Variable Definition 
FGACRES Acres of Feed Grain 
HFACRES Acres in Hay and Forage 
LABOR Number of Workers 
LABORP Price of Labor 
LAND Total Operated Acres 
LIVE Units of Livestock Used 
OCAP Capital Expenses 
OCAPP Price of Capital Expenses 
PCAPE Percent of Capital Expenses 
PCROPE Percent of Seed, Fertilizer and Chemical Expenses 
PLABORE Percent of Labor Expenses  
PLANDE Percent of Land Expenses 
PLIVDE Percent of Livestock Expenses 
POWNA Percent of Owned Acres 
RCHEMC Herbicide and Insecticide Cost 
RCINSC Insurance Cost 
RDKDDEPR Real Depreciation Cost 
RENTC Price of Land 
RFERTC Cost of Fertilizer 
RINTC Real Interest Cost 
RLABORC Cost of Labor 
RLANDC Total Cost of Land Computed As Weighted Farm-Specific Cash Price of Acres 
Times Total  Acreage 
RLIVEC Livestock Input Cost 
ROCAPC Cost of Capital Expenses 
RSEEDC Cost of Seed 
SACRES Acres of Soybeans 
SEED Units of Seed Used 
TACRES Total Operated Land in Acres 
  
 108
Variable Definition 
V468 Percent of Labor Devoted To Crops 
WACRES Acres in Wheat 
 Outputs 
BEEF Beef Production in Pounds 
BEEFI Income from Beef 
CROPINC Income from All Crops 
DAIRY Dairy Production in Pounds 
DAIRYI Income from Dairy 
EXPR Expenditure Ratio = Total Cost of Production Divided by Total Farm Income 
Including Farming Operations, Government Payments, and Insurance Receipts 
FGINC Income from Feed Grains 
FGPROD Production of Feed Grains in Bushels 
HFINC Income from Hay and Forage 
HFPROD Production of Hay and Forage in Tons 
LIVDINC Income from Dairy and Beef 
OFFI Income from Off-Farm Sources  
PCROPI Percent of Income from All Crop Operations 
PCWKI Percent of Income from Custom Work Operations 
PLIVDI Percent of Income from Dairy and Beef Operations 
RCINSI Insurance Income 
RCWORK Custom Work 
RGFI Gross Farm Income 
RGOVTI Real Income from Government Payments 
RNFI Net Farm Income 
RVFP Value of Farm Production 
SINC Income from Soybeans 
SPROD Production of Soybeans in Bushels 
TINC All Income: Crops, Dairy and Beef, and Custom Work 
WINC Income from Wheat 
WPROD Production of Wheat in Bushels 
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Appendix B - Codes 
This appendix covers the different codes that were used in this dissertation. The first 
section corresponds to a SAS Code used to retrieve the original dataset form the KFMA 
databank. The second section consists of two GAMS codes to solve the DEA programs. The last 
section lists a STATA code used for the Tobit Analysis. 
B.1 SAS Code to Retrieve Farms from the KFMA Databank 
Next, a modified version of the SAS code by Dr. Langemeier, 2008 is shown. This code 
retrieves the farms and variables that meet the requirements listed in the Data Chapter. The code 
takes farms with continuous data from 1998 to 2007 on production and socio-economic farm 
factors. The code also shows how the variables are calculated. For a full version of the 
description of the dataset see Langemeier, 2003. For a short description of the main variables 
used, a descriptive table is provided in Appendix A.  
 
/* lopez1m */ 
 
LIBNAME kfma10yr 'c:\'; 
data x1;                                                                         
set kfma10yr.farm10; 
 
libname crop10yr 'c:\'; 
data x2; 
set crop10yr.crop10; 
  
data x3; merge x1 x2; by farm; 
if v001 = . then delete; 
if v1261 = . then delete; 
 
proc means; var year v005 v006 v1262 v1263 v1266 v1269 v1271 v1281; 
 
data x4; set x3; 
 
keep farm year pce 
     rgovti rcinsi rcinsc 
     bassets eassets aassets bdebt edebt adebt dtar 
  bcinv ecinv acinv bcdebt ecdebt acdebt icr 
     rgfi rvfp rnfi 
     winc fginc sinc hfinc dairyi beefi 
     wprod fgprod sprod hfprod dairy beef rcwork 
     rlaborc rlivec rseedc rfertc rchemc rocapc rlandc  
     laborp livep seedp fertp chemp ocapp rentc 
     labor live seed fert chem ocap land 
  v008 v010-v013 v324-v341 v468 offi expr 
     pcropi pbeefi pdairyi plivei  
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     tacres cacres wacres fgacres sacres hfacres 
     wheata wheatp wheaty corna cornp corny 
     sorga sorgp sorgy soya soyp soyy 
     pirrc pnirrc ppast 
     powna crland lv 
     cropinc livdinc tinc pcropi plivdi pcwki 
     tacost expr pcrope plivde plabore pcape plande 
     rintc dkddepr 
     dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7;  
 
/* Deletion of Farms */  
 
if v007 >= 1 then delete; 
 
if v001 = 3 then delete; 
 
if v001 > 44 then delete; 
 
if v001 = 7 or v001 = 8 or v001 = 9 or v001 = 23 or v001 = 24 or 
     v001 = 25 or v001 = 30 or v001 = 32 or v001 = 43 then delete; 
 
if v001 = 10 or v001 = 11 or v001 = 26 or v001 = 27 or v001 = 44 then delete; 
 
if v001 = 12 or v001 = 13 or v001 = 29 or v001 = 31 or v001 = 34 then delete; 
 
if v010 <= 0 then delete; 
if v011 <= 0 then delete; 
 
if (v262+v264+v266+v268) <= 0 then delete; 
if (v263+v265+v267+v269) <= 0 then delete; 
if v324 <= 0 then delete; 
 
/*Delete, no dairy or beef operation but livestock expenses are high*/ 
 
if farm = 12395200 then delete; 
if farm = 21200601 then delete; 
if farm = 24804700 then delete; 
if farm = 40790300 then delete; 
if farm = 43494200 then delete; 
if farm = 44691500 then delete; 
if farm = 60907700 then delete; 
if farm = 62402100 then delete; 
if farm = 63104700 then delete; 
if farm = 65288500 then delete; 
 
/* Delete, beef output some years but high expenses for all years */ 
 
if farm = 25104900 then delete; 
if farm = 38940800 then delete; 
if farm = 40388100 then delete; 
if farm = 58080400 then delete; 
if farm = 65204403 then delete; 
 
/* Delete farms with more than $10,000 of dairy production in 
     discontinuous years or for a single year */ 
 
if farm = 11807200 then delete; 
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if farm = 11808201 then delete; 
if farm = 12305200 then delete; 
if farm = 12398300 then delete; 
if farm = 13006300 then delete; 
if farm = 12340100 then delete; 
if farm = 11886202 then delete; 
if farm = 20601502 then delete; 
if farm = 22840300 then delete; 
if farm = 24810900 then delete; 
if farm = 41580400 then delete; 
if farm = 48140102 then delete; 
if farm = 48191100 then delete; 
if farm = 61787000 then delete; 
if farm = 62493000 then delete; 
if farm = 63201701 then delete; 
 
/* Delete observations where there is crop output but 
     seed expenditures are zero;  observations are valid 
     if they refer to wheat farms, hay and forage or/and 
     beef/dairy */ 
 
if farm = 14730000 then delete; 
if farm = 20650900 then delete; 
if farm = 30201800 then delete; 
if farm = 42540600 then delete; 
if farm = 43400400 then delete; 
if farm = 43494200 then delete; 
if farm = 58010400 then delete; 
if farm = 60403901 then delete; 
if farm = 60404401 then delete; 
if farm = 60811600 then delete; 
if farm = 61170100 then delete; 
if farm = 61182000 then delete; 
if farm = 16582200 then delete; 
if farm = 21230901 then delete; 
if farm = 23340500 then delete; 
if farm = 33505600 then delete; 
if farm = 33590300 then delete; 
if farm = 39305400 then delete; 
if farm = 44600400 then delete; 
if farm = 60502201 then delete; 
if farm = 60809400 then delete; 
if farm = 61787000 then delete; 
if farm = 62203800 then delete; 
if farm = 62704300 then delete; 
if farm = 62980100 then delete; 
if farm = 62989100 then delete; 
if farm = 63200800 then delete; 
if farm = 67203901 then delete; 
if farm = 67290300 then delete; 
 
/* Delete crop farms where fertilizer expenses are zero. If it is 
     a dairy or beef farm, they can be using organic fertilizer 
     like manure and they are regarded as valid */ 
 
if farm=23340500 then delete; 
if farm=30201800 then delete; 
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if farm=39305400 then delete; 
if farm=41691100 then delete;  
 
/*Delete Farms whose total debt to total assets ratio is 1 or more than 1 and 
they look suspicious*/ 
If farm=12303800 then delete; 
If farm=12305600 then delete; 
If farm=12395300 then delete; 
If farm=14782100 then delete; 
If farm=41300600 then delete; 
If farm=45489000 then delete; 
If farm=61094000 then delete; 
If farm=61198100 then delete; 
 
 
/* Defining 2000 to 2007 */ 
 
if year = 0 then year = 100; 
if year = 1 then year = 101; 
if year = 2 then year = 102; 
if year = 3 then year = 103; 
if year = 4 then year = 104; 
if year = 5 then year = 105; 
if year = 6 then year = 106; 
if year = 7 then year = 107; 
 
/* Implicit Price Deflator */  
 
if year = 98 then pce = (117.59/95.98); 
if year = 99 then pce = (117.59/97.57); 
if year = 100 then pce = (117.59/100.00); 
if year = 101 then pce = (117.59/102.09); 
if year = 102 then pce = (117.59/103.54); 
if year = 103 then pce = (117.59/105.60); 
if year = 104 then pce = (117.59/108.39); 
if year = 105 then pce = (117.59/111.59); 
if year = 106 then pce = (117.59/114.67); 
if year = 107 then pce = (117.59/117.59); 
 
/* Assets and Debt */ 
 
cbinv = v182+v200+v212+v224+v230+v236+v242+v248               
     +v254+v258+v260+v272+v458+v496+v498+v500+v502+v504;                
                                                
ceinv = v185+v203+v215+v227+v233+v239+v245+v251               
    +v257+v259+v261+v273+v459+v497+v499+v501+v503+v505;                              
                                                         
cainv=(cbinv+ceinv)/2; 
  
if year = 98 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.1185; 
if year = 98 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.1185; 
if year = 99 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0968; 
if year = 99 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0968; 
if year = 100 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0771; 
if year = 100 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0771; 
if year = 101 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0590; 
if year = 101 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0590; 
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if year = 102 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0424; 
if year = 102 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0424; 
if year = 103 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0272; 
if year = 103 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0272; 
if year = 104 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0131; 
if year = 104 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0131; 
if year >= 105 then bdepra = (v262+v264+v266+v268)*1.0000; 
if year >= 105 then edepra = (v263+v265+v267+v269)*1.0000; 
 
adepra = (bdepra+edepra)/2; 
 
bblvstk = v188+v194+v206+v218; 
eblvstk = v191+v197+v209+v221; 
ablvstk = (bblvstk+eblvstk)/2;  
 
bncar = v460+v477;                                       
encar = v461+v478; 
ancar = (bncar+encar)/2;  
 
ainta = adepra + ablvstk + ancar; 
 
if year = 98 then bolv = (577/535)*v270; 
if year = 99 then bolv = (600/535)*v270; 
if year = 100 then bolv = (625/625)*v270; 
if year = 101 then bolv = (645/625)*v270; 
if year = 102 then bolv = (665/625)*v270; 
if year = 103 then bolv = (685/625)*v270; 
if year = 104 then bolv = (715/625)*v270; 
if year = 105 then bolv = (850/850)*v270; 
if year = 106 then bolv = (940/850)*v270; 
if year = 107 then bolv = (1090/850)*v270; 
 
if year = 98 then eolv = (577/535)*v271; 
if year = 99 then eolv = (600/535)*v271; 
if year = 100 then eolv = (625/625)*v271; 
if year = 101 then eolv = (645/625)*v271; 
if year = 102 then eolv = (665/625)*v271; 
if year = 103 then eolv = (685/625)*v271;  
if year = 104 then eolv = (715/625)*v271; 
if year = 105 then eolv = (850/850)*v271; 
if year = 106 then eolv = (940/850)*v271; 
if year = 107 then eolv = (1090/850)*v271; 
 
aolv = (bolv+eolv)/2; 
 
bassets = (cbinv+bdepra+bblvstk+bncar+bolv)*pce; 
eassets = (ceinv+edepra+eblvstk+encar+eolv)*pce;  
aassets = (cainv+adepra+ablvstk+ancar+aolv)*pce;                                         
                                             
bdebt = (v454+v473+v456)*pce; 
edebt = (v455+v474+v457)*pce; 
adebt = ((bdebt+edebt)/2); 
dtar = adebt/aassets; 
 
bcinv = cbinv*pce; 
ecinv = ceinv*pce; 
acinv = cainv*pce; 
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bcdebt = v454*pce; 
ecdebt = v455*pce; 
acdebt = ((v454+v455)/2)*pce; 
if acinv <= 0 then delete; 
if acdebt < 0 then acdebt = 0; 
icr = acdebt/acinv; 
 
/* Income Items */ 
 
if v274 < 0 then v274 = 0; 
if v275 < 0 then v275 = 0; 
if v276 < 0 then v276 = 0; 
if v277 < 0 then v277 = 0; 
if v278 < 0 then v278 = 0; 
if year > 97 then gfi = v005 + v586; else gfi = v005; 
if year > 97 then vfp = v005; else vfp = gfi - v586; 
cropi = (v282+v283+v284+v511); 
     if cropi < 0 then cropi = 0; 
livei = (v274+v275+v276+v277+v278+v279+v508+v509); 
     if livei < 0 then livei = 0; 
total = cropi+livei; 
resid = gfi - total; 
     if resid < 0 then resid = 0; 
presid = resid/gfi; 
     if presid > 0.50 then delete; 
if gfi <= 0 then delete; 
if vfp <= 0 then delete; 
 
if cropi > 0 then pcropi = 1; else pcropi = 0; 
if v274 > 0 then pbeefi = 1; else pbeefi = 0; 
if (v275+v508) > 0 then pdairyi = 1; else pdairyi = 0; 
if livei > 0 then plivei = 1; else plivei = 0; 
 
cinsi = v1269; 
cinsc = v598; 
govti = v511; 
cwork = v159 + v533 - v532; 
wheat = v1261+v1264+v1265+v1266+v1267+v1268+v1270; 
fg = v1262+v1263; 
hf = v1271+v1272+v1273+v1274+v1275+v1276+v1277+v1278+v1279+v1280; 
soy = v1281+v1282+v1283+v1284+v1285+v1286+v1287+v1288+v1289+v1290;  
 
if cinsi < 0 then cinsi = 0; 
if cinsc < 0 then cinsc = 0; 
if govti < 0 then govti = 0; 
if cwork < 0 then cwork = 0; 
if wheat < 0 then wheat = 0; 
if fg < 0 then fg = 0; 
if hf < 0 then hf = 0; 
if soy < 0 then soy = 0; 
 
rgfi = gfi*pce; 
rvfp = vfp*pce; 
rnfi = v006*pce; 
 
winc = wheat*pce; 
fginc = fg*pce; 
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sinc = soy*pce; 
hfinc = hf*pce; 
 
if year = 98 then wprod = wheat/2.76; 
if year = 99 then wprod = wheat/2.35; 
if year = 100 then wprod = wheat/2.52; 
if year = 101 then wprod = wheat/2.75; 
if year = 102 then wprod = wheat/3.35; 
if year = 103 then wprod = wheat/3.29; 
if year = 104 then wprod = wheat/3.44; 
if year = 105 then wprod = wheat/3.25; 
if year = 106 then wprod = wheat/4.38; 
if year = 107 then wprod = wheat/5.92; 
 
if year = 98 then fgprod = fg/2.21; 
if year = 99 then fgprod = fg/1.88; 
if year = 100 then fgprod = fg/1.93; 
if year = 101 then fgprod = fg/2.00; 
if year = 102 then fgprod = fg/2.22; 
if year = 103 then fgprod = fg/2.40; 
if year = 104 then fgprod = fg/2.60; 
if year = 105 then fgprod = fg/2.02; 
if year = 106 then fgprod = fg/2.41; 
if year = 107 then fgprod = fg/3.63; 
 
if year = 98 then sprod = soy/5.82; 
if year = 99 then sprod = soy/4.46; 
if year = 100 then sprod = soy/4.71; 
if year = 101 then sprod = soy/4.36; 
if year = 102 then sprod = soy/4.90; 
if year = 103 then sprod = soy/6.21; 
if year = 104 then sprod = soy/7.46; 
if year = 105 then sprod = soy/5.79; 
if year = 106 then sprod = soy/5.51; 
if year = 107 then sprod = soy/7.84; 
 
if year = 98 then hfprod = hf/76.42; 
if year = 99 then hfprod = hf/68.75; 
if year = 100 then hfprod = hf/69.75; 
if year = 101 then hfprod = hf/89.92; 
if year = 102 then hfprod = hf/90.83; 
if year = 103 then hfprod = hf/76.83; 
if year = 104 then hfprod = hf/66.75; 
if year = 105 then hfprod = hf/65.58; 
if year = 106 then hfprod = hf/91.67; 
if year = 107 then hfprod = hf/107.58; 
 
ndairy = v275+v508; 
dairyi = ndairy*pce; 
 
/* Dairy Output and Income is Changed to zero if there is less than 
     $10,000 of dairy production for a single year, no dairy production 
     for any other year */ 
 
if farm=11401200 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=11498100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=11800100 then dairyi=0; 
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if farm=12350000 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=12395100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=13795300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=14006000 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=14786200 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=14797100 then dairyi=0;  
if farm=20606701 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=20650300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=22806100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=24850200 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=24851000 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=24890300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=25190300 then dairyi=0;  
if farm=41305300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=41306100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=41691100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=43491100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=43494200 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=44297100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=59902101 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=59980300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=60401300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=61790200 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=62103600 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=62704300 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=63194000 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=64486100 then dairyi=0; 
if farm=44600400 then dairyi=0; 
 
if year = 98 then dairy = ndairy/0.1473; 
if year = 99 then dairy = ndairy/0.1388; 
if year = 100 then dairy = ndairy/0.1234; 
if year = 101 then dairy = ndairy/0.1493; 
if year = 102 then dairy = ndairy/0.1212; 
if year = 103 then dairy = ndairy/0.1243; 
if year = 104 then dairy = ndairy/0.1603; 
if year = 105 then dairy = ndairy/0.1493; 
if year = 106 then dairy = ndairy/0.1256; 
if year = 107 then dairy = ndairy/0.1932; 
 
nbeef = v274; 
beefi = nbeef*pce; 
 
if year = 98 then beef = nbeef/0.6248; 
if year = 99 then beef = nbeef/0.6645; 
if year = 100 then beef = nbeef/0.7185; 
if year = 101 then beef = nbeef/0.7412; 
if year = 102 then beef = nbeef/0.6870; 
if year = 103 then beef = nbeef/0.8316; 
if year = 104 then beef = nbeef/0.8459; 
if year = 105 then beef = nbeef/0.9028; 
if year = 106 then beef = nbeef/0.8874; 
if year = 107 then beef = nbeef/0.9389; 
 
rgovti = govti*pce; 
rcinsi = cinsi*pce; 
rcinsc = cinsc*pce; 
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rcwork = cwork*pce; 
 
rtotali = winc+fginc+sinc+hfinc+dairyi+beefi+rcwork; 
 
if wprod=0 then dum1=0; else dum1=1; 
if fgprod=0 then dum2=0; else dum2=1; 
if sprod=0 then dum3=0; else dum3=1; 
if hfprod=0 then dum4=0; else dum4=1; 
if beef=0 then dum5=0; else dum5=1; 
if dairy=0 then dum6=0; else dum6=1; 
if cwork=0 then dum7=0; else dum7=1; 
 
/* Inputs and Expenses */ 
 
hlaborc = v574; 
 
if year = 98 then operc = 32851; 
if year = 99 then operc = 31258; 
if year = 100 then operc = 31730; 
if year = 101 then operc = 36332; 
if year = 102 then operc = 36635; 
if year = 103 then operc = 38989;  
if year = 104 then operc = 41985;  
if year = 105 then operc = 45816; 
if year = 106 then operc = 46380; 
if year = 107 then operc = 50261; 
 
laborc = (hlaborc + (operc*v010)); 
 
if laborc <= 0 then delete; 
 
rlaborc = laborc*pce; 
 
laborp = rlaborc / v011; 
 
labor = rlaborc/laborp; 
 
livec = v582 + v586 + v587 + v588; 
if livec=0 and ndairy>0 then delete; 
if livec=0 and nbeef>0 then delete; 
if livec < 0 then delete; 
 
/* Livestock expenses changed to zero since these are not beef 
     or dairy farms and their expenses are less than $5,000, 
     in most cases between 0 and 1,000 */ 
 
if farm=11403402 then livec=0; 
if farm=11440000 then livec=0; 
if farm=11490100 then livec=0; 
if farm=12082200 then livec=0; 
if farm=12304500 then livec=0; 
if farm=12395100 then livec=0; 
if farm=14340000 then livec=0; 
if farm=20206502 then livec=0; 
if farm=20606702 then livec=0; 
if farm=20630000 then livec=0; 
if farm=20640300 then livec=0; 
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if farm=22601201 then livec=0; 
if farm=22606800 then livec=0; 
if farm=23307205 then livec=0; 
if farm=23340302 then livec=0; 
if farm=24805201 then livec=0; 
if farm=24809200 then livec=0; 
if farm=24809200 then livec=0; 
if farm=24809500 then livec=0; 
if farm=24809900 then livec=0; 
if farm=24812100 then livec=0; 
if farm=24850200 then livec=0; 
if farm=25350400 then livec=0; 
if farm=25360400 then livec=0; 
if farm=25370200 then livec=0; 
if farm=38921400 then livec=0; 
if farm=39310400 then livec=0; 
if farm=40300100 then livec=0; 
if farm=40380400 then livec=0; 
if farm=42596200 then livec=0; 
if farm=43405700 then livec=0; 
if farm=44505800 then livec=0; 
if farm=58008303 then livec=0; 
if farm=59930300 then livec=0; 
if farm=60495000 then livec=0; 
if farm=61085200 then livec=0; 
if farm=61094000 then livec=0; 
if farm=62288400 then livec=0; 
 
if year = 98 then livep = (111)*pce; 
if year = 99 then livep = (100)*pce; 
if year = 100 then livep = (102)*pce; 
if year = 101 then livep = (109)*pce; 
if year = 102 then livep = (112)*pce; 
if year = 103 then livep = (114)*pce; 
if year = 104 then livep = (121)*pce; 
if year = 105 then livep = (117)*pce; 
if year = 106 then livep = (124)*pce; 
if year = 107 then livep = (151)*pce; 
 
rlivec = livec*pce; 
live = rlivec/livep; 
 
seedc = v580; 
 
if seedc < 0 then delete; 
 
if 0>=soy<1000 and seedc=0 then soy=0; 
if 0>=fg<1000 and seedc=0 then fg=0 ; 
 
 
if year = 98 then seedp = (122)*pce; 
if year = 99 then seedp = (122)*pce; 
if year = 100 then seedp = (124)*pce; 
if year = 101 then seedp = (132)*pce; 
if year = 102 then seedp = (142)*pce; 
if year = 103 then seedp = (154)*pce; 
if year = 104 then seedp = (158)*pce; 
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if year = 105 then seedp = (168)*pce; 
if year = 106 then seedp = (182)*pce; 
if year = 107 then seedp = (205)*pce; 
 
rseedc = seedc*pce; 
seed = rseedc/seedp; 
 
fertc = v581; 
 
if fertc < 0 then delete; 
 
if year = 98 then fertp = (112)*pce; 
if year = 99 then fertp = (105)*pce; 
if year = 100 then fertp = (110)*pce; 
if year = 101 then fertp = (123)*pce; 
if year = 102 then fertp = (108)*pce; 
if year = 103 then fertp = (124)*pce; 
if year = 104 then fertp = (140)*pce; 
if year = 105 then fertp = (164)*pce; 
if year = 106 then fertp = (176)*pce; 
if year = 107 then fertp = (208)*pce; 
 
rfertc = fertc*pce; 
fert = rfertc/fertp; 
 
chemc = v585; 
 
if chemc < 0 then delete; 
 
if year = 98 then chemp = (122)*pce; 
if year = 99 then chemp = (121)*pce; 
if year = 100 then chemp = (120)*pce; 
if year = 101 then chemp = (121)*pce; 
if year = 102 then chemp = (119)*pce; 
if year = 103 then chemp = (121)*pce; 
if year = 104 then chemp = (121)*pce; 
if year = 105 then chemp = (123)*pce; 
if year = 106 then chemp = (128)*pce; 
if year = 107 then chemp = (131)*pce; 
 
rchemc = chemc*pce; 
chem = rchemc/chemp; 
 
udepr = v311+v312+v313; 
 
if year = 98 then dkddepr = udepr*1.1185; 
if year = 99 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0968; 
if year = 100 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0771; 
if year = 101 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0590;  
if year = 102 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0424; 
if year = 103 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0272; 
if year = 104 then dkddepr = udepr*1.0131; 
if year >= 105 then dkddepr = udepr; 
rkddepr=dkddpr*pce; 
intr = 0.08; 
 
gpur = (v071+v103+v107+v111+v115); 
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if gpur < 0 then gpur = 0; 
 
intc = (((livec+seedc+fertc+chemc)*0.5*intr)+ 
     (gpur*0.5*intr)+(ainta*intr)); 
rintc=intc*pce; 
 
ocapc = v575 + v576 + v577 + v578 + v579 + v583 + v584 + v589 + 
     v597 + dkddepr + intc;  
 
rocapc = ocapc*pce; 
 
if rocapc <=0 then delete; 
 
if year = 98 then repairp = (119)*pce; 
if year = 99 then repairp = (118)*pce; 
if year = 100 then repairp = (120)*pce; 
if year = 101 then repairp = (124)*pce; 
if year = 102 then repairp = (127)*pce; 
if year = 103 then repairp = (130)*pce; 
if year = 104 then repairp = (134)*pce; 
if year = 105 then repairp = (140)*pce; 
if year = 106 then repairp = (145)*pce; 
if year = 107 then repairp = (150)*pce; 
 
if year = 98 then fuelp = (84)*pce; 
if year = 99 then fuelp = (94)*pce; 
if year = 100 then fuelp = (129)*pce; 
if year = 101 then fuelp = (121)*pce; 
if year = 102 then fuelp = (115)*pce; 
if year = 103 then fuelp = (140)*pce; 
if year = 104 then fuelp = (165)*pce; 
if year = 105 then fuelp = (216)*pce; 
if year = 106 then fuelp = (239)*pce; 
if year = 107 then fuelp = (263)*pce; 
 
if year = 98 then intp = (104)*pce; 
if year = 99 then intp = (106)*pce; 
if year = 100 then intp = (113)*pce; 
if year = 101 then intp = (104)*pce; 
if year = 102 then intp = (99)*pce; 
if year = 103 then intp = (95)*pce; 
if year = 104 then intp = (98)*pce; 
if year = 105 then intp = (114)*pce; 
if year = 106 then intp = (139)*pce; 
if year = 107 then intp = (154)*pce; 
 
repairs = v575 + v576 + v589; 
energy = v578 + v579 + v583 + v584 + v597; 
other = v577 + dkddepr + intc; 
stotal = repairs + energy + other; 
ocapp = ((repairs/stotal)*repairp) + ((energy/stotal)*fuelp) + 
     ((other/stotal)*intp); 
ocap = rocapc/ocapp; 
land = v324; 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS CENTRAL REGION*/ 
/*Central- saline */ 
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If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 11400000  >= farm <= 11499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Dickinson*/ 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
 122
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 11800000  >= farm <= 11899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Marion*/ 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 12300000  >= farm <= 12399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Lincoln*/ 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
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If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 16600000  >= farm <= 16699999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-McPherson*/ 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 22600000  >= farm <= 22699999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Barton*/ 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
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If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 23300000  >= farm <= 23399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Rice*/ 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
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If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 24800000  >= farm <= 24899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-, Russell, Ellsworth*/ 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 16000000  >= farm <= 16499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Ellis*/ 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 53800000  >=  farm <= 53899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
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If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 53800000  >= farm <= 53899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/* Central-Rush*/ 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 34.4; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 34.1; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 64; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 66; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 64; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 67; 
 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 12.7; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 13; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 12; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 12.3; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 12.4; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 13.1; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 13.3; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 13.8; 
If 57300000  >= farm <= 57399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 14; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS NORTH CENTRAL REGION*/ 
/* North Central-Cloud, Washington, Republic, Clay, Jewell*/ 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 40; 
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If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 40.5; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 43; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 47; 
 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 75; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 76; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 79; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 76; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 74; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 74; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 76; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 80; 
 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 14; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 13.6; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 14.1; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 14.4; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 14.9; 
If 13600000  >= farm <= 14399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 16; 
 
/* North Central-Smith, Mitchell, Osborne*/ 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 40.5; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 43; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 47; 
 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 75; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 76; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 79; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 76; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 74; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 74; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 76; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 80; 
 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 98 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 99 then ppast = 14; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 100 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 101 then ppast = 13.6; 
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If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 102 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 103 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 104 then ppast = 14.1; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 105 then ppast = 14.4; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 106 then ppast = 14.9; 
If 15000000  >= farm <= 15699999 and year = 107 then ppast = 16; 
 
/* North Central- Ottawa*/ 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 40.5; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 43; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 47; 
 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 75; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 76; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 79; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 76; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 74; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 74; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 76; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 80; 
 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 14; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 13.6; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 14.1; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 14.4; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 14.9; 
If 16500000  >= farm <= 16599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 16; 
 
/* North Central- Phillips*/ 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 40.5; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 43; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 47; 
 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 75; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 76; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 79; 
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If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 76; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 74; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 74; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 76; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 80; 
 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 14; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 13.6; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 14.1; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 14.4; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 14.9; 
If 55800000  >= farm <= 55899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 16; 
 
/* North Central- Rooks*/ 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 40.5; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 43; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 47; 
 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 75; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 76; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 79; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 76; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 76; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 80; 
 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 98 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 99 then ppast = 14; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 100 then ppast = 13.5; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 101 then ppast = 13.6; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 102 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 103 then ppast = 13.7; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 104 then ppast = 14.1; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 105 then ppast = 14.4; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 106 then ppast = 14.9; 
If 57000000  >= farm <= 57099999 and year = 107 then ppast = 16; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS SOUTH CENTRAL REGION*/ 
/* South Central- Sedgwick, Reno, Sumner*/ 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
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If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 20200000  >= farm <= 21299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Harvey*/ 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
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If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 22800000  >= farm <= 22899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Harper, Pratt, Kingman, Stafford*/ 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 25100000  >= farm <= 25999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Barber, Pawnee*/ 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
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If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 36700000  >= farm <= 36999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Kiowa*/ 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 38500000  >= farm <= 38599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Commanche*/ 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
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If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 39000000  >= farm <= 39099999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/* South Central- Edwards*/ 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.9; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 33; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 35.5; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 37; 
 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 69; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 68; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 11; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10.9; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 11.1; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 11.2; 
 134
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 11.2; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 11.3; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 11.8; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 11.5; 
If 37900000  >= farm <= 37999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 12.4; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS NORTH EAST REGION*/ 
/* North East- Marshall*/ 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 12000000  >= farm <= 12099999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/* North East- Riley*/ 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
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If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 13000000  >= farm <= 13099999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/* North East- Brown, Nemaha, Pottawatomie, Jackson, Doniphan, Jefferson*/ 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 42500000  >= farm <= 44699999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/* North East- Wyandotte*/ 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
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If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 40100000  >= farm <= 40199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/* North East- Leavenworth*/ 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
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If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 40700000  >= farm <= 40799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/* North East- Atchison*/ 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 55; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 59; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 62; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 60; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 59.5; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 62.5; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 64.5; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 69; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 70; 
 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 75; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 80; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 80.32; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 85; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 83.38; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 81; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 83; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 83; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 84; 
If 41500000  >=  farm <= 41599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 16; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 16.1; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.1; 
If 41500000  >= farm <= 41599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 18.6; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS EAST CENTRAL REGION*/ 
/* East Central- Geary*/ 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
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If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 14700000  >= farm <= 14799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Shawnee*/ 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 40300000  >= farm <= 40399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Lyon*/ 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
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If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 41300000  >= farm <= 41399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Douglas, Johnson*/ 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
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If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 41600000  >= farm <= 41999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Morris, Wabaunsee, Chase*/ 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 45400000  >= farm <= 48199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Franklin*/ 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
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If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 62100000  >= farm <= 62199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Osage, Miami*/ 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 62900000  >= farm <= 63199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/* East Central- Coffey, Linn, Anderson*/ 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 39; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 42; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 41; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
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If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 41.5; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 42.5; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 44; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 50.5; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 50; 
 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 67.35; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 71.27; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 68.97; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 67; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 71; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 73; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 76; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 18; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 17; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 16.8; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 16.9; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 17.6; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 17.9; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 18.4; 
If 64400000  >= farm <= 65299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 19.4; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS SOUTH EAST REGION*/ 
/* South East - Crawford, Montgomery, Cowley, Butler, Cherokee, Labette, 
Bourbon*/ 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 36.5; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 36.4; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 41; 
 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66.35; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 70.21; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67.94; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 68; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 68; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 69; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 70; 
 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 17.3; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.4; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.5; 
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If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 16.2; 
If 60400000  >= farm <= 61799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 17.6; 
 
/* South East - Neosho, Allen, Wilson*/ 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 36.5; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 36.4; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 41; 
 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66.35; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 70.21; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67.94; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 68; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 68; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 69; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 70; 
 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 17.3; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.4; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.5; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 16.2; 
If 62200000  >= farm <= 62799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 17.6; 
 
/* South East - Greenwood*/ 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 36.5; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 36.4; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 41; 
 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66.35; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 70.21; 
 144
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67.94; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 68; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 68; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 69; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 70; 
 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 17.3; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.4; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.5; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 16.2; 
If 63200000  >= farm <= 63299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 17.6; 
 
/* South East - Chautauqua, Elk, Woodson*/ 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 36; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 37; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 36.5; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 36.4; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 38.5; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 40; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 41; 
 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66.35; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 70.21; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67.94; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 68; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 68; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 69; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 70; 
 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 16.5; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 17.3; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 16.4; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 15.5; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 15.2; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 15.3; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 15.4; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 16.2; 
If 66300000  >= farm <= 67299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 17.6; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS NORTH WEST REGION*/ 
/* North West- Decatur*/ 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 31; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 32; 
 145
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 66; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 67; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 70; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 72; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 83; 
 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.5; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 10; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 9.6; 
If 57400000  >= farm <= 57499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.5; 
 
/* North West- Graham, Rawlins, Thomas, Sherman, Cheyenne*/ 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 31; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
  
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 66; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 67; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 70; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 72; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 83; 
 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.5; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 10; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.7; 
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If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 9.6; 
If 57600000  >= farm <= 58299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.5; 
 
/* North West- Sheridan*/ 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 31; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
  
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 66; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 67; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 74; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 70; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 72; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 83; 
 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.5; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 10; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 9.6; 
If 58700000  >= farm <= 58799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.5; 
 
/* North West- Norton*/ 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 31; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 32.5; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 34.5; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 35; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 34; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 35; 
  
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 66; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 67; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 68; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 74; 
 147
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 67; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 66; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 70; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 72; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 74; 
If 56100000  >=  farm <= 56199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 83; 
 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.5; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 10; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 10; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 9.6; 
If 56100000  >= farm <= 56199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.5; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS WEST CENTRAL REGION*/ 
/* West Central- Wallace*/ 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 59900000  >=  farm <= 59999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 59900000  >=  farm <= 59999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 59900000  >= farm <= 59999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Wichita*/ 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
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If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 30200000  >= farm <= 30299999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Greeley*/ 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
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If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 30500000  >= farm <= 30599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Scott, Lane*/ 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 39600000  >= farm <= 39799999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Trego*/ 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
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If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
  
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 58300000  >= farm <= 58399999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Gove, Logan*/ 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
  
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 58800000  >= farm <= 59599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/* West Central- Ness*/ 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 27; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 29; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 32; 
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If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 29.7; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 30.5; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 31.5; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 30; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 31; 
  
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 64; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 63.44; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 68; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 63; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 65; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 70; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 78; 
  
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 9.2; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 9.3; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 9.7; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 9.8; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 10; 
If 57500000  >= farm <= 57599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 10.1; 
 
/ *LAND PRICES FOR KANSAS SOUTH WEST REGION*/ 
/* South West- Hamilton, Haskell*/ 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
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If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30000000  >= farm <= 30199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Grant, Stanton*/ 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 30300000  >= farm <= 30499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Ford*/ 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
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If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 33500000  >= farm <= 33599999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Meade, Gray*/ 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38600000  >= farm <= 38999999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Clark, Stevens, Hodgeman, Morton*/ 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
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If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39100000  >= farm <= 39499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Finney*/ 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
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If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 37100000  >= farm <= 37199999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Seward*/ 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 38400000  >= farm <= 38499999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
 
/* South West- Kearny*/ 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 98 then pnirrc = 23; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 99 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 100 then pnirrc = 25; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 101 then pnirrc = 25.5; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 102 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 103 then pnirrc = 25.6; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 104 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 105 then pnirrc = 26.5; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 106 then pnirrc = 26; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 107 then pnirrc = 28; 
  
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 98 then pirrc = 67; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 99 then pirrc = 66; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 100 then pirrc = 66; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 101 then pirrc = 72; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 102 then pirrc = 72; 
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If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 103 then pirrc = 69; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 104 then pirrc = 73; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 105 then pirrc = 74; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 106 then pirrc = 75; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 107 then pirrc = 85; 
  
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 98 then ppast = 8.6; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 99 then ppast = 9; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 100 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 101 then ppast = 8.5; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 102 then ppast = 8.8; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 103 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 104 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 105 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 106 then ppast = 8.7; 
If 39800000  >= farm <= 39899999 and year = 107 then ppast = 8.7; 
/* Percent of inputs*/ 
 
towna = v328+v331+v337+v340; 
lv=(v270 + v271)/2; 
if towna= 0 and lv>0 then delete; 
owna = v328+v331+v337; 
 
acrest = v327 + v330 + v336; 
 
if acrest > 0 then rentc = (((v327/acrest)*pirrc) + 
     ((v330/acrest)*pnirrc) + ((v336/acrest)*ppast))*pce; 
     else rentc = 0;  
 
if rentc = . then delete; 
 
/*if owna > 0 then rate = (((v331)/owna)*0.053) + 
     ((v328/owna)*0.060) + ((v337/owna)*0.030); else rate = 0.000; 
 
orent = rate*(aolv);  
 
if owna > 0 then rentc = (orent*pce)/owna; 
if owna = 0 and v592 > 0 then rentc = ((v592*pce)/v326); 
if owna = 0 and v592 <= 0 then rentc = 0; 
if rentc = 0 then prentc = 1; else prentc = 0; */ 
 
rlandc = (land*rentc); 
crland=(v329*pirrc)+ (v332*pnirrc) + (v338*ppast); 
 
 
 
/* Farm Characteristics */ 
Powna=(owna/land); 
Tacost=rlaborc+rlivec+rseedc+rfertc+rchemc+rocapc+rlanc; 
expr = tacost/(rtotali+rgovti+rcinsi); 
/* Percent of outputs*/ 
cropinc=(winc + fginc + hfinc + sinc); 
livdinc=dairyi+ beefi; 
tinc=cropinc+livdinc+rcwork; 
pcropi=cropinc/tinc; 
plivdi=livdinc/tinc; 
pcwki=rcwork/tinc; 
 157
 
 
/* Percent of inputs*/ 
 
Plabore=rlaborc/tacost; 
Pcape= rocapc/tacost; 
Plande=crland/tacost; 
Pcrope=(rseedc+rfertc+rchemc)/tacost; 
Plivde=rlivec/tacost; 
 
tacres = v324; 
cacres = v333; 
wacres = v363+v366+v405+v408; 
fgacres = v369+v372+v375+v378; 
sacres = v381+v384+v387+v390+v417+v420; 
hfacres = v393+v396+v399+v402+v411+v414; 
 
wheata = v363+v366; 
corna = v369+v372; 
sorga = v375+v378; 
soya = v381+v384; 
 
wheatp = v423+v424+v425+v426; 
cornp = v427+v428+v429+v430; 
sorgp = v431+v432+v433+v434; 
soyp = v435+v436+v437+v438; 
 
if wheata > 0 then wheaty = wheatp/wheata; else wheaty = .; 
if corna > 0 then corny = cornp/corna; else corny = .; 
if sorga > 0 then sorgy = sorgp/sorga; else sorgy = . ; 
if soya > 0 then soyy = soyp/soya; else soyy = .; 
 
offi = v030*pce; 
 
proc sort; by farm; 
 
data x5; set x4; 
proc means noprint; var farm; by farm; output out=aaa n=nyears; 
proc sort data=aaa; by farm; 
 
libname ml10yr 'c:\'; 
data ml10yr.lopez10; merge x4 aaa; by farm; 
if nyears < 10 then delete; 
 
proc sort; by farm year; 
 
proc means maxdec=4; var farm year pce 
     rgovti rcinsi rcinsc 
     bassets eassets aassets bdebt edebt adebt dtar 
  bcinv ecinv acinv bcdebt ecdebt acdebt icr 
     rgfi rvfp rnfi 
  winc fginc sinc hfinc dairyi beefi 
     wprod fgprod sprod hfprod dairy beef rcwork 
     rlaborc rlivec rseedc rfertc rchemc rocapc rlandc  
     laborp livep seedp fertp chemp ocapp rentc 
     labor live seed fert chem ocap land 
  v008 v010-v013 v324-v341 v468 offi  
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     pcropi pbeefi pdairyi plivei  
     tacres cacres wacres fgacres sacres hfacres 
     wheata wheatp wheaty corna cornp corny 
     sorga sorgp sorgy soya soyp soyy 
  pirrc pnirrc ppast 
     powna crland lv 
     cropinc livdinc tinc pcropi plivdi pcwki 
     tacost expr pcrope plivde plabore pcape plande 
     rintc dkddepr 
     dum1 dum2 dum3 dum4 dum5 dum6 dum7;  
 
run; 
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B.2 GAMS Codes 
This section includes the GAMS codes to calculate technical efficiency under constant 
and variable returns to scale, and minimum costs under variable and constant returns to scale. 
Two programs were used to solve the specific DEA problems. The program for the input-
oriented model, where all inputs are variable and there are no environmental effects. The 
program for the debt-constraint model, where total annual debt is introduced in the DEA 
problems formulation as a non-discretionary or environmental variable. In both codes, a matrix 
of input quantities for the 456 farms, a matrix of input prices for the farms, and output quantities 
are firstly entered. Results are collected at the end of the program. These results will be used to 
calculate efficiencies later. 
B.2.1 GAMS Code for Input-Oriented DEA Model 
The following is the GAMS Code for basic model (discretionary or non-environmental 
model. This model was estimated 10 times, each time for each independent year from 1998 to 
2007. Here there is the example for the model to estimate technical efficiency and minimum 
costs for the 456 farms for the year 2007. 
  
****************************************************************** 
*NONPARAMETRIC EFFICIENCY APPROACH FOR  KANSAS FARMS 
*TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY UNDER VRS 
*INPUT ORIENTED COST MINIMIZATION UNDER VRS AND CRTS 
*INCREASING/DECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
*NON-ENVIRONMENTAL OR DISCRETIONARY MODEL 
****************************************************************** 
* A SAMPLE OF 456 KANSAS FAMS 
* AS OUTPUTS= 7: SG,FG,SG,HY,BEEF, DAIRY,CW 
* AS INPUTS=7:   LAND, LABOR, CAPITAL, LIVESTOCK, SEED, FERTI, CHEM 
* NO ENVIRONMENTAL OR DISCRETIONARY VARIABLES 
OPTION DECIMALS=5; 
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SETS 
K OBSERVATION /F1*F456/ 
N INPUTS /X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7/ 
J OUTPUTS /Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5, Y6, Y7/ 
IT /IT1*IT456/ 
*S DISINPUT /DX1/ 
****************************** 
*INCLUDE DATA IN THIS SECTION 
****************************** 
TABLE X(K,N) INPUT LEVELS 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\INP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE Y(K,J) OUTPUT LEVES 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\OUT.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XP(K,N) INPUT PRICES 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\PINP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE YIT(IT,J) ITERATION FOR OUTPUT LEVELS 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITOUT.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XIT(IT,N) ITERATION FOR INPUT LEVELS 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITINP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XPIT(IT,N)  ITERATION FOR INPUT PRICES 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITPINP.PRN"; 
 
*************************** 
*PARAMETER I IS FOR INPUTS 
*PARAMETER O IS FOR OUTPUTS 
*************************** 
 161
 PARAMETER I(N) 
/X1 1 
 X2 1 
 X3 1 
 X4 1 
 X5 1 
 X6 1 
 X7 1/; 
PARAMETER IP(N) 
/X1 1 
 X2 1 
 X3 1 
 X4 1 
 X5 1 
 X6 1 
 X7 1/; 
PARAMETER O(J) 
/Y1 1 
 Y3 1 
 Y4 1 
 Y5 1 
 Y6 1 
 Y7 1/ ; 
PARAMETER OP(J) 
/Y1 1 
 Y3 1 
 Y4 1 
 Y5 1 
 Y6 1 
 Y7 1/ ; 
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POSITIVE VARIABLES 
Z(K) INTENSITY MEASURE 
OI(N) OPTIMAL INPUT LEVEL 
VARIABLES 
TE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
LAMBDA TECHNICAL EFFIECIENCY 
COSTTC COST UNVER COSNTANT RETURNS TO SCALE 
COSTTV COST UNDER VARIABEL RETURNS TO SCALE 
COSTTOP COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
************************************************************************ 
*CREATING PARAMTERS FOR EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION AND INTENSITY 
VALUES 
************************************************************************ 
PARAMETER 
ZVAL(IT,K) Z VALUES 
PARAMETER 
TCOSTTV(IT) TOTAL COST UNDER VARIABLE RETURN TO SCALE FOR FARM 
I 
PARAMETER 
TCOSTTC(IT) TOTAL COST UNVER CONSTANT RETURN TO SCALE 
PARAMETER 
TCOSTTOP(IT) TOTAL COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
PARAMETER 
TEM(IT) TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY MEASURE 
PARAMETER 
OPTIN(IT,N) OPTIMAL INPUT LEVEL VALUES 
PARAMETER 
ACOST(IT) ACTUAL COST OF INPUTS FOR FARMS 
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************************************************************************ 
*SETTING UP NAMES FOR OBJECTIVE FUNCTION AND CONSTRAINTS 
EQUATIONS 
************************************************************************ 
*TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY MEASURE  -VRS 
************************************************************************ 
EQUATIONS 
OBJL LAMBDA OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
CON1A INPUT CONSTRAINT FOR TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
CON2A OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3A Z CONSTRAINT EQUALS ONE; 
OBJL..TE=E=LAMBDA; 
CON1A(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=I(N)*LAMBDA; 
CON2A(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON3A..SUM(K,Z(K))=E=1; 
MODEL L /OBJL, CON1A, CON2A, CON3A/; 
************************************************************************ 
*MIN COST UNDER CRST    -COSTTC 
************************************************************************ 
EQUATIONS 
OBJTC COST UNDER CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE 
CON2B OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3B INPUT CONSTRAINT; 
OBJTC.. COSTTC=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2B(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON3B(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
MODEL CTC /OBJTC, CON2B, CON3B/; 
************************************************************************ 
*Ci(w,y,Tv)      MIN COST VRS 
************************************************************************ 
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EQUATIONS 
OBJTV COST UNDER VARIABLE RETURN TO SCALE 
CON2C OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON4C INPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3C Z CONSTRAINT EQUALS ONE; 
OBJTV.. COSTTV=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2C(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON4C(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
CON3C..SUM(K,Z(K))=E=1; 
MODEL CTV /OBJTV, CON4C,CON2C, CON3C/; 
 
************************************************************************ 
*Ci(w,y,T*)      MIN COST N-DECREA RTS 
************************************************************************ 
EQUATIONS 
OBJTOP COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
CON2D OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON4D INPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON5D Z CONSTRAINT LESS THAN ONE; 
OBJTOP.. COSTTOP=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2D(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON4D(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
 CON5D..SUM(K,Z(K))=L=1; 
MODEL CTOP /OBJTOP, CON4D, CON2D, CON5D/; 
************************************************************************ 
*LOOP 
************************************************************************ 
LOOP(IT, 
O(J)=YIT(IT,J); 
I(N)=XIT(IT,N); 
IP(N)=XPIT(IT,N); 
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SOLVE L USING NLP MINIMIZING LAMBDA; 
SOLVE CTOP USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTOP; 
SOLVE CTV USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTV; 
SOLVE CTC USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTC; 
ACOST(IT)= SUM(N,XIT(IT,N)*XPIT(IT,N)); 
OPTIN(IT,N)=OI.L(N); 
ZVAL(IT,K)=Z.L(K); 
TEM(IT)=LAMBDA.L; 
TCOSTTOP(IT)=COSTTOP.L; 
TCOSTTV(IT)=COSTTV.L; 
TCOSTTC(IT)=COSTTC.L; 
); 
************************************************************************ 
* SAVING RESULTS 
************************************************************************ 
FILE ALLBASIC/C:\DATA\DISSJUL\RESULTS\99\ALLBA.PRN/ 
PUT ALLBASIC; 
ALLBASIC.PC=5 ; 
PUT "ID" "TE" "MCOSTNDRS" "MCOSTVRS" "MCOSTCRS" "ACOST" "X1" "X2" 
"X3" "X4" "x5" "X6" "X7" ; 
PUT/ 
LOOP(IT, PUT IT.TL,@5,TEM(IT),TCOSTTOP(IT),TCOSTTV(IT),TCOSTTC(IT), 
ACOST(IT), 
LOOP(N, PUT OI.L(N)) 
PUT/); 
 
************************************************************************ 
*USE A SPREADSHEET TO ESTIMATE RHO, ALPHA, AND BETHA 
************************************************************************ 
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B.2.2 GAMS Code for Non-Discretionary DEA Model 
The following is the GAMS code for debt-constraint model- discretionary or non 
environmental model. This model was estimated 10 times, each time for each 
independent year from 1998 to 2007. 
 
****************************************************************** 
*NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH  FOR  KANSAS FARMS 
*TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
*INPUT ORIENTED COST MINIMIZATION 
*INCREASING/DECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
*NON-DISCRETIONARY-ENVIRONMENTAL MODEL 
****************************************************************** 
 
 
 
* A SAMPLE OF 456 KANSAS FAMS 
* AS OUTPUTS= 7: SG,FG,SG,HY,BEEF, DAIRY,CW 
* AS INPUTS=7:LAND, LABOR, CAPITAL, LIVESTOCK, SEED, FERTI, CHEM 
* TOTAL ANNUAL Debt AS A  NON-DISCRETIONARY OR ENVIRONMENTAL 
VARIABLE, ALL PRICES IN REAL $2007  
 
OPTION DECIMALS=5; 
 
 
 
SETS 
K OBSERVATION /F1*F456/ 
N INPUTS /X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7/ 
J OUTPUTS /Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5, Y6, Y7/ 
IT /IT1*IT456/ 
S DISINPUT /DX1/ 
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****************************** 
*INCLUDE DATA IN THIS SECTION 
****************************** 
TABLE X(K,N) INPUT LEVELS 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\INP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE Y(K,J) OUTPUT LELVES 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\OUT.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XP(K,N) INPUT PRICES 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\PINP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE YIT(IT,J) 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITOUT.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XIT(IT,N) 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITINP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE XPIT(IT,N) 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITPINP.PRN"; 
 
TABLE DI(IT,s) DISCRETIONARY VARIABLE 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\ITDIS.PRN"; 
 
TABLE D(K,S) 
$INCLUDE "C:\DATA\DISSJUL\FILES\2007\DIS.PRN"; 
 
 
*************************** 
*PARAMETER I IS FOR INPUTS 
*PARAMETER O IS FOR OUTPUTS 
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*************************** 
PARAMETER I(N) 
/X1 1 
 X2 1 
 X3 1 
 X4 1 
 X5 1 
 X6 1 
 X7 1/; 
 
PARAMETER IP(N) 
/X1 1 
 X2 1 
 X3 1 
 X4 1 
 X5 1 
 X6 1 
 X7 1/; 
 
PARAMETER O(J) 
/Y1 1 
 Y2 1 
 Y3 1 
 Y4 1 
 Y5 1 
 Y6 1 
 Y7 1/ ; 
 
PARAMETER OP(J) 
/Y1 1 
 Y2 1 
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 Y3 1 
 Y4 1 
 Y5 1 
 Y6 1 
 Y7 1/ ; 
 
PARAMETER DX(S) 
/DX1 1/; 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
Z(K) INTENSITY MEASURE 
OI(N) OPTIMAL INPUT LEVEL 
 
VARIABLES 
TE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
LAMBDA TECHNICAL EFFIECIENCY 
COSTTC COST UNVER COSNTANT RETURNS TO SCALE 
COSTTV COST UNDER VARIABEL RETURNS TO SCALE 
COSTTOP COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
********************************************************************** 
*CREATING PARAMTERS FOR EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION AND INTENSITY 
VALUES 
************************************************************************ 
PARAMETER 
ZVAL(IT,K) Z VALUES 
PARAMETER 
TCOSTTV(IT) TOTAL COST UNDER VARIABLE RETURN TO SCALE FOR FARM 
i 
 
PARAMETER 
TCOSTTC(IT) TOTAL COST UNVER CONSTANT RETURN TO SCALE 
PARAMETER 
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TCOSTTOP(IT) TOTAL COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
PARAMETER 
TEM(IT) TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY MEASURE 
OPTIN(IT,N) OPTIMAL INPUT LEVEL VALUES 
PARAMETER 
ACOST(IT) ACTUAL COST OF INPUTS FOR FARMS 
*********************************************************************** 
*SETTING UP NAMES FOR OBJECTIVE FUNCTION AND CONSTRAINTS 
EQUATIONS 
*********************************************************************** 
************************************************************************ 
*TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY  MEASURE  -VRS 
************************************************************************ 
EQUATIONS 
OBJL LAMBDA OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
CON1A INPUT CONSTRAINT FOR TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
CON2A OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3A Z CONSTRAINT EQUALS ONE 
CON4A  DISCRETIONARY CONSTRAINT; 
 
OBJL..TE=E=LAMBDA; 
CON1A(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=I(N)*LAMBDA; 
CON4A(S)..SUM(K,D(K,s)*Z(K))=L=DX(S); 
CON2A(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON3A..SUM(K,Z(K))=E=1; 
 
MODEL L /OBJL, CON1A, CON2A, CON3A, CON4A/; 
 
************************************************************************ 
*MIN COST UNDER CRST    -COSTTC 
************************************************************************ 
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EQUATIONS 
OBJTC COST UNDER CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE 
CON2B OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3B INPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON4B NON-DISC CONSTRAINT; 
 
OBJTC.. COSTTC=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2B(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON4B(S)..SUM(K,D(K,s)*Z(K))=L=DX(S); 
CON3B(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
 
MODEL CTC /OBJTC, CON2B, CON3B,CON4B/; 
************************************************************************ 
*Ci(w,y,Tv)      MIN COST VRS 
************************************************************************ 
EQUATIONS 
OBJTV COST UNDER VARIABLE RETURN TO SCALE 
CON2C OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON4C INPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON3C Z CONSTRAINT EQUALS ONE 
CON5C NON-DISC CONSTRAINT; 
OBJTV.. COSTTV=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2C(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON4C(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
CON5C(S)..SUM(K,D(K,s)*Z(K))=L=DX(S); 
CON3C..SUM(K,Z(K))=E=1; 
 
MODEL CTV /OBJTV, CON4C,CON2C, CON3C, CON5C/; 
************************************************************************ 
*Ci(w,y,T*)      MIN COST N-DECREA RTS 
************************************************************************ 
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EQUATIONS 
OBJTOP COST UNDER NONDECREASING RETURNS TO SCALE 
CON2D OUTPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON4D INPUT CONSTRAINT 
CON5D Z CONSTRAINT LESS THAN ONE 
CON3D NON-DISC CONSTRAINT; 
OBJTOP.. COSTTOP=E=SUM(N,IP(N)*OI(N)); 
CON2D(J)..SUM(K,Y(K,J)*Z(K))-O(J)=G=0; 
CON4D(N)..SUM(K,X(K,N)*Z(K))=L=OI(N); 
CON3D(S)..SUM(K,D(K,s)*Z(K))=L=DX(S); 
CON5D..SUM(K,Z(K))=L=1; 
 
MODEL CTOP /OBJTOP, CON4D, CON2D, CON3D, CON5D/; 
*********************************************************************** 
*LOOP 
*********************************************************************** 
LOOP(IT, 
O(J)=YIT(IT,J); 
I(N)=XIT(IT,N); 
DX(S)=DI(IT,S); 
IP(N)=XPIT(IT,N); 
 
SOLVE L USING NLP MINIMIZING LAMBDA; 
SOLVE CTOP USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTOP; 
SOLVE CTV USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTV; 
SOLVE CTC USING NLP MINIMIZING COSTTC; 
 
 
ACOST(IT)= SUM(N,XIT(IT,N)*XPIT(IT,N)); 
OPTIN(IT,N)=OI.L(N); 
ZVAL(IT,K)=Z.L(K); 
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TEM(IT)=LAMBDA.L; 
TCOSTTOP(IT)=COSTTOP.L; 
TCOSTTV(IT)=COSTTV.L; 
TCOSTTC(IT)=COSTTC.L; 
); 
*********************************************************************** 
* SAVING RESULTS  
************************************************************************ 
FILE ALLBASIC/C:\DATA\DISSJUL\RESULTSNDIS\2007\ALLNBA.TXT/ 
PUT ALLBASIC; 
ALLBASIC.PC=5 ; 
PUT "ID" "TE" "MCOSTNDRS" "MCOSTVRS" "MCOSTCRS" "ACOST" "X1" "X2" 
"X3" "X4" "x5" "X6" "X7" ; 
PUT/ 
LOOP(IT, PUT IT.TL,@5,TEM(IT),TCOSTTOP(IT),TCOSTTV(IT),TCOSTTC(IT), 
ACOST(IT), 
LOOP(N, PUT OI.L(N)) 
PUT/); 
 
*********************************************************************** 
*USE A SPREADSHEET TO ESTIMATE ALLOCATIVE, SCALE AND OVERALL 
EFFICIENCY 
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B.3 STATA Code to Conduct Tobit Regression Analysis 
STATA Code 
--Identifying the dataset as a panel data--- 
 iis (n) 
 tis(year 
 
---Summary statistics: All, by efficiencies, inefficiencies and differentials by year--- 
 sum 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==98 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==99 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==100 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==101 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==102 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==103 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==104 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==105 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==106 
 sum te oe se oe ti ai si oi ted aed sed oed if year ==107 
 
---Summary statistics: Farms by Output Specialization in terms of Net Gross Farm 
Income--- 
 sum if  plivdi>.8 
 sum if  pcropi>.8 
 sum if  plivdi<.8 & pcropi<.8 
 sum te ae se oe ted aed sed oed if typecrop==1 
 sum te ae se oe ted aed sed oed if typelivest==1 
 sum te ae se oe ted aed sed oed if typemixed==1 
 
---Summary statistics: Farms by Size in terms of Net Gross Farm Income--- 
 sum if   rgfi<100000 
 sum if  rgfi>100000 & rgfi<250000 
 sum if  rgfi>250000 & rgfi<500000 
 sum if  rgfi>500000  
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 ---Summary statistics of Fully Efficient Farms in Both Models, by year--- 
 
 sum if te==1 & year==98 
 sum if te==1 & year==99 
 sum if te==1 & year==100 
 sum if te==1 & year==101 
 sum if te==1 & year==102 
sum if te==1 & year==103 
sum if te==1 & year==104 
 sum if te==1 & year==105 
 sum if te==1 & year==106 
sum if te==1 & year==107 
 
  sum if ted==1 & year==98 
 sum if ted==1 & year==99 
 sum if ted==1 & year==100 
 sum if ted==1 & year==101 
 sum if ted==1 & year==102 
sum if ted==1 & year==103 
sum if ted==1 & year==104 
 sum if ted==1 & year==105 
 sum if ted==1 & year==106 
 sum if ted==1 & year==107 
 
 sum if ae==1 & year==98 
 sum if ae==1 & year==99 
 sum if ae==1 & year==100 
 sum if ae==1 & year==101 
 sum if ae==1 & year==102 
 sum if ae==1 & year==103 
 sum if ae==1 & year==104 
 sum if ae==1 & year==105 
 sum if ae==1 & year==106 
 sum if ae==1 & year==107 
  
 sum if aed==1 & year==98 
 sum if aed==1 & year==99 
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 sum if aed==1 & year==100 
 sum if aed==1 & year==101 
 sum if aed==1 & year==102 
 sum if aed==1 & year==103 
 sum if aed==1 & year==104 
 sum if aed==1 & year==105 
 sum if aed==1 & year==106 
sum if aed==1 & year==107 
 
sum if se==1 & year==98 
 sum if se==1 & year==99 
 sum if se==1 & year==100 
 sum if se==1 & year==101 
 sum if se==1 & year==102 
 sum if se==1 & year==103 
 sum if se==1 & year==104 
 sum if se==1 & year==105 
 sum if se==1 & year==106 
 sum if se==1 & year==107 
  
 sum if sed==1 & year==98 
 sum if sed==1 & year==99 
 sum if sed==1 & year==100 
 sum if sed==1 & year==101 
 sum if sed==1 & year==102 
 sum if sed==1 & year==103 
 sum if sed==1 & year==104 
 sum if sed==1 & year==105 
 sum if sed==1 & year==106 
 sum if sed==1 & year==107 
 
 sum if oe==1 & year==98 
 sum if oe==1 & year==99 
 sum if oe==1 & year==100 
 sum if oe==1 & year==101 
 sum if oe==1 & year==102 
 sum if oe==1 & year==103 
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 sum if oe==1 & year==104 
 sum if oe==1 & year==105 
 sum if oe==1 & year==106 
 sum if oe==1 & year==107 
  
 sum if oed==1 & year==98 
 sum if oed==1 & year==99 
 sum if oed==1 & year==100 
 sum if oed==1 & year==101 
 sum if oed==1 & year==102 
 sum if oed==1 & year==103 
 sum if oed==1 & year==104 
 sum if oed==1 & year==105 
 sum if oed==1 & year==106 
 sum if oed==1 & year==107 
 
 sum if te==ted 
 sum if ae==aed 
 sum if se==sed 
 sum if oe==oed 
 
sum if te~=ted 
 sum if ae~=aed 
 sum if se~=sed 
 sum if oe~=oed 
 
 sum if bdebt==0 
 sum if bdebt~=0 & bdebt<50000 
 sum if bdebt>50000 & bdebt<100000 
 sum if bdebt>100000 & bdebt<250000 
 sum if bdebt>250000 & bdebt<500000 
 sum if  bdebt>500000 
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--First essay Panel data Tobits and Tobit test statistics--- 
 
 xttobit ti powna offi v468 plivdi pcwki m55age  tdta  rnfiac  ppasta year1  year2 year3 year4 year5 
year6 year7 year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
xttobit ai powna offi v468 plivdi pcwki m55age  tdta  rnfiac  ppasta year1  year2 year3 year4 year5 
year6 year7 year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
xttobit si powna offi v468 plivdi pcwki m55age  tdta  rnfiac  ppasta year1  year2 year3 year4 year5 
year6 year7 year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit oi powna offi v468 plivdi pcwki m55age  tdta  rnfiac  ppasta year1  year2 year3 year4 
year5 year6 year7 year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
 
 xttobit ti rnfi  ppasta offi tdta m55age  v468  pcropi year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 , ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit ai rnfi  ppasta offi tdta m55age  v468  pcropi year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 , ll(0)  tobit 
 xttobit si rnfi  ppasta offi tdta m55age  v468  pcropi year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit oi rnfi  ppasta offi tdta m55age  v468  pcropi year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9, ll(0) tobit 
year7 year8 year9   
--Second essay Panel data Tobits and Tobit test statistics-- 
 xttobit tincons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit ticons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit aincons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit aicons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit sincons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit sicons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
xttobit oincons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 xttobit oicons livdincp cropincp cwincp tdta cdca rnfiac offipg roa bassets year, ll(0) tobit 
 
. ttesti 4560 .93 .12 4560 .86 .17 
 ttesti 4560 .83 .12 4560 .75  .15 
 ttesti 4560 .91 .13 4560 .84  .16 
 ttesti 4560 .69 .18 4560 .57  .20 
….. 
 
.estat hettest, rhs 
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Appendix C - Marginal Effects and Elasticities Corresponding to 
the Inefficiency Basic DEA Models (Section 5.3) 
C.1 Stata Description of Marginal Effects and Elasticity Calculations 
Stata numerically calculates the marginal effects or the elasticities and their standard 
errors after estimation.  Exactly what mfx can calculate is determined by the previous estimation 
command and the predict (predict_option) option (next section on panel Tobit models is below).  
By default, mfx calculates the marginal effects or elasticities at the means of the independent 
variables. Some disciplines use the term partial effects, rather than marginal effects, for what is 
computed by mfx. The option varlist (varlist) specifies the variables for which to calculate 
marginal effects (elasticities).  The default is all variables. The way of calculating marginal 
effects is: 1. dydx specifies that marginal effects be calculated. This is the default. 2. eyex 
specifies that elasticities be calculated in the form of d(lny)/d(lnx). 3. dyex specifies that 
elasticities be calculated in the form of d(y)/d(lnx). eydx specifies that elasticities be calculated 
in the form of d(lny)/d(x). The option nodiscrete treats dummy variables as continuous.  If 
nodiscrete is not specified, the marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete 
change in y as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.  This option is irrelevant to the 
computation of the elasticities because all the dummy variables are treated as continuous when 
computing elasticities (www.stata.com). Marginal effect computation for panel tobit models, 
commands xtintreg and xttobit are: 
1. The marginal effects for the probability of being uncensored are: mfx compute, 
predict(pr0(a, b)), where a is the lower limit for left censoring and b is the upper limit for 
right censoring.  
2. The marginal effects for the expected value of y conditional on being uncensored are  
mfx compute, predict(e0(a, b)), where a is the lower limit for left censoring and b is the 
upper limit for right censoring. 
3. The marginal effects for the unconditional expected value of y are: mfx compute, 
predict(ys(a, b)), where a is the lower limit for left censoring and b is the upper limit for 
right censoring. 
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C.2 Tables of Marginal Effects and Elasticities 
C. Panel data Tobit for Basic DEA Technical Inefficiencies, followed by a report of their 
marginal effects according to option 1, 2, and 2, respectively.   
 
Table C.1 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being 
Uncensored 
Y = Pr (0<ti<0.69 (predict pr0(0, 0.69)) = 0.4762 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.0048 0.0003 -16.5000 0.0000 33.4187 -0.3403 
POWNA -0.1401 0.0541 -2.5900 0.0100 0.4469 -0.1315 
OFFI 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3600 0.1740 9877.9900 -0.0189 
V468 0.2024 0.0918 2.2100 0.0270 0.7872 0.3345 
PLIVDI 0.0228 0.0650 0.3500 0.7250 0.3225 0.0155 
PCWKI -1.7530 0.3367 -5.2100 0.0000 0.0157 -0.0578 
M55AGE -0.0103 0.0027 -3.8300 0.0000 64.5455 -1.3995 
TDTA -0.2246 0.0709 -3.1700 0.0020 0.2226 -0.1050 
PPASTA -0.0128 0.0746 -0.1700 0.8630 0.3292 -0.0089 
YEAR1* -0.3143 0.0292 -10.7600 0.0000 0.0750 -0.0495 
YEAR2* -0.2369 0.0321 -7.3900 0.0000 0.0792 -0.0394 
YEAR3* -0.2190 0.0313 -6.9900 0.0000 0.0835 -0.0384 
YEAR4* -0.3032 0.0272 -11.1400 0.0000 0.0882 -0.0562 
YEAR5* -0.2466 0.0285 -8.6500 0.0000 0.0954 -0.0494 
YEAR6* -0.1147 0.0301 -3.8100 0.0000 0.1044 -0.0251 
YEAR7* -0.1916 0.0285 -6.7200 0.0000 0.1086 -0.0437 
YEAR8* -0.2499 0.0265 -9.4400 0.0000 0.1134 -0.0595 
YEAR9* -0.3025 0.0250 -12.1000 0.0000 0.1214 -0.0771 
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Table C.2 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional 
on being Uncensored 
Y = Pr (ti0<oi<0.69 (predict e(0, 0.69) = 0.1711 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. Z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.0009 0.0001 -17.1900 0.0000 33.4187 -0.1805 
POWNA -0.0267 0.0103 -2.5900 0.0100 0.4469 -0.0697 
OFFI 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3600 0.1730 9877.9900 -0.0100 
V468 0.0386 0.0175 2.2100 0.0270 0.7872 0.1774 
PLIVDI 0.0044 0.0124 0.3500 0.7260 0.3225 0.0082 
PCWKI -0.3340 0.0629 -5.3100 0.0000 0.0157 -0.0307 
M55AGE -0.0020 0.0005 -3.9200 0.0000 64.5455 -0.7423 
TDTA -0.0428 0.0134 -3.1900 0.0010 0.2226 -0.0557 
PPASTA -0.0024 0.0142 -0.1700 0.8630 0.3292 -0.0047 
YEAR1* -0.0548 0.0050 -10.9000 0.0000 0.0750 -0.0240 
YEAR2* -0.0416 0.0053 -7.7800 0.0000 0.0792 -0.0192 
YEAR3* -0.0385 0.0052 -7.3900 0.0000 0.0835 -0.0188 
YEAR4* -0.0530 0.0046 -11.4200 0.0000 0.0882 -0.0273 
YEAR5* -0.0433 0.0048 -9.0900 0.0000 0.0954 -0.0241 
YEAR6* -0.0208 0.0052 -3.9900 0.0000 0.1044 -0.0127 
YEAR7* -0.0341 0.0048 -7.0900 0.0000 0.1086 -0.0216 
YEAR8* -0.0440 0.0045 -9.8600 0.0000 0.1134 -0.0292 
YEAR9* -0.0532 0.0043 -12.3800 0.0000 0.1214 -0.0377 
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Table C.3 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent 
Variable 
Y = E (ti*0<ti<0.69 (predict ys(0, 0.69)) = 0.0820 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.0013 0.0001 -15.7500 0.0000 33.4187 -0.5264 
POWNA -0.0373 0.0145 -2.5800 0.0100 0.4469 -0.2033 
OFFI 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3600 0.1730 9877.9900 -0.0293 
V468 0.0539 0.0245 2.2000 0.0280 0.7872 0.5175 
PLIVDI 0.0061 0.0173 0.3500 0.7260 0.3225 0.0239 
PCWKI -0.4669 0.0882 -5.2900 0.0000 0.0157 -0.0895 
M55AGE -0.0028 0.0007 -3.9300 0.0000 64.5455 -2.1649 
TDTA -0.0598 0.0188 -3.1800 0.0010 0.2226 -0.1624 
PPASTA -0.0034 0.0199 -0.1700 0.8630 0.3292 -0.0137 
YEAR1* -0.0663 0.0054 -12.3400 0.0000 0.0750 -0.0606 
YEAR2* -0.0528 0.0061 -8.6300 0.0000 0.0792 -0.0510 
YEAR3* -0.0495 0.0061 -8.1000 0.0000 0.0835 -0.0504 
YEAR4* -0.0650 0.0052 -12.5300 0.0000 0.0882 -0.0699 
YEAR5* -0.0550 0.0056 -9.8900 0.0000 0.0954 -0.0640 
YEAR6* -0.0280 0.0068 -4.1600 0.0000 0.1044 -0.0357 
YEAR7* -0.0445 0.0059 -7.5500 0.0000 0.1086 -0.0590 
YEAR8* -0.0561 0.0054 -10.4900 0.0000 0.1134 -0.0776 
YEAR9* -0.0662 0.0051 -12.9500 0.0000 0.1214 -0.0980 
  
 183
D. Panel data Tobit for Basic DEA Allocative Inefficiencies, followed by a report of their 
marginal effects according to option 1, 2, and 3, respectively.   
 
Table C.4 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being 
Uncensored 
Y = Pr(0<ai<0.8296788) (predict pr0(0, 0.8296788)) = 0.9414 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. Z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00138 0.00013 -11 0 33.4187 -0.0491 
POWNA 0.008777 0.01554 0.56 0.572 0.446888 0.0042 
OFFI -1.49E-07 0 -0.78 0.434 9877.99 -0.0016 
V468 0.072425 0.0247 2.93 0.003 0.787249 0.0606 
PLIVDI 0.03499 0.01768 1.98 0.048 0.322472 0.0120 
PCWKI -0.46809 0.08417 -5.56 0 0.015712 -0.0078 
M55AGE -0.00123 0.00076 -1.61 0.107 64.5455 -0.0841 
TDTA -0.05106 0.01978 -2.58 0.01 0.222642 -0.0121 
PPASTA -0.02151 0.02062 -1.04 0.297 0.329245 -0.0075 
YEAR1* -0.20333 0.03135 -6.49 0 0.074953 -0.0162 
YEAR2* -0.12777 0.02434 -5.25 0 0.079222 -0.0108 
YEAR3* -0.14239 0.02453 -5.8 0 0.083491 -0.0126 
YEAR4* -0.22452 0.02906 -7.73 0 0.088235 -0.0210 
YEAR5* -0.09674 0.01927 -5.02 0 0.095351 -0.0098 
YEAR6* -0.12446 0.02029 -6.14 0 0.104364 -0.0138 
YEAR7* -0.18379 0.02347 -7.83 0 0.108634 -0.0212 
YEAR8* -0.15097 0.02106 -7.17 0 0.113378 -0.0182 
YEAR9* -0.19278 0.02275 -8.47 0 0.121442 -0.0249 
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Table C.5 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional 
on being Uncensored 
Y = E(ai0<ai<0.8296788) (predict e0(0, 0.8296788)) = 0.2151 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00119 0.00006 -20.71 0 33.4187 -0.1848 
POWNA 0.007539 0.01332 0.57 0.571 0.446888 0.0157 
OFFI -1.28E-07 0 -0.78 0.434 9877.99 -0.0059 
V468 0.062215 0.02078 2.99 0.003 0.787249 0.2277 
PLIVDI 0.030057 0.01503 2 0.046 0.322472 0.0451 
PCWKI -0.40211 0.06679 -6.02 0 0.015712 -0.0294 
M55AGE -0.00105 0.00063 -1.66 0.097 64.5455 -0.3162 
TDTA -0.04386 0.01668 -2.63 0.009 0.222642 -0.0454 
PPASTA -0.01848 0.01764 -1.05 0.295 0.329245 -0.0283 
YEAR1* -0.08364 0.00668 -12.52 0 0.074953 -0.0291 
YEAR2* -0.06364 0.00711 -8.95 0 0.079222 -0.0234 
YEAR3* -0.06835 0.00671 -10.19 0 0.083491 -0.0265 
YEAR4* -0.08959 0.00593 -15.12 0 0.088235 -0.0368 
YEAR5* -0.05366 0.00679 -7.9 0 0.095351 -0.04035 
YEAR6* -0.06391 0.0062 -10.31 0 0.104364 -0.05176 
YEAR7* -0.08161 0.00566 -14.41 0 0.108634 -0.07051 
YEAR8* -0.0728 0.00583 -12.49 0 0.113378 -0.06137 
YEAR9* -0.08504 0.00552 -15.4 0 0.121442 -0.07421 
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Table C.6 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent 
Variable 
Y = E(ai*<ai<0.8296788) (predict ys(0, 0.8296788)) = 0.2025 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00142 0.00006 -21.87 0 33.4187 -0.2339 
POWNA 0.008985 0.01588 0.57 0.571 0.446888 0.0198 
OFFI -1.53E-07 0 -0.78 0.434 9877.99 -0.0075 
V468 0.074145 0.02471 3 0.003 0.787249 0.2883 
PLIVDI 0.035821 0.0179 2 0.045 0.322472 0.0571 
PCWKI -0.47921 0.079 -6.07 0 0.015712 -0.0372 
M55AGE -0.00126 0.00076 -1.66 0.097 64.5455 -0.4003 
TDTA -0.05227 0.01986 -2.63 0.008 0.222642 -0.0575 
PPASTA -0.02202 0.02102 -1.05 0.295 0.329245 -0.0358 
YEAR1* -0.10765 0.0091 -11.83 0 0.074953 -0.0399 
YEAR2* -0.08038 0.00947 -8.49 0 0.079222 -0.0315 
YEAR3* -0.08664 0.00896 -9.67 0 0.083491 -0.0357 
YEAR4* -0.11555 0.00798 -14.49 0 0.088235 -0.0504 
YEAR5* -0.06701 0.00886 -7.56 0 0.095351 -0.04964 
YEAR6* -0.08042 0.00815 -9.87 0 0.104364 -0.06445 
YEAR7* -0.10415 0.00749 -13.9 0 0.108634 -0.08947 
YEAR8* -0.09216 0.00767 -12.02 0 0.113378 -0.07714 
YEAR9* -0.10853 0.00723 -15 0 0.121442 -0.09435 
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E. Panel data Tobit for Basic DEA Scale Inefficiencies, followed by a report of their 
marginal effects according to option 1, 2, and 3, respectively.   
 
Table C.7 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being 
Uncensored 
Y = Pr(0<si<0.940343) (predict pr0(0, 0.9403438)) = 0.8594 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00184 0.00014 -13.2 0 33.4187 -0.0715 
POWNA 0.095544 0.02877 3.32 0.001 0.446888 0.0497 
OFFI 1.13E-06 0 3.48 0.001 9877.99 0.0130 
V468 0.098129 0.03916 2.51 0.012 0.787249 0.0899 
PLIVDI 0.222653 0.03141 7.09 0 0.322472 0.0835 
PCWKI -0.33783 0.12452 -2.71 0.007 0.015712 -0.0062 
M55AGE 0.005349 0.00149 3.59 0 64.5455 0.4017 
TDTA -0.07146 0.03523 -2.03 0.042 0.222642 -0.0185 
PPASTA -0.0973 0.03579 -2.72 0.007 0.329245 -0.0373 
YEAR1* -0.07229 0.02458 -2.94 0.003 0.074953 -0.0063 
YEAR2* -0.01885 0.01927 -0.98 0.328 0.079222 -0.0017 
YEAR3* -0.0083 0.01734 -0.48 0.632 0.083491 -0.0008 
YEAR4* -0.14455 0.02472 -5.85 0 0.088235 -0.0148 
YEAR5* 9.09E-05 0.0152 0.01 0.995 0.095351 0.0000 
YEAR6* 0.027073 0.01248 2.17 0.03 0.104364 0.0033 
YEAR7* -0.10121 0.01888 -5.36 0 0.108634 -0.0128 
YEAR8* -0.16332 0.02096 -7.79 0 0.113378 -0.0215 
YEAR9* -0.15682 0.01989 -7.88 0 0.121442 -0.0222 
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Table C.8 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional 
on being Uncensored 
Y = E(si0<si<0.940343) (predict e0(0, 0.9403438)) = 0.1860 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00075 0.00004 -16.71 0 33.4187 -0.1343 
POWNA 0.038855 0.01153 3.37 0.001 0.446888 0.0933 
OFFI 4.60E-07 0 3.5 0 9877.99 0.0244 
V468 0.039906 0.01584 2.52 0.012 0.787249 0.1689 
PLIVDI 0.090546 0.01179 7.68 0 0.322472 0.1570 
PCWKI -0.13739 0.05038 -2.73 0.006 0.015712 -0.0116 
M55AGE 0.002175 0.00064 3.4 0.001 64.5455 0.7548 
TDTA -0.02906 0.01427 -2.04 0.042 0.222642 -0.0348 
PPASTA -0.03957 0.01439 -2.75 0.006 0.329245 -0.0700 
YEAR1* -0.02455 0.00673 -3.65 0 0.074953 -0.0099 
YEAR2* -0.00728 0.00697 -1.04 0.296 0.079222 -0.0031 
YEAR3* -0.0033 0.00669 -0.49 0.622 0.083491 -0.0015 
YEAR4* -0.04313 0.0052 -8.29 0 0.088235 -0.0205 
YEAR5* 0.000037 0.00619 0.01 0.995 0.095351 0.0000 
YEAR6* 0.011908 0.00603 1.97 0.048 0.104364 0.0067 
YEAR7* -0.03293 0.00474 -6.95 0 0.108634 -0.0192 
YEAR8* -0.04805 0.00441 -10.9 0 0.113378 -0.0293 
YEAR9* -0.04684 0.00437 -10.72 0 0.121442 -0.0306 
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Table C.9 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent 
Variable 
Y = E(si*<si<0.940343) (predict ys(0, 0.9403438)) = 0.1599 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00098 0.00005 -18.09 0 33.4187 -0.2057 
POWNA 0.051165 0.01516 3.37 0.001 0.446888 0.1430 
OFFI 6.05E-07 0 3.52 0 9877.99 0.0374 
V468 0.052549 0.02082 2.52 0.012 0.787249 0.2588 
PLIVDI 0.119233 0.01538 7.75 0 0.322472 0.2405 
PCWKI -0.18091 0.06619 -2.73 0.006 0.015712 -0.0178 
M55AGE 0.002864 0.00083 3.44 0.001 64.5455 1.1565 
TDTA -0.03827 0.01877 -2.04 0.041 0.222642 -0.0533 
PPASTA -0.0521 0.01892 -2.75 0.006 0.329245 -0.1073 
YEAR1* -0.03303 0.00927 -3.56 0 0.074953 -0.0155 
YEAR2* -0.00964 0.00931 -1.04 0.3 0.079222 -0.0048 
YEAR3* -0.00436 0.00887 -0.49 0.623 0.083491 -0.0023 
YEAR4* -0.05877 0.00726 -8.09 0 0.088235 -0.0324 
YEAR5* 4.87E-05 0.00814 0.01 0.995 0.095351 0.0000 
YEAR6* 0.015523 0.00776 2 0.045 0.104364 0.0101 
YEAR7* -0.04449 0.00652 -6.82 0 0.108634 -0.0302 
YEAR8* -0.06553 0.00606 -10.82 0 0.113378 -0.0465 
YEAR9* -0.06379 0.00597 -10.69 0 0.121442 -0.0485 
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 F. Panel data Tobit for Basic DEA Overall Inefficiencies, followed by a report of their 
marginal effects according to option 1, 2, and 3, respectively.   
 
Table C.10 Marginal Effects for the Probability of the Dependent Variable being 
Uncensored 
Y = Pr (0<oi<0.989 (predict pr0(0, 0.989839)) = 0.9958 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00022 0.00004 -5.3 0 33.4187 -0.0073 
POWNA 0.000995 0.00162 0.62 0.538 0.446888 0.0004 
OFFI 3.90E-08 0 1.9 0.058 9877.99 0.0004 
V468 0.009974 0.00304 3.28 0.001 0.787249 0.0079 
PLIVDI 0.009326 0.00258 3.61 0 0.322472 0.0030 
PCWKI -0.06233 0.01348 -4.62 0 0.015712 -0.0010 
M55AGE 5.53E-05 0.00008 0.72 0.472 64.5455 0.0036 
TDTA -0.01018 0.00274 -3.72 0 0.222642 -0.0023 
PPASTA -0.0056 0.00238 -2.35 0.019 0.329245 -0.0019 
YEAR1* -0.05272 0.01189 -4.43 0 0.074953 -0.0040 
YEAR2* -0.02221 0.00607 -3.66 0 0.079222 -0.0018 
YEAR3* -0.01985 0.00537 -3.7 0 0.083491 -0.0017 
YEAR4* -0.08377 0.01494 -5.61 0 0.088235 -0.0074 
YEAR5* -0.01745 0.0046 -3.79 0 0.095351 -0.0017 
YEAR6* -0.00883 0.0027 -3.27 0.001 0.104364 -0.0009 
YEAR7* -0.04352 0.00838 -5.2 0 0.108634 -0.0047 
YEAR8* -0.05721 0.01004 -5.7 0 0.113378 -0.0065 
YEAR9* -0.073 0.01155 -6.32 0 0.121442 -0.0089 
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Table C.11 Marginal Effects for the Expected Value of the Dependent Variable Conditional 
on being Uncensored 
Y = Pr (oi0<oi<0.989 (predict e(0, 0.989839)) = 0.3888 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00254 0.00007 -34.82 0 33.4187 -0.2186 
POWNA 0.011645 0.01869 0.62 0.533 0.446888 0.0134 
OFFI 4.56E-07 0 2.02 0.043 9877.99 0.0116 
V468 0.116668 0.0282 4.14 0 0.787249 0.2362 
PLIVDI 0.109098 0.02069 5.27 0 0.322472 0.0905 
PCWKI -0.7291 0.0904 -8.07 0 0.015712 -0.0295 
M55AGE 0.000647 0.00091 0.71 0.478 64.5455 0.1074 
TDTA -0.11903 0.02329 -5.11 0 0.222642 -0.0682 
PPASTA -0.06547 0.02448 -2.67 0.007 0.329245 -0.0554 
YEAR1* -0.15045 0.01083 -13.89 0 0.074953 -0.0290 
YEAR2* -0.10277 0.01127 -9.12 0 0.079222 -0.0209 
YEAR3* -0.09744 0.01086 -8.97 0 0.083491 -0.0209 
YEAR4* -0.18155 0.00907 -20.02 0 0.088235 -0.0412 
YEAR5* -0.09204 0.01032 -8.92 0 0.095351 -0.07182 
YEAR6* -0.06193 0.00999 -6.2 0 0.104364 -0.04235 
YEAR7* -0.14429 0.00876 -16.47 0 0.108634 -0.12712 
YEAR8* -0.16212 0.00846 -19.16 0 0.113378 -0.14554 
YEAR9* -0.17957 0.00811 -22.15 0 0.121442 -0.16368 
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Table C.12 Marginal Effects for the Unconditional Expected Value of the Dependent 
Variable 
Y = E (oi*0<oi<0.989 (predict ys(0, 0.989839)) = 0.3872 
Variable dy/dx Std. Dev. z P>z X Elasticities 
RNFIAC -0.00262 0.00007 -35.62 0 33.4187 -0.2260 
POWNA 0.01199 0.01925 0.62 0.533 0.446888 0.0138 
OFFI 4.70E-07 0 2.02 0.043 9877.99 0.0120 
V468 0.12013 0.02903 4.14 0 0.787249 0.2442 
PLIVDI 0.112335 0.02134 5.26 0 0.322472 0.0936 
PCWKI -0.75073 0.09268 -8.1 0 0.015712 -0.0305 
M55AGE 0.000667 0.00094 0.71 0.478 64.5455 0.1111 
TDTA -0.12256 0.02396 -5.11 0 0.222642 -0.0705 
PPASTA -0.06742 0.02522 -2.67 0.008 0.329245 -0.0573 
YEAR1* -0.16319 0.0127 -12.85 0 0.074953 -0.0316 
YEAR2* -0.10898 0.01249 -8.72 0 0.079222 -0.0223 
YEAR3* -0.10307 0.01195 -8.62 0 0.083491 -0.0222 
YEAR4* -0.19989 0.0109 -18.33 0 0.088235 -0.0456 
YEAR5* -0.09708 0.01125 -8.63 0 0.095351 -0.0239 
YEAR6* -0.06468 0.01063 -6.08 0 0.104364 -0.0174 
YEAR7* -0.15526 0.00998 -15.55 0 0.108634 -0.0436 
YEAR8* -0.17581 0.00976 -18.02 0 0.113378 -0.0515 
YEAR9* -0.19616 0.00939 -20.88 0 0.121442 -0.0615 
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Appendix D - Effects of Total Debt on Technical Inefficiency  
This section is a preliminary and exploratory study to characterize the main factors which 
affect technical inefficiency when the level of farm debt was accounted for as a non-
discretionary factor to account for capital availability as a farm input; in this way, direct effect of 
the level of farms debt on efficiencies was measured. The efficiencies under study correspond to 
the farm efficiencies scores obtained through the non-discretionary or debt-constrained DEA 
model. The farm efficiencies in these models were calculated as in the same way the basic DEA 
model for the seven discretionary inputs; however, this model is modified by adding the 
constraint that the farms were compared only to corresponding farms with the same or less level 
of debt. The resulting debt-constrained model rendered farms efficiencies which were compared 
not only in terms of the discretionary inputs, but also in terms of their level of debt.  
Technical, allocative, scale and overall efficiencies and inefficiencies for the sample 
farms were described in Section 5.2. In this section, a comparison between farm efficiencies 
scores before and after adjusting for farms’ debt levels was also detailed.  
According to the comparison of results in the just mentioned section (Table 5.4), it was 
noted that the difference farms efficiency scores differed according to the efficiency under study. 
Regarding technical and overall efficiency scores, the difference between them across models 
was zero or positive. Thus, if the difference was zero; it implied that the level of debt had no 
impact the efficiency of these farms. If the difference was more than zero; this suggested that the 
level of debt for these farms was positively influencing the farms efficiency scores. However, 
regarding allocative and scale efficiency scores and the difference between them across models, 
an additional alternative was found. A small percentage of the farms had a difference of scores 
for these efficiencies that was negative, meaning that for these farms, the level of debt had 
impacted their efficiencies but in a negative way. Thus, differential scores between the basic 
model and the debt-constrained model were zero or positive for the technical and overall 
efficiency of sampled farms. However, the differential scores were zero, positive or negative for 
allocative and scale efficiency of the sampled farms. In Appendix E, summary statistics for farms 
under these categories and their efficiency were reported. In total, there are 4 summary statistics 
for non-debt-constrained farms by efficiency, 4 summary statistics for positively constrained 
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debt farms by efficiency, and 2 summary statistics for negatively constrained debt farms 
corresponding to allocative and scale efficiency of the farms. 
In order to characterize farms that are debt-constrained from those that are not, further 
analysis was pursued. Based on the results of the previous farms statistics on the technical 
efficiency of the farms and the impact of the variables on each of them, the debt-constrained 
efficiency scores are divided into two groups: farms whose technical efficiency scores were not 
constrained (i.e. the level of debt did not impact the efficiency of these farms), and farms whose 
technical efficiency scores were constrained and adjusted for their level of debt (i.e. the level of 
debt did impact the efficiency of the farms). In the latter case, the efficiency scores derived from 
the basic model are different than the efficiency scores derived from the debt-constrained model. 
These two subsets of farms from the debt-constrained model, and the pooled sample of all farms 
(i.e. the scores of the debt-constrained model) were regressed against a vector of socio-economic 
characteristics using Panel data Tobit models to elicit the causes of inefficiencies in light of 
farms’ capital availability. The following step consisted on comparing the coefficient estimates 
of the three Panel Tobit models to report differences, if any, of the impact of the selected farm 
characteristics. The econometric estimation of these models was a preliminary study since these 
models do not account for a possible sampling selection bias as the same sample is divided into 
two groups. 
Table D.1 and Table D.2 provide a definition and summary statistics, respectively, of the 
variables used in these Panel Tobit models. Technical efficiencies and inefficiencies from the 
basic and the debt-constrained model are also reported. Additionally, summary statistics on the 
farm efficiencies in the debt-constrained model versus the non-constrained farms efficiencies are 
also listed. The factors considered to investigate which farms are prone to be debt-constrained 
and which may not where: 1. Farms output specialization: LIVDINCP, CROPINCP, CWINCP; 
2. Financial ratios: TDTA, CDCA, ROA, BASSETS; 3. Other farm characteristics: RNFIAC, 
OFFIPG, and a time trend, YEAR.  
  
 194
Table D.1 Definitions for Variables used in Debt-Constrained and Panel Tobit Models 
Variable Definition 
AI Allocative Inefficiency, Basic Model 
AICONS Allocative Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
AID Allocative Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
AINCONS Allocative Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
BASSETS Total Annual Assets 
CDCA Ratio of Short-term Debt to Short-term Assets 
CROPINCP Income from Crop operations per Gross Farm Income 
CWINCP Income from Custom Work Operations per Gross Farm Income 
LIVDINCP Income from Livestock Operations per Gross Farm Income 
OI Overall Inefficiency, Basic Model 
OICONS Overall Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
OID Overall Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
OINCONS Overall Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
OFFIPG Off-farm Income per Gross Farm Income 
RNFIAC Gross Farm Income per Acre 
ROA Return on Assets, Ratio of Interest Cost plus Net Farm Income Divided by Total 
Assets 
SI Scale Inefficiency, Basic Model 
SICONS Scale Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
SID Scale Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
SINCONS Scale Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
TDTA Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets 
TI Technical Inefficiency, Basic Model 
TICONS Technical Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
TID Technical Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
TINCONS Technical Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
YEAR Year from 88 to 107, 1988-2007 
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Table D.2 Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Debt-Constrained and Panel Tobit 
Models 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. 
BASSETS $ 1,010,649 790,855 
CDCA % 0.74 4.13 
CROPINCP % 0.53 0.26 
CWINCP % 0.01 0.03 
LIVDINCP % 0.28 0.29 
MFIAC $ 33 79 
OFFIPG % 0.10 0.21 
ROA % 0.10 0.09 
TDTA % 0.28 0.23 
TI # 0.10 0.14 
TICONS # 0.20 0.12 
TID # 0.08 0.13 
TINCONS # 0.08 0.13 
YEAR # 
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In this dissertation, the interest is to focus on technical efficiency and the impact of 
farms’ debt levels on it; thus, in this section results to address this question are the goal and are 
the ones that are reported and compared. Table D.3 through Table D.6 report Tobit results where 
only the dependent variable varied: technical efficiency scores of constrained farms, technical 
efficiency scores of non-constrained farms, and technical efficiency scores of all farms in the 
sample (i.e. 456). Table D.3 reports the coefficients of the selected farm characteristics in the 
technical inefficiency of farms that were debt constrained. All coefficients are significant expect 
for BASSETS and ROA. All output measures decreased technical inefficiency, as expected. The 
largest coefficient, indicating a larger impact, was CWINCP. Indeed, TDTA, the ratio of total 
debt-to assets decreased technical inefficiency, but by a smaller magnitude. The positive 
influence of the long term leverage ratio on technical efficiency was supported by studies such as 
Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), Lambert and Bayda (2005), Davidova and Latruffe (2007). The 
effect was even smaller, but of the same sign (i.e. reducing technical inefficiency) for the 
variables RNFIAC and OFFIPG; indicating that larger farms are more technical efficient (even 
when constrained by their current/fixed level of debt), and that off-farm income could reduced 
technical inefficiencies, probably because of the extra money provided to the household. Over 
the years, the time trend indicated that technical inefficiency increased, this fact was not 
expected. Interestingly, the ratio of current debt-to current assets increased technical efficiency. 
Bayda (2003) reported not significant effects by this variable, and Featherstone and Al-
Kheraiji(1995), Handley et al. (2001), Lambert and Bayda (2005), and Davidova and Latruffe 
(2007) reported a negative effect of short-term debt in technical efficiency.  
The results for Technical Inefficiency model for the Non-Debt constrained farms in the 
Debt-constrained model is reported in Table D.4. All the variables in the model are significant 
except for CDCA. The results for the specialization variables was much smaller in magnitude in 
the preceding model when farms where debt-constrained. However, the sign and significance for 
all the specialization variables were the same in both models. Similarly, RNFIAC and OFFIPG 
decreased technical inefficiency. ROA and BASSETS both decreased technical inefficiency in 
this model. The magnitude of the coefficient of ROA is the highest in this model, indicating that 
it had the most impact on technical inefficiency scores. YEAR had a similar impact, and sign in  
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Table D.3 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.29** 0.13 -2.29 0.022 
LIVDINCP -0.33* 0.03 -12.27 0 
CROPINCP -0.35* 0.03 -11.95 0 
CWINCP -0.70* 0.18 -3.97 0 
TDTA -0.09* 0.04 -2.63 0.009 
CDCA 3.79E-
03*** 
0 1.79 0.074 
RNFIAC -1.28E-03* 0 -7.43 0 
OFFIPG -0.08* 0.02 -3.43 0.001 
ROA -0.10 0.08 -1.28 0.202 
BASSETS -5.19E-09 0 -0.6 0.546 
YEAR 0.01* 0 6.21 0 
N 878      
Log Likelihood Function 756.12*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          321.29      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 66.71*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level,** at α = 0.05 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table D.4 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, 
Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.86* 0.14 -6.37 0 
LIVDINCP -0.68* 0.04 -19.35 0 
CROPINCP -0.63* 0.03 -18.63 0 
CWINCP -2.31* 0.20 -11.81 0 
TDTA 0.23* 0.03 8.47 0 
CDCA -1.34E-03 0 -0.64 0.522 
RNFIAC -7.74E-05*** 0 -1.63 0.103 
OFFIPG -0.08* 0.03 -2.68 0.007 
ROA -1.15* 0.06 -18.62 0 
BASSETS -1.76E-08** 0 -2.06 0.039 
YEAR 0.01* 0 10.12 0 
N 3680      
Log Likelihood Function -615.69*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          889.02      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 795.67*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level, ** at α = 0.05 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table D.5 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency for Basic Model, Panel Tobit Model 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.44* 0.10 -4.34 0 
LIVDINCP -0.57* 0.03 -20.85 0 
CROPINCP -0.56* 0.03 -21.72 0 
CWINCP -1.75 0.15 -11.99 0.238 
TDTA -0.03 0.02 -1.18 0.896 
CDCA -1.36E-04* 0 -0.13 0 
RNFIAC -1.67E-04* 0 -4.05 0.001 
OFFIPG -0.08* 0.02 -3.4 0 
ROA -1.02* 0.05 -21.77 0 
BASSETS -3.28E-08* 0 -4.29 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 10.12 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function -458.49*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1204.01      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1226.47*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level 
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Table D.6 Relationship between Technical Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.51* 0.11 -4.62 0 
LIVDINCP -0.63* 0.03 -21.12 0 
CROPINCP -0.60* 0.03 -21.18 0 
CWINCP -1.94* 0.16 -12.07 0 
TDTA 0.13* 0.02 5.7 0 
CDCA -2.33E-04 0 -0.21 0.833 
RNFIAC -1.38E-04* 0 -2.8 0.005 
OFFIPG -0.08* 0.03 -3.23 0.001 
ROA -1.02* 0.05 -19.67 0 
BASSETS -2.72E-08* 0 -3.53 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 9.49 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function -660.09*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1075.75      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1095*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level 
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this model as in the preceding one, indicating that in the case of non-debt constrained farms, 
technical inefficiency over the years was increasing. There are only two, put important 
differences between coefficients in these two models, the debt constrained farms in their level of 
technical inefficiency and the non-debt constrained farms model. The TDTA coefficient indicate 
that higher levels of TDTA increased the technical inefficiency of the farms. This finding did not 
coincide with the ones obtained in the technical inefficiency for the basic model; and it disagreed 
with the findings in the model for technical inefficiency for debt-constrained farms. The CDCA 
variable was insignificant in this model, implying that leverage does not impact farm production. 
Results for the Technical Inefficiency Panel Tobit for all farms in the Debt-constrained 
model are reported in Table D.6. All variables were statistically significant except for CDCA. 
All variables decreased technical inefficiency scores except for the trend YEAR and the TDTA 
ratio. Both of these variables showed that an increase in them would increase the level of 
technical inefficiency.  
In terms of sign and significance, the coefficients estimated in model reproduced in Table 
D.3, Table D.4 and Table D.6 were similar. Models in Table D.4 and in Table D.6 for the non-
constrained debt farms and the pooled sample are the most similar: all variables are significant 
and when they increase their levels, the level of technical efficiency decreases; except for the 
trend variable and the leverage (TDTA) ratio, which both increased technical inefficiency scores 
as they increase. In both models CDCA was insignificant. The magnitude of the impact of the 
variables was similar in both models. The coefficients for CWINCP and RNFIAC were 
statistically smaller in the pooled model when compared to corresponding coefficients in the 
non-debt constrained farms model. Only the impact of TDTA was statistically smaller in the 
pooled model. A similar comparison between models in Table D.4 and Table D.3 suggest that, 
contrary to the preceding comparison, the coefficients for most of the variables in the pooled 
model were statistically larger than the ones reported in the farms’ debt-constrained sample. 
Results of the comparison of models with the three sub-set of technical efficiencies 
showed that coefficients for the selected variables were mostly significant and the same sign in 
the three models, however, the magnitude differed between them. In general, highest coefficients 
corresponded to the non debt-constrained farms, followed by the pooled sample farms; and the 
smallest variable impacts were reported in the debt-constrained farms model. Interestingly, the 
leverage ratio had a different sign for debt-constrained farms model and the other two models.  
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 Table D.5 reports the results of the technical inefficiencies for the basic Panel Tobit 
model. In this model, the coefficients for CWINCP and TDTA are insignificant. The sign and 
significance of the coefficients in this model as compared to those in Table D.5 for the technical 
inefficiencies for the pooled Debt-constrained Panel Tobit were similar. However, TDTA was 
insignificant in the pooled debt-constrained efficiency model, whereas it was significant and 
positive for technical inefficiency in the basic technical inefficiency model. Thus, further 
conclusion can be reached on the characteristics of farms that are impacted by the of liquidity 
variable.  
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Table D.7 Definition of Variables used in Essay Two Tobit Models 
Variable Definition 
AI Allocative Inefficiency, Basic Model 
AICONS Allocative Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
AID Allocative Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
AINCONS Allocative Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
BASSETS Total Annual Assets 
CDCA Ratio of Short-term Debt to Short-term Assets 
CROPINCP Income from Crop operations per Gross Farm Income 
CWINCP Income from Custom Work Operations per Gross Farm Income 
LIVDINCP Income from Livestock Operations per Gross Farm Income 
OE Overall Inefficiency, Basic Model 
OECONS Overall Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
OED Overall Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
OENCONS Overall Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
OFFIPG Off-farm Income per Gross Farm Income 
RNFIAC Gross Farm Income per Acre 
ROA Return on Assets, Ratio of Interest Cost + Net Farm Income / Total Assets 
SI Scale Inefficiency, Basic Model 
SICONS Scale Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
SID Scale Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
SINCONS Scale Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
TDTA Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets 
TI Technical Inefficiency, Basic Model 
TICONS Technical Inefficiency for Farms Constrained by Debt Levels 
TID Technical Inefficiency, Debt-Constrained Model 
TINCONS Technical Inefficiency for Farms Non-Constrained by Debt Levels 
YEAR Year from 88 to 107, 1988-2007 
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Table D.8 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, 
Panel Tobit Model 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.26* 0.09 -2.8 0.005 
LIVDINCP -0.24* 0.02 -10.34 0 
CROPINCP -0.24* 0.02 -10.79 0 
CWINCP -1.24* 0.11 -11.62 0 
TDTA 0.09* 0.02 4.82 0 
CDCA 4.73E-04 0 0.94 0.345 
RNFIAC -2E-04* 0 -5.38 0 
OFFIPG -0.04* 0.02 -2.71 0.007 
ROA -0.68* 0.04 -16.48 0 
BASSETS -1.64E-08 0 -2.9 0.004 
YEAR 0.01* 0 7.23 0 
N 2506      
Log Likelihood Function 924.33*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          662.93      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 365.78*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level 
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Table D.9 Relationship Between Allocative Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Model 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.19* 0.08 -2.49 0.013 
LIVDINCP -0.19* 0.02 -10.81 0 
CROPINCP -0.19* 0.02 -10.3 0 
CWINCP -0.56* 0.10 -5.92 0 
TDTA -0.04* 0.02 -1.91 0.056 
CDCA -3.82E-03* 0 -2.77 0.006 
RNFIAC -9.7E-04* 0 -11.53 0 
OFFIPG -0.02 0.02 -1.42 0.155 
ROA -0.05 0.04 -1.31 0.191 
BASSETS 2.49E-08* 0 4.69 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 7.43 0 
N 2052      
Log Likelihood Function 1895.67*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          475.06      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 233.22*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level 
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Table D.10 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.08 0.06 -1.31 0.19 
LIVDINCP -0.21* 0.02 -13.04 0 
CROPINCP -0.21* 0.01 -13.82 0 
CWINCP -0.98* 0.07 -13.32 0 
TDTA -0.02*** 0.01 -1.69 0.09 
CDCA -7.69E-07 0 0 0.999 
RNFIAC -2.4E-04* 0 -9.03 0 
OFFIPG -0.03* 0.01 -2.58 0.01 
ROA -0.47* 0.03 -18.14 0 
BASSETS -1.17E-08* 0 -2.72 0.006 
YEAR 0.01* 0 8.36 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 2593.18*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1002.55      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 832.34*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table D.11 Relationship between Allocative Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT -0.22* 0.07 -3.29 0.001 
LIVDINCP -0.25* 0.02 -14.25 0 
CROPINCP -0.27* 0.02 -16.12 0 
CWINCP -1.21* 0.08 -14.52 0 
TDTA 0.09* 0.01 6.47 0 
CDCA 3.56E-05 0 0.08 0.94 
RNFIAC -2.2E-04* 0 -7.76 0 
OFFIPG -0.03*** 0.01 -1.88 0.06 
ROA -0.58* 0.03 -19.92 0 
BASSETS -1.83E-08* 0 -3.84 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 9.56 0 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 1818.84*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1129.91      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 793.44*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table D.12 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, 
Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.36* 0.07 4.99 0 
LIVDINCP -0.18* 0.02 -9.34 0 
CROPINCP -0.24* 0.02 -14.38 0 
CWINCP -0.74* 0.09 -8.34 0 
TDTA -0.02 0.02 -0.99 0.322 
CDCA 2.24E-04 0 0.57 0.571 
RNFIAC -3.4E-05 0 -1.55 0.122 
OFFIPG 0.18* 0.01 13.66 0 
ROA -0.44* 0.03 -13.54 0 
BASSETS -2.47E-08* 0 -4.66 0 
YEAR -4.5E-05 0 -0.06 0.951 
N 2314      
Log Likelihood Function 1710.24*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          825.24      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 747.01*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level  
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Table D.13 Relationship between Farms Scale Inefficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, 
Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.18* 0.07 2.66 0.008 
LIVDINCP -0.09* 0.02 -5.13 0 
CROPINCP -0.18* 0.02 -10.79 0 
CWINCP -0.30* 0.08 -3.51 0 
TDTA -0.12* 0.02 -6.18 0 
CDCA 1.49E-03 0 1.63 0.103 
RNFIAC -5.3E-04* 0 -7.07 0 
OFFIPG 0.16* 0.02 10.26 0 
ROA -0.09 0.03 -2.59 0.009 
BASSETS -3.51E-08* 0 -5.88 0 
YEAR 1.38E-03** 0 1.98 0.047 
N 2244      
Log Likelihood Function 2139.96*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          567.94      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 978.05*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and ** at α = 0.05 
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Table D.14 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.35* 0.05 7.12 0.00 
LIVDINCP -0.13* 0.01 -9.47 0.00 
CROPINCP -0.22* 0.01 -18.01 0.00 
CWINCP -0.52* 0.06 -8.53 0.00 
TDTA -0.06* 0.01 -4.59 0.00 
CDCA 5.18E-04 0 1.48 0.14 
RNFIAC -8.7E-05* 0 -4.14 0.00 
OFFIPG 0.17* 0.01 16.29 0.00 
ROA -0.31* 0.02 -14.82 0.00 
BASSETS -2.63E-08* 0 -6.19 0.00 
YEAR -1.0E-04 0 -0.21 0.84 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 3871.75*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1250.04      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1906.17*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level 
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Table D.15 Relationship between Scale Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel Tobit 
Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.32* 0.05 6.13 0 
LIVDINCP -0.19* 0.01 -13.23 0 
CROPINCP -0.26* 0.01 -20.48 0 
CWINCP -0.70* 0.06 -10.8 0 
TDTA 0.02*** 0.01 1.68 0.092 
CDCA 5.66E-04 0 1.54 0.124 
RNFIAC -7.7E-05* 0 -3.5 0 
OFFIPG 0.17* 0.01 15.69 0 
ROA -0.36* 0.02 -16.23 0 
BASSETS -2.12E-08* 0 -5.01 0 
YEAR 2.13E-04 0 0.4 0.686 
N 4560      
Log Likelihood Function 3326.27*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1358.03      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 1481.24*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level and *** at α = 0.10 level 
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Table D.16 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency for Non-Debt Constrained Farms, 
Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.829 
LIVDINCP -0.52* 0.02 -21.16 0 
CROPINCP -0.54* 0.02 -24.13 0 
CWINCP -1.81* 0.11 -16.03 0 
TDTA -0.01 0.02 -0.42 0.677 
CDCA 4.95E-04 0 0.91 0.365 
RNFIAC -1.71E-04* 0 -5.49 0 
OFFIPG 0.09* 0.02 5.6 0 
ROA -1.09* 0.04 -26.4 0 
BASSETS -4.21E-08* 0 -6.79 0 
YEAR 9.05E-03* 0 9.45 0 
N 2557      
Log Likelihood Function 1148.66*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1908.27      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 454.3*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level  
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Table D.17 Relationship between Overall Efficiency for Debt-Constrained Farms, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.03 0.09 0.34 0.735 
LIVDINCP -0.37* 0.02 -16.84 0 
CROPINCP -0.42* 0.02 -17.94 0 
CWINCP -1.37* 0.10 -13.66 0 
TDTA -0.23* 0.02 -10.4 0 
CDCA -6.3E-04 0 -0.53 0.598 
RNFIAC -1.73E-03* 0 -17.51 0 
OFFIPG 0.07* 0.02 3.72 0 
ROA -0.26* 0.05 -5.7 0 
BASSETS -3.35E-08* 0 -5.78 0 
YEAR 8.12E-03* 0 8.48 0 
N 2001      
Log Likelihood Function 1483.48*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          1628.95      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 159.08*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level  
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Table D.18 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency Basic Model, Panel Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.18* 0.07 2.73 0.006 
LIVDINCP -0.45* 0.02 -25.22 0 
CROPINCP -0.49* 0.02 -29.68 0 
CWINCP -1.60* 0.08 -19.86 0 
TDTA -0.08* 0.01 -5.27 0 
CDCA 5.52E-04 0 1.13 0.257 
RNFIAC -2.9E-04* 0 -9.86 0 
OFFIPG 0.09* 0.01 6.91 0 
ROA -0.90* 0.03 -31.42 0 
BASSETS -4.08E-08* 0 -8.42 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 10.47 0 
N 4650      
Log Likelihood Function 2488.85*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          3072      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 837.9*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level  
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Table D.19 Relationship between Overall Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model, Panel 
Tobit Analysis 
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Standard Error Z Statistic P > Z 
INTERCEPT 0.06 0.08 0.82 0.415 
LIVDINCP -0.51* 0.02 -25.89 0 
CROPINCP -0.56* 0.02 -30.32 0 
CWINCP -1.87* 0.09 -20.49 0 
TDTA 0.12* 0.02 7.2 0 
CDCA 6.18E-04 0 1.15 0.25 
RNFIAC -2.56E-04* 0 -7.92 0 
OFFIPG 0.10* 0.01 6.92 0 
ROA -0.99* 0.03 -30.83 0 
BASSETS -3.61E-08* 0 -6.71 0 
YEAR 0.01* 0 10.41 0 
N 4650      
Log Likelihood Function 1743.90*      
Wald Chi2 (10)          2895.62      
Log L.R.T. Chibar2 (01) = 833.88*      
Note: * indicates significance at α = 0.01 level  
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Appendix E - Definition of Variables and Results of DEA Models 
and Summary Statistics for Debt-Constrained Samples 
Table E.1 Definition of Variables used for Summary Statistics of DEA Results 
Variable Definition 
 General Farm Characteristics 
ID From 1 to 456 
INTEXPR Ratio of Interest Cost by Depreciation 
M55AGE Variable for Operators Older than 55 Years 
MNFI Real Net Farm Income 
OFFI Off-farm Income 
RGFI Real Gross Farm Income 
RNFIAC Real Net Farm Income per Acre 
RVFP Real Value of Farm Production 
TDTA Beginning Total Debt to Beginning Total Asset Ratio 
TYPECROP Dummy Variable for Farms with more than 80% of Income from Crops 
TYPELIVE Dummy Variable for Farms with more than 80% of Income from Livestock 
TYPEMIX Dummy Variable for Farms not in the Other Two Categories 
V013 Operators Age 
V468 Percent of Labor Costs Devoted to Crop Operations 
YEAR Year, from 98 to 107 
 Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
CACRES Total Acres Devoted to Crops 
CAPITA Capital Costs per Acre 
CHEMICA Chemical Costs per Acre 
FERTILA Fertilizer Cost per Acre 
LABORA Labor Costs per Acre 
LAND Total Operated Acres 
LANDA Land Costs per Acre 
LIVESA Livestock Costs per Acre 
PCAPE Percent of Short-term and Intermediate-term Capital 
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Table E.1 Continued   
Variable Definition 
PCROPE Percent of Crop Costs 
PCROPI Percent of Income from Crop Operations 
PCWKI Percent of Income from Custom Work 
PLABORE Percent of Labor Costs 
PLANDE Percent of Land Costs  
PLIVDE Percent of Livestock Costs 
PLIVDI Percent of  Income from Livestock Operations 
POWNA Percent of Acres Owned 
PPASTA Percent of Acres Devoted to Pasture 
SEEDA Seed Costs per Acre 
 Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
AE Allocative Efficiency 
AED Allocative Efficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
OE Overall Efficiency 
OED Overall Efficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
SE Scale Efficiency 
SED Scale Efficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
TE Technical Efficiency 
TED Technical Efficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
 Inefficiencies, Debt-Constrained and Non-Debt Constrained  
AI Allocative Inefficiency 
AID Allocative Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
OI Overall Inefficiency 
OID Overall Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
SI Scale Inefficiency 
SID Scale Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
TI Technical Inefficiency 
TID Technical Inefficiency Debt-Constrained Model 
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Table E.1 Continued 
Variable Definition 
 Differential Efficiency Values for Basic and Debt-Constrained Model 
DAE Difference between AE and AED 
DOE Difference between OE and OED 
DSE Difference between SE and SED 
DTE Difference between TE and TED 
 Non-Constrained and Constrained Farms by Efficiency 
AICONS Allocative Efficiency Score for Constrained Farms in AE Scores 
AINCONS Allocative Efficiency Score for  Non-Constrained Farms in AE Scores 
OICONS Overall Efficiency Score for Constrained Farms in OE Scores 
OINCONS Overall Efficiency Score for  Non-Constrained Farms in OE Scores 
SICONS Scale Inefficiency Score for Constrained Farms in SE Scores 
SINCONS Scale Inefficiency Score for  Non-Constrained Farms in SE Scores 
TICONS Technical Efficiency Score for Constrained Farms in TE Scores 
TINCONS Technical Efficiency Score for  Non-Constrained Farms in TE Scores 
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Table E.2 Summary Statistic for Farms with No Change in Technical Efficiency Score 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  3,683    98  107 
M55AGE  3,683  64  6  56  87 
V013  3,683  55  11  21  87 
TDTA  3,683  0.32  0.24  0  1.19 
V468  3,683  0.78  0.23  0  1 
RGFI  3,683  313,130  272,450  11,264  2,813,310 
RVFP  3,683  285,790  238,784  9,109  2,672,675 
RMFI  3,683  60,985  91,729  -287,988  966,614 
OFFI  3,683  13,136  20,049  0  188,129 
TYPECROP  3,683  0.43    
TYPELIVE  3,683  0.14    
TYPEMIX  3,683  0.43    
INTEXPR  3,683  0.13  0.08  0.01  1.50 
RNFIAC  3,683  35  86  -3,991  627 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  3,683  1,819  1,271  24  10,016 
CACRES  3,683  1,191  856  0  9,472 
PPASTA  3,683  0.30  0.25  0  1 
POWNA  3,683  0.36  0.27  0  1 
PLIVDI  3,683  0.33  0.32  0  1 
PCWKI  3,683  0.02  0.04  0  0.41 
PCROPI  3,683  0.65  0.32  0  1 
PLABORE  3,683  0.22  0.09  0.03  0.69 
CPAPE  3,683  0.38  0.08  0.13  0.72 
PLANDE  3,683  0.10  0.06  0  0.67 
PCROPE  3,683  0.21  0.10  0  0.58 
PLIVDE  3,683  0.09  0.12  0  0.61 
LANDA  3,683  17  10  0  64 
CAPITA  3,683  75  78  6  3,239 
CHEMICA  3,683  10  9  0  175 
FERTILA  3,683  17  15  0  448 
SEEDA  3,683  12  14  0  542 
LIVESA  3,683  26  82  0  2,704 
LABORA  3,683  43  53  5  2,397 
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Table E.2 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  3,683  0.92  0.13  0.31  1 
TED  3,683  0.92  0.13  0.31  1 
AE  3,683  0.81  0.13  0.17  1 
AED  3,683  0.83  0.13  0.26  1 
SE  3,683  0.87  0.15  0.06  1 
SED  3,683  0.88  0.14  0.04  1 
OE  3,683  0.65  0.20  0.01  1 
OED  3,683  0.68  0.21  0.01  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  3,683  0.08  0.13  0  0.69 
OI  3,683  0.35  0.20  0  0.99 
AI  3,683  0.19  0.13  0  0.83 
SI  3,683  0.13  0.15  0  0.94 
TID  3,683  0.08  0.13  0  0.69 
AID  3,683  0.17  0.13  0  0.74 
SID  3,683  0.12  0.14  0  0.96 
OID  3,683  0.32  0.21  0  0.99 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  3,683  0  0  0  0 
DAE  3,683  -0.02  0.06  -0.60  0 
DSE  3,683  -0.01  0.05  -0.56  0.36 
DOE  3,683  -0.03  0.08  -0.64  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  2,506  0.18  0.14  0  0.69 
AICONS  1,176  0.22  0.13  0  0.83 
TICONS  0     
TINCONS  3,683  0.08  0.13  0  0.69 
SICONS  1,437  0.14  0.15  0  0.94 
SINCONS  2,245  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OICONS  1,241  0.32  0.18  0  0.86 
OINCONS  2,441  0.36  0.20  0  0.99 
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Table E.3 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Technical Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  877    98  107 
M55AGE  877  65  6  56  83 
V013  877  56  11  26  83 
TDTA  877  0.11  0.13  0  0.89 
V468  877  0.80  0.19  0.19  1 
RGFI  877  258,248  178,235  12,552  1,759,560 
RVFP  877  243,012  161,532  11,757  1,558,810 
RMFI  877  48,751  63,132  -121,976  423,565 
OFFI  877  12,364  18,896  0  111,986 
TYPECROP  877  0.45    
TYPELIVE  877  0.06    
TYPEMIX  877  0.49    
INTEXPR  877  0.14  0.07  0.04  1.09 
RNFIAC  877  27  34  -93  182 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  877  1,751  849  310  6,472 
CACRES  877  1,168  631  182  5,109 
PPASTA  877  0.31  0.22  0  0.91 
POWNA  877  0.32  0.27  0  1 
PLIVDI  877  0.28  0.26  0  1 
PCWKI  877  0.01  0.03  0  0.21 
PCROPI  877  0.71  0.26  0  1 
PLABORE  877  0.22  0.08  0.08  0.51 
CPAPE  877  0.38  0.07  0.2  0.61 
PLANDE  877  0.11  0.05  0  0.39 
PCROPE  877  0.23  0.08  0.04  0.54 
PLIVDE  877  0.06  0.08  0  0.46 
LANDA  877  17  9  0  52 
CAPITA  877  65  28  15  258 
CHEMICA  877  11  7  0  52 
FERTILA  877  17  10  0  92 
SEEDA  877  12  9  0  67 
LIVESA  877  12  28  0  327 
LABORA  877  37  20  6  154 
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Table E.3 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  877  0.80  0.12  0.35  0.99 
TED  877  0.89  0.12  0.36  1 
AE  877  0.77  0.10  0.39  1 
AED  877  0.79  0.12  0.36  1 
SE  877  0.87  0.13  0.23  1 
SED  877  0.90  0.11  0.17  1 
OE  877  0.54  0.14  0.07  1 
OED  877  0.64  0.16  0.07  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  877  0.20  0.12  0.01  0.65 
OI  877  0.46  0.14  0.10  0.93 
AI  877  0.23  0.10  0.01  0.61 
SI  877  0.13  0.13  0  0.77 
TID  877  0.11  0.12  0  0.64 
AID  877  0.21  0.12  0  0.64 
SID  877  0.10  0.11  0  0.83 
OID  877  0.36  0.16  0  0.93 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  877  -0.09  0.09  -0.48  -0.01 
DAE  877  -0.02  0.09  -0.49  0.27 
DSE  877  -0.03  0.09  -0.47  0.45 
DOE  877  -0.09  0.11  -0.61  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  0  
AICONS  877  0.23  0.10  0.01  0.61 
TICONS  877  0.20  0.12  0.01  0.65 
TINCONS  0      
SICONS  808  0.13  0.13  0  0.77 
SINCONS  69  0.12  0.13  0  0.53 
OICONS  760  0.45  0.13  0.10  0.89 
OINCONS  117  0.48  0.14  0.20  0.93 
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Table E.4 Summary Statistics for Farms with No Change in Allocative Efficiency Scores  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  2,506    98  107 
M55AGE  2,506  64  6  56  87 
V013  2,506  54  10  26  87 
TDTA  2,506  0.39  0.22  0.00  1.19 
V468  2,506  0.77  0.23  0.00  1.00 
RGFI  2,506  331,269  295,738  11,264  2,813,310 
RVFP  2,506  300,025  256,554  9,109  2,672,675 
RMFI  2,506  59,900  98,271  -287,988  966,614 
OFFI  2,506  13,947  20,717  0  188,129 
TYPECROP  2,506  0.42    
TYPELIVE  2,506  0.15    
TYPEMIX  2,506  0.43    
INTEXPR  2,506  0.13  0.08  0.01  1.50 
RNFIAC  2,506  33  100  -3,991  627 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  2,506  1,848  1,314  24  10,016 
CACRES  2,506  1,208  878  0  9,472 
PPASTA  2,506  0.31  0.25  0  1 
POWNA  2,506  0.37  0.26  0  1 
PLIVDI  2,506  0.34  0.32  0  1 
PCWKI  2,506  0.02  0.05  0  0.41 
PCROPI  2,506  0.64  0.32  0  1 
PLABORE  2,506  0.21  0.08  0.04  0.66 
CPAPE  2,506  0.38  0.08  0.13  0.72 
PLANDE  2,506  0.10  0.06  0  0.67 
PCROPE  2,506  0.21  0.10  0  0.58 
PLIVDE  2,506  0.10  0.12  0  0.57 
LANDA  2,506  17  9  0  59 
CAPITA  2,506  77  90  6  3,239 
CHEMICA  2,506  11  9  0  175 
FERTILA  2,506  18  15  0  448 
SEEDA  2,506  12  15  0  542 
LIVESA  2,506  30  92  0  2,704 
LABORA  2,506  43  60  5  2,397 
  
 224
Table E.4 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  2,506  0.90  0.14  0.34  1 
TED  2,506  0.90  0.14  0.34  1 
AE  2,506  0.82  0.14  0.31  1 
AED  2,506  0.82  0.14  0.31  1 
SE  2,506  0.87  0.15  0.18  1 
SED  2,506  0.88  0.15  0.18  1 
OE  2,506  0.65  0.21  0.09  1 
OED  2,506  0.66  0.21  0.09  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  2,506  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
OI  2,506  0.35  0.21  0  0.91 
AI  2,506  0.18  0.14  0  0.69 
SI  2,506  0.13  0.15  0  0.82 
TID  2,506  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
AID  2,506  0.18  0.14  0  0.69 
SID  2,506  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OID  2,506  0.34  0.21  0  0.91 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  2,506  0  0  0  0 
DAE  2,506  0  0  0  0 
DSE  2,506  -5E-03  0.03  -0.46  0 
DOE  2,506  -5E-03  0.03  -0.46  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  2,506  0.18  0.14  0  0.69 
AICONS  0     
TICONS  0     
TINCONS  2,506  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
SICONS  261  0.17  0.17  0  0.68 
SINCONS  2,245  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OICONS  261  0.29  0.21  0  0.78 
OINCONS  2,245  0.35  0.21  0  0.91 
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Table E.5 Summary Statistics for Farms with Negative Change in Allocative Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  464    98  107 
M55AGE  464  65  6  56  83 
V013  464  55  11  26  83 
TDTA  464  0.13  0.13  0  0.89 
V468  464  0.80  0.18  0.21  1 
RGFI  464  250,716  180,265  12,552  1,759,560 
RVFP  464  235,140  160,670  11,757  1,558,810 
RMFI  464  40,204  56,226  -121,976  338,674 
OFFI  464  13,664  19,823  0  107,103 
TYPECROP  464  0.43    
TYPELIVE  464  0.06    
TYPEMIX  464  0.51    
INTEXPR  464  0.14  0.08  0.04  1.09 
RNFIAC  464  24  35  -93  289 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  464  1,744  837  296  ,472 
CACRES  464  1,163  603  182  4,240 
PPASTA  464  0.31  0.22  0  0.86 
POWNA  464  0.31  0.26  0  1 
PLIVDI  464  0.29  0.26  0  1 
PCWKI  464  0.01  0.03  0  0.21 
PCROPI  464  0.70  0.26  0  1 
PLABORE  464  0.21  0.07  0.08  0.5 
CPAPE  464  0.38  0.06  0.21  0.58 
PLANDE  464  0.11  0.05  0  0.39 
PCROPE  464  0.23  0.08  0.05  0.54 
PLIVDE  464  0.06  0.08  0  0.4 
LANDA  464  17  9  0  51 
CAPITA  464  65  28  15  258 
CHEMICA  464  11  8  0  52 
FERTILA  464  17  11  1  92 
SEEDA  464  12  10  0  67 
LIVESA  464  12  26  0  287 
LABORA  464  36  20  6  187 
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Table E.5 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  464  0.78  0.13  0.35  1 
TED  464  0.87  0.13  0.36  1 
AE  464  0.78  0.10  0.39  1 
AED  464  0.74  0.11  0.36  1 
SE  464  0.86  0.14  0.23  1 
SED  464  0.89  0.12  0.17  1 
OE  464  0.53  0.14  0.07  1 
OED  464  0.58  0.14  0.07  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  464  0.22  0.13  0  0.65 
OI  464  0.47  0.14  0.15  0.93 
AI  464  0.22  0.10  0  0.61 
SI  464  0.14  0.14  0  0.77 
TID  464  0.13  0.13  0  0.64 
AID  464  0.26  0.11  0  0.64 
SID  464  0.11  0.12  0  0.83 
OID  464  0.42  0.14  0  0.93 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  464  -0.09  0.09  -0.48  0 
DAE  464  0.04  0.04  0  0.27 
DSE  464  -0.03  0.07  -0.40  0.14 
DOE  464  -0.05  0.07  -0.38  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  0     
AICONS  464  0.22  0.10  0  0.61 
TICONS  463  0.22  0.13  0.01  0.65 
TINCONS  1  0  0  0  0 
SICONS  395  0.14  0.14  0  0.77 
SINCONS  69  0.12  0.13  0  0.53 
OICONS  358  0.47  0.14  0.15  0.89 
OINCONS  106  0.48  0.14  0.20  0.93 
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Table E.6 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Allocative Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  1,590  98  107 
M55AGE  1,590  66  7  56  87 
V013  1,590  56  11  21  87 
TDTA  1,590  0.15  0.17  0  1.07 
V468  1,590  0.79  0.22  0  1 
RGFI  1,590  272,684  201,380  24,929  1,404,635 
RVFP  1,590  254,757  185,031  24,120  1,371,337 
RMFI  1,590  62,116  74,261  -238,608  590,478 
OFFI  1,590  11,286  18,243  0  145,603 
TYPECROP  1,590  0.46 
TYPELIVE  1,590  0.10   
TYPEMIX  1,590  0.45 
INTEXPR  1,590  0.13  0.07  0.02  1.36 
RNFIAC  1,590  37  42  -201  349 
Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  1,590  1,757  1,101  137  9,548 
CACRES  1,590  1,161  773  0  6,148 
PPASTA  1,590  0.31  0.24  0  1 
POWNA  1,590  0.34  0.28  0  1 
PLIVDI  1,590  0.30  0.30  0  1 
PCWKI  1,590  0.02  0.04  0  0.28 
PCROPI  1,590  0.68  0.30  0  1 
PLABORE  1,590  0.23  0.10  0.03  0.69 
CPAPE  1,590  0.38  0.08  0.17  0.63 
PLANDE  1,590  0.11  0.06  0  0.34 
PCROPE  1,590  0.21  0.09  0.01  0.52 
PLIVDE  1,590  0.07  0.11  0  0.61 
LANDA  1,590  17  10  0  64 
CAPITA  1,590  68  37  9  361 
CHEMICA  1,590  10  9  0  70 
FERTILA  1,590  17  12  0  119 
SEEDA  1,590  11  10  0  110 
LIVESA  1,590  17  46  0  550 
LABORA  1,590  42  30  5  330 
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Table E.6 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  1,590  0.93  0.11  0.31  1 
TED  1,590  0.95  0.10  0.31  1 
AE  1,590  0.78  0.12  0.17  1 
AED  1,590  0.85  0.13  0.26  1 
SE  1,590  0.87  0.14  0.06  1 
SED  1,590  0.90  0.13  0.04  1 
OE  1,590  0.63  0.17  0.01  1 
OED  1,590  0.73  0.18  0.01  1 
Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  1,590  0.07  0.11  0  0.69 
OI  1,590  0.37  0.17  0.01  0.99 
AI  1,590  0.22  0.12  0  0.83 
SI  1,590  0.13  0.14  0  0.94 
TID  1,590  0.05  0.10  0  0.69 
AID  1,590  0.15  0.13  0  0.74 
SID  1,590  0.10  0.13  0  0.96 
OID  1,590  0.27  0.18  0  0.99 
Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  1,590  -0.02  0.06  -0.42  0.28 
DAE  1,590  -0.07  0.09  -0.60  0 
DSE  1,590  -0.02  0.09  -0.56  0.45 
DOE  1,590  -0.10  0.12  -0.64  0 
Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  0 
AICONS  1,590  0.22  0.12  0  0.83 
TICONS  415  0.17  0.11  0  0.61 
TINCONS  1,175  0.03  0.09  0  0.69 
SICONS  1,590  0.13  0.14  0  0.94 
SINCONS  0 
OICONS  1,383  0.36  0.16  0.01  0.86 
OINCONS  207  0.39  0.18  0.03  0.99 
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Table E.7 Summary Statistics for Farms for No Change in Scale Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  2,314    98  107 
M55AGE  2,314  63  6  56  86 
V013  2,314  54  10  26  86 
TDTA  2,314  0.41  0.22  0  1.19 
V468  2,314  0.77  0.23  0  1 
RGFI  2,314  328,828  287,114  11,264  2,813,310 
RVFP  2,314  297,513  248,236  9,109  2,672,675 
RMFI  2,314  56,302  94,157  -287,988  966,614 
OFFI  2,314  14,184  20,951  0  188,129 
TYPECROP  2,314  0.42    
TYPELIVE  2,314  0.15    
TYPEMIX  2,314  0.43    
INTEXPR  2,314  0.13  0.07  0.01  1.50 
RNFIAC  2,314  31  102  -3,991  627 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  2,314  1,834  1,214  24  10,016 
CACRES  2,314  1,201  825  17  9,472 
PPASTA  2,314  0.30  0.24  0  0.97 
POWNA  2,314  0.37  0.26  0  1 
PLIVDI  2,314  0.34  0.32  0  1 
PCWKI  2,314  0.02  0.04  0  0.41 
PCROPI  2,314  0.64  0.32  0  1 
PLABORE  2,314  0.21  0.08  0.04  0.58 
CPAPE  2,314  0.38  0.08  0.13  0.72 
PLANDE  2,314  0.10  0.06  0  0.67 
PCROPE  2,314  0.22  0.10  0  0.55 
PLIVDE  2,314  0.10  0.12  0  0.57 
LANDA  2,314  17  9  0  59 
CAPITA  2,314  78  91  6  3,239 
CHEMICA  2,314  11  9  0  175 
FERTILA  2,314  18  15  0  448 
SEEDA  2,314  12  15  0  542 
LIVESA  2,314  30  93  0  2,704 
LABORA  2,314  43  61  5  2,397 
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Table E.7 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  2,314  0.89  0.14  0.34  1 
TED  2,314  0.89  0.14  0.34  1 
AE  2,314  0.81  0.13  0.31  1 
AED  2,314  0.81  0.13  0.31  1 
SE  2,314  0.88  0.15  0.18  1 
SED  2,314  0.88  0.15  0.18  1 
OE  2,314  0.64  0.21  0.09  1 
OED  2,314  0.64  0.21  0.09  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  2,314  0.11  0.14  0  0.66 
OI  2,314  0.36  0.21  0  0.91 
AI  2,314  0.19  0.13  0  0.69 
SI  2,314  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
TID  2,314  0.11  0.14  0  0.66 
AID  2,314  0.19  0.13  0  0.69 
SID  2,314  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OID  2,314  0.36  0.21  0  0.91 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  2,314  -8E-04  0.01  -0.15  0 
DAE  2,314  7E-04  0.01  0  0.12 
DSE  2,314  0  0  0  0 
DOE  2,314  0  0  0  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  2,245  0.19  0.13  0  0.69 
AICONS  69  0.26  0.11  0.08  0.61 
TICONS  69  0.20  0.12  0.01  0.50 
TINCONS  2,245  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
SICONS  0     
SINCONS  2,314  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OICONS  0     
OINCONS  2,314  0.36  0.21  0  0.91 
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Table E.8 Summary Statistics for Farms with a Positive Change in Scale Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  1,435    98  107 
M55AGE  1,435  66  7  56  87 
V013  1,435  57  11  21  87 
TDTA  1,435  0.13  0.16  0  1.07 
V468  1,435  0.79  0.21  0  1 
RGFI  1,435  262,910  223,939  12,552  1,759,560 
RVFP  1,435  245,404  204,068  11,757  1,558,810 
RMFI  1,435  60,925  81,530  -238,608  887,884 
OFFI  1,435  11,100  17,733  0  116,255 
TYPECROP  1,435  0.42    
TYPELIVE  1,435  0.10    
TYPEMIX  1,435  0.48    
INTEXPR  1,435  0.14  0.09  0.03  1.36 
RNFIAC  1,435  35  43  -125  312 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  1,435  1,744  1,215  137  9,573 
CACRES  1,435  1,132  839  0  6,373 
PPASTA  1,435  0.32  0.25  0  1 
POWNA  1,435  0.35  0.29  0  1 
PLIVDI  1,435  0.32  0.30  0  1 
PCWKI  1,435  0.02  0.04  0  0.34 
PCROPI  1,435  0.66  0.30  0  1 
PLABORE  1,435  0.24  0.10  0.06  0.69 
CPAPE  1,435  0.38  0.08  0.16  0.61 
PLANDE  1,435  0.10  0.06  0  0.39 
PCROPE  1,435  0.21  0.09  0.01  0.58 
PLIVDE  1,435  0.07  0.10  0  0.61 
LANDA  1,435  16  10  0  54 
CAPITA  1,435  66  41  13  978 
CHEMICA  1,435  10  8  0  53 
FERTILA  1,435  16  12  0  117 
SEEDA  1,435  11  10  0  84 
LIVESA  1,435  16  46  0  920 
LABORA  1,435  42  29  5  303 
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Table E.8 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  1,435  0.91  0.13  0.35  1 
TED  1,435  0.95  0.11  0.36  1 
AE  1,435  0.80  0.13  0.27  1 
AED  1,435  0.85  0.14  0.36  1 
SE  1,435  0.85  0.15  0.23  1 
SED  1,435  0.91  0.12  0.27  1 
OE  1,435  0.62  0.18  0.11  1 
OED  1,435  0.73  0.19  0.18  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  1,435  0.09  0.13  0  0.65 
OI  1,435  0.38  0.18  0  0.89 
AI  1,435  0.20  0.13  0  0.73 
SI  1,435  0.15  0.15  0  0.77 
TID  1,435  0.05  0.11  0  0.64 
AID  1,435  0.15  0.14  0  0.64 
SID  1,435  0.09  0.12  0  0.73 
OID  1,435  0.27  0.19  0  0.82 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  1,435  -0.04  0.07  -0.48  0 
DAE  1,435  -0.04  0.09  -0.45  0.27 
DSE  1,435  -0.06  0.08  -0.56  0 
DOE  1,435  -0.11  0.12  -0.64  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  261  0.11  0.14  0  0.58 
AICONS  1,174  0.22  0.12  0  0.73 
TICONS  514  0.20  0.12  0  0.65 
TINCONS  921  0.03  0.09  0  0.55 
SICONS  1,435  0.15  0.15  0  0.77 
SINCONS  0      
OICONS  1,435  0.38  0.18  0  0.89 
OINCONS  0      
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Table E.9 Summary Statistics for Farms with Negative Change in Scale Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  811    98  107 
M55AGE  811  65  6  56  84 
V013  811  55  11  27  84 
TDTA  811  0.19  0.18  0  1.03 
V468  811  0.80  0.21  0.05  1 
RGFI  811  298,245  213,304  27,999  1,404,635 
RVFP  811  277,966  190,864  26,141  1,371,337 
RMFI  811  61,428  74,818  -212,036  571,863 
OFFI  811  12,929  19,830  0  145,603 
TYPECROP  811  0.50    
TYPELIVE  811  0.09    
TYPEMIX  811  0.41    
INTEXPR  811  0.12  0.06  0.02  0.65 
RNFIAC  811  35  42  -201  349 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  811  1,834  1,138  147  9,548 
CACRES  811  1,242  751  40  6,148 
PPASTA  811  0.28  0.23  0  0.97 
POWNA  811  0.31  0.26  0  1 
PLIVDI  811  0.27  0.29  0  1 
PCWKI  811  0.02  0.04  0  0.26 
PCROPI  811  0.71  0.29  0  1 
PLABORE  811  0.22  0.09  0.03  0.57 
CPAPE  811  0.38  0.07  0.2  0.63 
PLANDE  811  0.11  0.06  0  0.3 
PCROPE  811  0.23  0.09  0.02  0.48 
PLIVDE  811  0.07  0.11  0  0.56 
LANDA  811  18  10  0  64 
CAPITA  811  70  39  9  361 
CHEMICA  811  12  9  0  70 
FERTILA  811  18  13  0  119 
SEEDA  811  12  11  0  110 
LIVESA  811  18  48  0  530 
LABORA  811  40  29  5  330 
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Table E.9 Continued 
  Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  811  0.91  0.13  0.31  1 
TED  811  0.93  0.11  0.31  1 
AE  811  0.77  0.11  0.17  1 
AED  811  0.82  0.12  0.26  1 
SE  811  0.90  0.13  0.06  1 
SED  811  0.87  0.13  0.04  1 
OE  811  0.63  0.16  0.01  1 
OED  811  0.67  0.17  0.01  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  811  0.09  0.13  0  0.69 
OI  811  0.37  0.16  0  0.99 
AI  811  0.23  0.11  0  0.83 
SI  811  0.10  0.13  0  0.94 
TID  811  0.07  0.11  0  0.69 
AID  811  0.18  0.12  0  0.74 
SID  811  0.13  0.13  0  0.96 
OID  811  0.33  0.17  0  0.99 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  811  -0.03  0.06  -0.46  0.28 
DAE  811  -0.05  0.09  -0.60  0.22 
DSE  811  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.45 
DOE  811  -0.04  0.07  -0.43  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  0     
AICONS  811  0.23  0.11  0  0.83 
TICONS  295  0.19  0.12  0  0.60 
TINCONS  516  0.04  0.09  0  0.69 
SICONS  811  0.10  0.13  0  0.94 
SINCONS  0     
OICONS  567  0.35  0.14  0  0.86 
OINCONS  244  0.40  0.18  0  0.99 
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Table E.10 Summary Statistics for Farms with Positive Change in Overall Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  2,002    98  107 
M55AGE  2,002  66  7  56  87 
V013  2,002  57  11  21  87 
TDTA  2,002  0.14  0.16  0  1.07 
V468  2,002  0.79  0.21  0  1 
RGFI  2,002  277,553  221,373  12,552  1,759,560 
RVFP  2,002  259,184  201,004  11,757  1,558,810 
RMFI  2,002  62,843  80,492  -238,608  887,884 
OFFI  2,002  11,194  17,931  0  116,255 
TYPECROP  2,002  0.44    
TYPELIVE  2,002  0.09    
TYPEMIX  2,002  0.46    
INTEXPR  2,002  0.13  0.08  0.03  1.36 
RNFIAC  2,002  36  42  -125  312 
  Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  2,002  1,798  1,206  137  9,573 
CACRES  2,002  1,181  822  0  6,373 
PPASTA  2,002  0.31  0.24  0  1 
POWNA  2,002  0.34  0.28  0  1 
PLIVDI  2,002  0.30  0.30  0  1 
PCWKI  2,002  0.02  0.04  0  0.34 
PCROPI  2,002  0.68  0.29  0  1 
PLABORE  2,002  0.23  0.09  0.03  0.69 
CPAPE  2,002  0.38  0.08  0.16  0.61 
PLANDE  2,002  0.11  0.06  0  0.39 
PCROPE  2,002  0.21  0.09  0.01  0.58 
PLIVDE  2,002  0.07  0.10  0  0.61 
LANDA  2,002  17  10  0  64 
CAPITA  2,002  67  40  9  978 
CHEMICA  2,002  10  8  0  70 
FERTILA  2,002  17  12  0  119 
SEEDA  2,002  11  10  0  110 
LIVESA  2,002  16  46  0  920 
LABORA  2,002  41  28  5  303 
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Table E.10 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  2,002  0.91  0.13  0.31  1 
TED  2,002  0.95  0.11  0.31  1 
AE  2,002  0.79  0.12  0.27  1 
AED  2,002  0.84  0.13  0.36  1 
SE  2,002  0.87  0.14  0.23  1 
SED  2,002  0.90  0.12  0.27  1 
OE  2,002  0.63  0.17  0.11  1 
OED  2,002  0.72  0.18  0.14  1 
  Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TI  2,002  0.09  0.13  0  0.69 
OI  2,002  0.37  0.17  0  0.89 
AI  2,002  0.21  0.12  0  0.73 
SI  2,002  0.13  0.14  0  0.77 
TID  2,002  0.05  0.11  0  0.69 
AID  2,002  0.16  0.13  0  0.64 
SID  2,002  0.10  0.12  0  0.73 
OID  2,002  0.28  0.18  0  0.86 
  Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  2,002  -0.04  0.07  -0.48  0.28 
DAE  2,002  -0.05  0.09  -0.60  0.27 
DSE  2,002  -0.03  0.09  -0.56  0.45 
DOE  2,002  -0.10  0.11  -0.64  0 
  Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  261  0.11  0.14  0  0.58 
AICONS  1,741  0.22  0.11  0  0.73 
TICONS  761  0.19  0.12  0  0.65 
TINCONS  1,241  0.03  0.09  0  0.69 
SICONS  2,002  0.13  0.14  0  0.77 
SINCONS  0     
OICONS  2,002  0.37  0.17  0  0.89 
OINCONS  0     
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Table E.11 Summary Statistics for Farms with No Change in Overall Efficiency 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 General Farm Characteristics 
YEAR  2,558    98  107 
M55AGE  2,558  63  6  56  86 
V013  2,558  54  10  26  86 
TDTA  2,558  0.39  0.22  0  1.19 
V468  2,558  0.77  0.23  0  1 
RGFI  2,558  322,283  281,761  11,264  2,813,310 
RVFP  2,558  292,081  243,892  9,109  2,672,675 
RMFI  2,558  55,401  91,850  -287,988  966,614 
OFFI  2,558  14,396  21,098  0  188,129 
TYPECROP  2,558  0.43    
TYPELIVE  2,558  0.14    
TYPEMIX  2,558  0.43    
INTEXPR  2,558  0.13  0.07  0.01  1.50 
RNFIAC  2,558  31  98  -3,991  627 
 Inputs and Outputs, Units and Percents 
LAND  2,558  1,812  1,199  24  10,016 
CACRES  2,558  1,191  814  17  9,472 
PPASTA  2,558  0.30  0.24  0  0.97 
POWNA  2,558  0.37  0.26  0  1 
PLIVDI  2,558  0.33  0.32  0  1 
PCWKI  2,558  0.02  0.04  0  0.41 
PCROPI  2,558  0.65  0.31  0  1 
PLABORE  2,558  0.21  0.08  0.04  0.58 
CPAPE  2,558  0.38  0.08  0.13  0.72 
PLANDE  2,558  0.10  0.06  0  0.67 
PCROPE  2,558  0.22  0.10  0  0.55 
PLIVDE  2,558  0.09  0.12  0  0.57 
LANDA  2,558  17  9  0  61 
CAPITA  2,558  77  88  6  3,239 
CHEMICA  2,558  11  9  0  175 
FERTILA  2,558  18  15  0  448 
SEEDA  2,558  12  15  0  542 
LIVESA  2,558  29  90  0  2,704 
LABORA  2,558  43  60  5  2,397 
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Table E.11 Continued 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Efficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model 
TE  2,558  0.89  0.14  0.34  1 
TED  2,558  0.90  0.14  0.34  1 
AE  2,558  0.81  0.13  0.17  1 
AED  2,558  0.81  0.13  0.26  1 
SE  2,558  0.87  0.15  0.06  1 
SED  2,558  0.87  0.15  0.04  1 
OE  2,558  0.64  0.20  0.01  1 
OED  2,558  0.64  0.20  0.01  1 
 Inefficiencies, Basic and Constrained Model  
TI  2,558  0.11  0.14  0  0.66 
OI  2,558  0.36  0.20  0  0.99 
AI  2,558  0.19  0.13  0  0.83 
SI  2,558  0.13  0.15  0  0.94 
TID  2,558  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
AID  2,558  0.19  0.13  0  0.74 
SID  2,558  0.13  0.15  0  0.96 
OID  2,558  0.36  0.20  0  0.99 
 Differential Efficiency Values for Debt-Constrained Model 
DTE  2,558  0.00  0.01  -0.20  0 
DAE  2,558  0.00  0.01  -0.24  0.20 
DSE  2,558  0.00  0.01  0  0.14 
DOE  2,558  0  0  0  0 
 Constrained Farms but not by Efficiency 
AINCONS  2,245  0.19  0.13  0  0.69 
AICONS  313  0.22  0.12  0  0.83 
TICONS  117  0.21  0.13  0.01  0.60 
TINCONS  2,441  0.10  0.14  0  0.66 
SICONS  244  0.17  0.17  0  0.94 
SINCONS  2,314  0.12  0.15  0  0.82 
OICONS  0      
OINCONS  2,558  0.36  0.20  0  0.99 
 
